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The thesis initially aims to expand on the prescriptive social loss model
by incorporating differing views about the role of punishment and the
effects thereof upon the original model. Utilitarian, retributive, re¬
habilitative, and expressive roles and their potential combinations are
examined. Their incorporation into the original model leads to a series
of opposing 'optimum' positions. It is concluded that no generally
acceptable optimum position may be derived. Despite this indeterminancy
a common basis of all the prescriptive models is deterrence. So the thesis
proceeds to comprehensively measure for the existence of a deterrent effect.
A descriptive macro-crime supply model for Scotland is developed for regional
annual property crime rates (Class Two and Three) over the period 1970-1978.
The basis of the model is embodied in three relationships: the crime rate,
certainty and expenditure functions. This model is tested and results
analysed using a time series cross section simultaneous log-linear equation
framework. Additionally relationships accounting for: recording effects,
differences in perceptions, and severity effects are incorporated. Finally
the effect of both structural change (1973 Local Government Act) and inter¬
regional differences (eight regional forces) are analysed.
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THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
1.1. Introduction
In economic theory individuals are assumed to make choices according to the
consequences they perceive. Deterrence may be defined as the choice not to
commit a criminal act in response to a perceived risk of punishment: "man
may be controlled by his fear of punishment".1 This thesis analyses the
implications for society of this assumed response to punishment.
Initial theoretical assumptions (necessarily) constrain the questions economists
attempt to answer. However they sometimes (unnecessarily) constrain their
answers. The economic theory of crime and its punishment poses two major
questions:
1. how do potential offenders respond to changes in expected
punishment levels: and,
2. given their response, what punishment levels are the most
efficient?
Initially assuming punishment is a price, the law a price list, economic theory
prevents the economist from stating that punishment is NOT a deterrent.
Consequently the answer to (b) is obvious: the most efficient level of
punishment is that which deters the most offences at the least social cost.
The present study contends that even if punishment is a deterrent, this second
answer is not necessarily correct. Reformulating the second question as:
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() how does one know if existing criminal justice practices
are inefficient?;
one cannot answer this question by 'knowing' the answer to (a). Only
knowledge of the purpose of existing practices allows one to determine if they
are inefficiently achieved. The first and primary aim of the present study is to
outline the possible roles that punishment (means) are believed to fulfil (ends).
Utilitarian, retributive, rehabilitative and expressive roles, and their potential
combinations, are examined. On assumption of at least partial acceptance of
the economic approach in determining criminal justice policy (i.e. minimizing
social loss) the effects of incorporating these views into the basic social loss
model are illustrated. However it is found that the question of whether
practices are optimal (c)' is indeterminate; if punishment serves other goals
than deterrence the potential conflict among these goals cannot be resolved
on utilitarian grounds. What may potentially be resolved is acceptance of the
economic approach itself since this fundamentally depends upon potential
offenders' assumed response to punishment, i.e. that punishment deters.
The second aim of the present study is therefore addressed at (a). An
econometric model is developed of the Scottish Criminal Justice System for
aggregate property crime rates over the period of 1970 to 1978. The basis of
the model is embodied in three relationships: the crime rate function, the
certainty function, and the expenditure function. Additionally relationships
accounting for (any) recording effects, differences in perceptions and severity
effects are also incorporated. Finally the effects of both structural change
(1973 Local Government Act) and inter-regional differences (eight regional
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forces) are also analysed. The model is estimated and results reported using
a simultaneous log-linear equation framework. While there is limited evidence
of deterrence, the results obtained do not provide a sufficient platform upon
which to draw conclusions about the relevance of the economic model to
actual Scottish Criminal Justice System practices.
The purpose of Chapter One is to provide an introduction and analysis of
BECKER'S original 'prescriptive social loss model', ("Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach", Journal of Political Economy 1968) and a survey of the
resultant literature, analysing both criticisms of Becker's model and the
implications derived.
Emphasis throughout is placed on the social loss model for two reasons.
Firstly models of the decision to commit an offence have been fully developed
elsewhere. They show that if the time allocated to legal and illegal activity is
introduced explicitly into utility functions no comparative static results are
forthcoming under traditional preference restrictions, and furthermore, no
conclusions may be drawn concerning behaviour toward risk. This restricts
the possible interpretations to be placed on any theoretically postulated
deterrent effects (vis a vis risk) while emphasizing the need to determine
empirically if such effects exist at all.
Secondly, as indicated in the conclusion to this chapter, Becker's original
social loss model has not been fully developed to take account of different
views of the Criminal Justice System's purpose. While the incorporation of
such views is developed in Chapter Two, concentration is placed on the
original model in this chapter in order to provide a basis from which to
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include these incorporations, while also indicating that in the social loss
model, the 'optimum level of punishment' does not depend nor (necessarily)
imply anything about preferences for risk.
1.2. Assumptions
Economics is concerned with the optimum use of scarce resources. In the
field of crime and punishment therefore economics deals with the normative
question: 'how many of society's scarce resources should be devoted to crime
prevention?' The first attempt to answer this question was formulated by
Becker who stated that the optimum solution is that which minimizes the
social loss from crime in order that society has the maximum resources left to
use for other purposes. Since Becker's model provides, if not the basis, at
least a catalyst for all recent studies it is of central importance that the
assumptions and implications of this model are understood. In outlining the
model due weight is given to the criticism of others.
Analysing potential changes in policy requires the stability of some frame of
reference. Becker assumes that the definition of 'crime' is given. This
assumption bypasses two problems. Firstly defining crime in terms of specific
actions since the definition of crime differs over societies: "a property owning
society will define deviance with respect to its property owning concepts... a
nomadic society will regard deviance from its norms as actionable .... a
religious society will define deviance beyond certain limits as heresy",
(L.T. WILKINS. 1964). Secondly, evaluating the political process whereby certain
behaviour is judged to be criminal. There are two reasons for this. The
determination of society's values lies outwith economic theory, "it requires a
political theory rather than an individualistic ethical theory to account for
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policies and goals whose chief commendation to a substantial minority of
people is that their acceptance spares them a term in "jail". (G.J. STIGLER,
1965). Furthermore, economists necessarily wish to stress the need to analyse
efficient resource use given society's values for: "an operational system for
criminal justice cannot be evaluated in categorical terms of ethics or
jurisprudence alone. To do so would eliminate for consideration the
constraints placed on society by the limits of technology and resource
availability and the fundamental choices which these limitations require"
(R.C. LIND and J.P.J. LIPSKEY, 1971)
Given that the definition of crime is known, in order to minimise social loss
the concept of 'social loss' itself has to be defined. This Becker does by
specifying a social loss function. The first component of Becker's social loss
function is the net damages from offences:
D(O) = H(O) - G(O)
(1)
D(O) is the level of damages that result from offences 0 and is obtained by
subtracting the gain to offenders G(O) from the harm done to others H(O).
Further:
G' > 0 G" < 0 and H' > O H" > 0
(1a)
as offences increase so do gains and harm, gains at a diminishing rate and
harm at an increasing rate. Crime being an 'externality' the offender obtains
9
diminishing marginal utility from his actions, the victim, increasing marginal
costs. Becker restricts his analysis to the region where net damages are
positive (i.e. D > 0), arguing that where D' < 0 an extra offence is 'beneficial'
(i.e. involves no social loss) because the gains to the offender outweigh the
losses to the rest of society. This view has led others to criticise the
punishment of 'victimless crimes'. These crimes are. "victimless in the sense
that the persons punished as criminals do not consider themselves as victims
since they willingly seek illegal transactions" (D. GLASER, 1973), in the absence
of legal prohibition such transactions could be regarded as ordinary exchange
trade. For if these activities cause no damage (i.e. D' (O) < O) by considering
them as 'crimes' society is wasting scarce resources on their control.2
By redefining these activities as legitimate such resources could be used to
achieve other 'more desirable' ends. However even if the social cost of
victimless crimes is to consider them crimes others argue that for theft (and
presumably other offences) there is no offence level where D' (O) < O. "The
community should treat losses sustained by victims as a net cost, without
offset for the benefits obtained by the thieves" (R.L. CARTER, 1974); society
should assign a zero welfare significance to offender's gains. For even if in
utility terms no apparent net social loss results (i.e. D' (O) < 0), the
transaction is still a 'contested transfer' (G. TULLOCK, 1971). Social costs arise
because both parties use resources to contest the transfer: both have an
incentive to prevent the success of the other. Net damages should therefore
be regarded as the subjective value of harm only.
The second component of Becker's social loss function is the 'cost of
apprehension and conviction':
10
C = f(0, p)
(2)
public expenditure on the Criminal Justice System (C.J.S.) is a function of the
probability of conviction p and the level of offences 0. Further
Cp > 0 Cpp > O
(2a)
given offences, costs increase as the probability of conviction increases as
does marginal cost: apprehension risk is positively related to police resources
where these resources display decreasing marginal productivity. Additionally,
C0 > O C00 > 0
(2b)
given the probability of conviction, costs increase as offences increase as
does marginal cost: with decreasing marginal productivity the cost of
maintaining a given level of p increases (at an increasing rate) as offences
increase.





where b is the co-efficient that transforms punishment per offence into the
social loss per offence punished, and p. O is the total number of offences
punished. The size of b varies between punishments, b = O for fines, since
fines produce a gain to 'others' that should equal the costs to an offender,
aside from collection costs i.e. fines are 'transfer payments'. Whereas b > 0
for imprisonment: imprisonment adds to social loss by absorbing scarce
resources through incarceration of offenders.
The total loss from crime L is identical to the total social loss from offences,
convictions and punishments:
L = D(O) + C(0,p) + bfpo
(4)
; society's objective should be to minimize the social loss function. As f and p
are the decision variables subject to social control (b is regarded as a given
constant greater than zero) their optimum values are found by differentiating L
with respect to p and f. However since C.J.S. activity is not determined by,
but is also a determining factor of the level of crime, predictions about the
response of criminals to changes in p and f are also necessary before the
'optimum' can be illustrated.
Becker outlines the following supply function:
O = f(p, f, u)
(5)
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in any given period, the number of offences committed 0 is a function of the
probability of conviction p, the punishment if convicted f, and a portmanteau
variable u representing all other influences. Further
Op < 0 Of < 0
(5a)
an increase in the probability or severity of punishment reduces the number of
offences. Becker derives this result by assuming that in any given period




where YL is income, monetary plus psychic, from legal activity, and UL is the
utility function. The expected utility from committing an offence is:
(I - p) Uj (Yj) + p Uj (Yj - f)
(6b)
where Y, is income, monetary plus psychic, from an offence, and U, is the
utility function. In both cases it is assumed that the marginal utility of income
is positive. A 'rational' person (i.e. utility maximizer) will compare the expected
utility associated with each outcome and choose the option with the highest
expected utility. He or she will commit an offence if:
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UL (Yl) < (1 - p) Uj (Y;) + p U; (Y, - f)
(6c)
however given that the expected utility from an offence decreases as p and f
increase, 3 the number of people (and therefore the number of offences) for
which (6c) holds decreases as p and f increase. Thus the number of offences
committed is a decreasing function of the probability of conviction and the
severity of punishment - i.e. (5a). Expected punishment is a deterrent, by
raising the expected costs of crime the frequency of future offences is
reduced. Critics of this approach adopt several positions.
First it is argued that the assumption of rationality and utility maximization are
unrealistic - potential criminals are not 'rational', adjustments to the expected
benefits and costs of crime do not alter decisions to commit crime. For
example: "... those who 'actually' work with offenders are aware of the
impulsively nonrational nature of much crime, including crimes against
property".4 Obviously the assumption of rationality is unrealistic if interpreted
literally, however: "the economic approach does not assume that decision
units are necessarily conscious of their efforts to maximize or can verbalize or
otherwise describe in an informative way reasons for systematic patterns in
behaviour" (G.S. BECKER, 1974); individuals are assumed to behave only 'as if'
they were rational. The validity of these assumptions is therefore not to be
judged by their realism but by their predictive power.5
Other critics direct attention to the relative importance attached to p and f in
explaining criminal behaviour - other factors (u) may be central in determining
crime levels. For example: "what particularly bothers me about Becker's
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scheme ... is his inclusion of a catchall variable, a person's willingness to
commit an illegal act in the first place without specifying the importance of
this factor alone, and in comparison to the factors that he does enumerate,
and without discussing the important factors that influence one's willingness
to commit illegal acts" (W.C. Bailey, 1973). However given that assumptions
are necessarily unrealistic, tastes have to be either assumed constant or stably
distributed. Subjective factors (u) have to be separated from the 'objective'
opportunities people confront. Justification is two fold. First, assumed
separation allows determination of whether crime is affected by changes in
opportunities. Second, in economic models concern is directed towards the
short-run practical problem of efficient resource use within a given
C.J.S. framework. If deterrence 'works' predictions are correct and resources
may be allocated (more) efficiently. By definition no explanation of why
deterrence works is necessary. Whether this approach is best is debateable.6
But given no tendency to interpret observations of deterrence 'as' rather than
'as if' a result of rational behaviour, conflict between alternative views of
criminal behaviour need not arise. Analogy (rational criminals) and explanation
(criminal preferences) are separate.7 Both however should add to
understanding the C.J.S.8
Other critics question Becker's specification of criminal choice. EHRLICH (1973)
argues that legal and illegal activities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Postulating an expected utility function:




p = probability of conviction
U(Xa) = utility derived if caught and punished
U(Xb) = utility derived if offender not caught
; EHRLICH shows that crimes will only be committed when the marginal reward
from crime is greater than the expected value of punishment.9 Reactions to
changes in variables are unclear; simply stated only increases in p
unequivocally reduce the likelihood of crimes being committed.10 Others using
alternative formulations, for example W.M. BROWN and M.O. REYNOLDS, arrive
at similar conclusions. However, before reviewing the impact of these
conclusions upon the 'optimum' level of expected punishment, the optimum
position has first to be analysed.
Using Becker's framework the first order conditions for an 'optimum' are:
8L = D' Of + C'Of + bpO + bpfOf = O
3f
(8)
3L = D' Op + C' Op + Cp + bfO + bpfOp = 0
3p
(9)
which given (5a) and defining the elasticity of demand for offences with
respect to f and p as ef and ep may be reformulated11 as:
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D' + C' = -bpf (1 - ^;f)
(8a)
and
D' + C' + Cp^p = - bpf(l )
(9a)
Thus first order conditions require that p and f should be set at that offence
rate where the marginal cost of a change in criminal activity; the left hand
sides of (8a) and (9a) - equal the marginal cost of enforcement - the right
hand sides of (8a) and (9a).12
On the basis of this analysis BECKER concluded that a necessary condition for
social cost minimization is that;13
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1 > ep > £f > o
(10)
; at the optimum the 'deterrent effect' of a percentage increase in the marginal
penalty per offence falls short of an equal increase in the probability of
apprehension. This implies, from (6b), that at the optimum all offenders must
be risk preferrers. For if the percentage change in expected utility from an
increase in p is greater than the percentage change in expected utility from an
equal increase in f then14
Uj (Y,) - Ui(Yj - f) > f Uj '(Yj- f)
(11)
; ie where the utility function is convex15, which corresponds to increasing
marginal utility of income, and hence 'risk preference'. It is this implication
which, as previously noted above, some have criticised.16
If potential criminals are assumed to obtain potential gains from crime.
Recasting (6b) as:
(I - p) Uj (Yp + G) - p Uj (Yp - f)
(6d)
where
Yp = present 'certain' income
G = prospective gains from crime
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then condition (11) becomes:
Uj (Yp + G) - Uj (Yp - f) > f' U|'(Yp - f)
(11a)
Now unless (11a) holds for all values of G, the inequality may be reversed.17
Hence: "risk avoidance implies nothing about differing responsiveness to
probability of conviction vis a vis punishment", W.M. BROWN and
M.O. REYNOLDS (1973)
Clearly, given the efficiency conditions for the C.J.S. and determining the
response of individuals to these conditions is indeterminate limits the
analytical value of Becker's original model, while also underlining the necessity
of empirically testing for any assumed deterrent effect. However focusing on
individual choice necessarily ignores the choice of the C.J.S. itself. For by
assuming a choice of which C.J.S. to adopt, and then determining how such
choices may be efficiently pursued within Becker's initial theoretical framework,
allows various comparative analytical implications to be drawn. Before
developing this approach (see Chapter Two) and to provide a contrast to the
resultant predictions, the other implications which may be derived from
Becker's initial framework using standard micro-economic principles are
outlined below.
1.3. Implications
Minimizing the total social loss from crime does not imply the elimination of
all offences. To spend more on crime prevention after 'the optimum' is
obtained would be to waste resources capable of yielding more benefit in
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alternative uses: "expenditure on prevention and enforcement should yield a
diminution in offences at the margin equal to the return upon these resources
in other areas" G.J. STIGLER (1970) This (opportunity) cost limitation upon
enforcement prevents society from detecting and punishing all offenders.
However, if punishment is a deterrent (i.e. Of < 0) then there may be no
offsetting costs to increasing f. For although where b > O, the social cost of
punishment (bf) rises as f rises, where b = 0, simple cost minimization
dictates18 that p should fall to zero and f should rise to infinity "if deterrence
is costless through f we should avoid using the costly p" N. STERN (1978).
This conclusion is unrealistic - what is an infinite fine? However to show it as
logically incorrect critics adopt several arguments
First, raising all fines would blur the distinction between 'serious' and 'less
serious' crimes so encouraging criminals to upgrade their crime at little
additional net cost. If a thief is fined £10,000 for stealing £5, he or she might
as well steal £5,000 i.e. "marginal costs are necessary to marginal deterrence"
G.J. STIGLER (1970). Second, as HARRIS (1970) shows, raising a fine also
raises the social cost of an 'erroneous conviction' (R). If the marginal benefit
from increasing the value of a fine is subject to declining marginal returns (i.e.
Of < O and Off > o) and the offsetting cost (which is not included in Becker's
model) is subject to increasing marginal weight (i.e. Rf > O and Rff > O) then
the 'optimal' fine will not be infinite. For as a fine increases the marginal cost
of punishing the innocent would at some value of this fine outweigh the
marginal benefits (through reduced offences) derived.19
Another argument against infinite fines is that as fines increase so does the
finees valuation of a marginal unit of income. At some point the marginal unit
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of income to a finee could be more valuable than the unit to the government,
and total social welfare would 'decrease' i.e., b > o. Alternatively if account is
taken of gains, then if offences involve transfers from relatively rich victims to
relatively poor offenders D' < O and no punishment 'should' be imposed.
Finally a fine does not represent total perceived punishment. If the "social
consequences of conviction"20 (e.g. changes in family and social relationships
and employment opportunities) are taken into account fines 'should' not be
infinite - the offsetting increase in this cost would be some point outweigh
the benefit (in terms of reduced costs) from increased fines (i.e. again b > O).
It must be noted though that 'logically' if fines were infinite the above
arguments would not hold: there would be no convictions i.e. p = O. However
assuming realistically that fines will be set below infinitely further implications
arise.
Assuming (8a) is an optimum condition, dividing through by Of yields
Lf = D' + C' =0
(8b)
substituting (1) for D' then:
G' = H' + C'
(12)
iff p = 1, offenders will undertake offences until at the margin expected
benefits (G') equal expected costs (p.f = f) hence:
f = H' + C'
21
(12a)
the optimum fine equals the total (marginal) social costs of the offence (i.e., p
= mc). Obviously where p < 1, f would be higher by a value of 1/p. In all
cases though the level of f is independent of a convicted offenders income.
For given b = 0 it must be (implicitly) assumed that at the margin the transfer
involved (f) from finee to the C.J.S. does not change social welfare. But to
return to an earlier argument this assumption may not be valid. For if transfer
does cause a rise or fall in social welfare b < 0 or b > 0 respectively.
Inclusion of these distributive effects has the following implications. If b < 0
for an optimum to exist either ef > 1 or D' < 0. Fine levels may be limited in
increase either by a reduction in revenue outweighing the reduction in
damages and costs, or by offence levels being 'beneficial'.21
Where b > 0 initial optimum conditions hold. However, in this case expected
marginal gains for 'poor' offenders may be positive (i.e. G' > pf) encouraging
transfers from rich to poor. Although not in itself a 'bad thing' such transfers
could be undertaken in a less socially disruptive and certainly more efficient
manner (i.e. without D(0) and C(0,p) through direct government intervention).
Equity therefore conflicts with efficiency. Varying fines may be equitable but
not efficient, not varying them may be efficient but unequitable.
In contrast to the above it may be efficient for fines to vary when stolen
goods are recovered. Their value could be deducted from a fine in recognition
of the fall in social loss (via a fall in H(0)) and as an incentive for the finee to
return the goods. This would not effect expected punishment since the fall in
the fine would be offset by the fall in criminal gains. If total perceived
22
punishment in monetary terms (fa) equals ail the losses (L) and gains (G) from
an offence then:
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fa = - (L + G)
(13)
if G falls (G > 0) an offsetting fall in L (L > 0) leaves fa unchanged, and given
p, pfa also. Hence offences would not increase. However without this
offsetting fall convicted criminals would have no incentive to disclose stolen
goods (i.e. lower G) because their punishment (-(L+G)) would increase i.e. no
'rational' offender will voluntarily increase his or her punishment.
The same type of argument may be used to justify 'plea bargaining'. If an
apprehended criminal confesses he is certain to be punished. If he does not
confess he has a finite chance of being found innocent. If the level of




where P2 represents the probability of conviction conditional on arrest.
However if certain punishment (f) is lower than probable punishment (f) then
some individuals will prefer the certain outcome (f) to the uncertain outcome
(p2f) and confess.22 As long as certain punishment remains above or equal to
uncertain punishment (i.e. f > p2f) then society will benefit. The costs of
conviction are reduced without any offsetting losses via increased offences:
expected punishment remains unchanged.
Another implication derivable from Becker's original model concerns the 'cross
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elasticities of demand' for various punishments. Increasing the expected
punishment for one offence may induce a substitution into, or a
complementary move out of other offences. Assuming that
Oa = Offence type (a)
Oc = Complementary offences for (a)
Os = Substitute offences for (a)
where:
Oa = f (fa- fc- fs •■■> 80a/3fa, 30a3fc < 0
30a/ 3fs > O
(15)
Oc = f (fa,fc,fs...) 30c/3fa,30c/3fc < O
30c/3fs > 0
(16)
Os = f(fa,fc,fs -) 30s/3fa,30s/3fc > 0
30s/3fs > 0
(17)
the original social loss function (4) may be formulated:
L = D(Oa,Oc,Os) + C(pa,pc,ps,Oa,Oc,Os,) +b1pafaOa + b2pcfc0c + b3psfs0s
(18)
If the complementary and substitution effects are ignored the first order
differential for offence type (a) with respect to fa only is:
25
Lfao = D'a + C'a + b,pafa . 1 "1/efa
(19)
but given that:
C = (Dc + Cc + b2pcfc)
(201
S = (°s + Cs + b3Psfs)
(21)
and introducing complementary and substitution effects the social loss
optimum for (a) with respect to fa from (18) is:
Lfai = Lfa0 + [C] . craf + IS] 30s . oaf = O
(22)
where:
[C] 3Qn . 1 > O
3fa Oaf
(23)




so in comparison to the original optimum condition (i.e. Lfao = 0), the marginal
cost of (a) is increased by (23) and reduced by (24). Condition (23) describes
complementary effects for (a): reductions in fa lead to increases in Oc as well
as Oa. Condition (24) describes substitution effects: reductions in fa lead to
reductions in Os (assuming that Os (all substitute offences of Oa) has no
complements). Taking both effects together the optimum level of fa will be
higher, equal, or lower relative to the original optimum as (23) (24).23 Hence,
considered separately reductions in the optimum level of fa may appear
inefficient (i.e. Lfao > 0). However if this reduction induces a move out of
other substitute crimes the social losses from all crimes will be lowered (until
Lfa| = 0). For fc predictions similar to fa arise, for fs the substitution effect
predominates: Os has no complements.24 The difference between fa, fs, fc will
be determined by the relative weights attached to all losses. For example, if
over all Os and Oa total social losses for Os are everywhere greater than Oa
the optimal level of fs > fa. The same conclusions are derivable for p given
that changes in any one probability do not directly affect another.25
A final implication allied but not drawn from Becker's model concerns the
'industrial' structure of criminal output. If monopoly in the supply of 'goods' is
inefficient (i.e. higher prices and lower output vis a vis competition) then it
may be desirable for 'bads' because of this inefficiency. This is the first
argument to monopolization of crime. It presumes there is no perfect
discrimination and that there is some form of voluntary agreement between
buyers and sellers (e.g. victimless crimes).26 This last assumption does not
hold in the case of predatory crimes ("predatory crimes are acts in which a
person deliberately takes or injures someone else's person or property", D
GLASER (1973)), because they involve contested transfers.
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However a second argument for monopolisation covers both victimless and
predatory crimes. If the resource inputs to the criminal industry are not
available at constant supply price, a monopsonist unable to discriminate
among owners of specialised inputs will, in order to maximize profits (i.e. MC
= MRP) hire a total input below that generated under a competitive
organisation. Thus total output produced will be below that of a competitive
structure.
Finally a rational and monopolistic criminal organisation will look upon its
'victims' as long term sources of revenue. It has an incentive to husband
'victim resources' by placing a shadow price on their increase. On the other
hand the competitive criminal organisation sees victims as a one time benefit
source - a foregone victim may be captured by a competitor - it will not
value the future of victim resources at all. Under a monopoly situation then
there is likely to be a smaller 'input' of victims as compared to perfect
competition. All the above suggest there are social benefits from the
monopolisation of crime. A change from competitive to a monopoly structure
would lower the level of offences and hence costs at which losses are
minimized. Of course if a monopoly exists because of 'economies of scale'
none of these arguments hold: output (i.e. offences) will be greater than under
competition.
1.4. Conclusion
From the above it is clear that optimal levels of p and f depend on how initial
assumptions are perceived. In particular the application of standard
micro-economic principles to the original social loss framework yields various
alternative predictions to those derived by Becker. Such applications are
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limiting: however viewed the efficiency conditions that arise from these
applications still imply that the objective of society in operating the
C.J.S. should be to minimize social losses using expected punishment as a
deterrent; deviations from this objective are by definition inefficient. Why
should this be the case?
Inefficiency means that what society (theoretically) does is different from what
it wants to and therefore should do. Provided there is concensus on the
optimum conditions this is correct. In practice concensus in unlikely:
"conceptually agreement may be attained, but practically the choice of a set of
punishment institutions presents more difficulties in obtaining compromises
among differing preferences than almost any aspect of the imaged
constitutional contract", J.M. BUCHANAN (1975); punishment may be believed
to fulfil other roles apart from deterrence. The determination of these beliefs
lies outwith economic theory,27 hence their non-inclusion in previous analyses
of the social loss model. But unless the economic model of the C.J.S. is
regarded as the 'ideal' solution then the resulting alternatives should, and can,
be analysed without necessarily concluding that deviations from the economic
view are inefficient. The social loss model may not, as BECKER pessimistically
concluded, be hampered by: "the absence of a reliable theory of political
decision making', G.S. BECKER (1968). For even though punishment may not
be used as a deterrent it is still a matter of choice what role it should play:
"the exogeneity of some gives may be a matter of the decision makers choice"
L.A. Boland (1982). So without (explicitly) questioning why these choices are
made the social loss model may be used to analyse and predict their
outcomes.
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Finally, before developing this (alternative) approach it must be noted that it is
an implicit assumption that such choices will and should be efficiently pursued
in the sense of efficient allocation of resources. For if alternative norms are
incorporated into the social loss model and then judged in terms of this
efficiency criterion, potential conflict arises: the norms are being judged on an
altogether different basis from their original objective. To avoid this conflict




THE ROLE OF PUNISHMENT
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of Chapter Two is to outline the potential roles punishment is
believed to fulfil, and the effect of their incorporation into the original social
loss model.
Concentration is (still) placed upon the prescriptive social loss model, rather
than a descriptive C.J.S. model. Firstly because the latter depends on the
former: any policy conclusions about the efficiency of existing C.J.S. practices
must be based on a theory of what the purpose of the criminal justice system
is. Chapter Two reviews all the alternative theories of the C.J.S. purpose; in
contrast previous economic studies have implicitly assumed only one purpose
- if punishment is a price, it should therefore be a deterrent. Secondly,
differences in the theories of punishment's role have practical implications:
"deterrence, physical restraint, and the rehabilitation of the offender by
treatment, are factors which courts have to take into account in deciding
sentence. The law gives them no guidance on the weight to be given to each
factor; and because of the divisions of public opinion and the great variety of
circumstances they face in individual cases it would be infeasible for the law
to do so"; SCOTTISH COUNCIL ON CRIME (1975)
Chapter Two illustrates that, assuming initial acceptance of a 'rational
framework', it is possible to incorporate these different views about
punishment's role into the basic economic model. However it is concluded that
the problem of attaining 'the optimum' is still undetermined; as there is no
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single accepted justification for punishment in theory, 'the purpose' of
C.J.S. policy cannot be resolved in practice.
It may of course be argued that conclusions about the social less model
should depend only on the correspondence of data with the hypotheses of
theory: "viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged
by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to
explain. Only factual evidence can show whether it (theory) is right or wrong
or better tentatively accepted or rejected," M. FRIEDMAN (1971). However, to
reiterate, no policy conclusions should be made without considering the
relevance of the assumed purpose of the C.J.S.: "nothing can be considered
sufficiently achieved until one discovers what the aim of the activity was "
A.A. LEFF (1976). Furthermore even if the 'assumed purpose' of the C.J.S. may
be viewed as a subset of the "body of substantive hypotheses", acceptance of
this hypotheses depends, ultimately; on observed agreement to any change
suggested by its implications - even if all the other hypotheses of the theory
may 'correspond with the data'. Consideration of the assumed purposes of
the C.J.S., and the role that punishment should therefore play, is developed
below.
2.2. The Role of Punishment
P and f are the instruments through which C.J.S. policy is achieved. The
possible purposes of the C.J.S. may therefore be indicated by outlining the
possible roles that punishment may be believed to fulfil.
The distinction between facts and judgement is one of concensus. 'Facts' are
expressions of thought that tend to hold wide consensus, value judgements do
32
not. In neo-classical economics value judgements are inclined to be ignored:
'efficiency' is assumed to have consensus approval: "efficiency is such a weak
value, so widely believed to be desirable that it can be treated as if it were a
purely factual concept", B WARD (1972). In this context "efficiency" means
minimizing the social loss from crime. Punishment levels are set to obtain
this end. But is this the role that punishment should play? The answer
depends on one's values. Below are the opposing judgements on punishments
role.
2.2.1. UTILITARIAN
In the economic theory of crime, punishment is a price. By increasing the
probability of paying this price (p) or the price itself (f) the number of offences
'consumed' decreases. Punishment deters. The optimum punishment level is
where the marginal benefit of reduced offences equals the marginal cost of
enforcement.1 However: "punishment that is imposed ex post cannot be a
deterrent ex ante for the same offence" J.M. BUCHANAN (1975) ; actual
punishments have no deterrent effect on the convicted offender. So should
the relation between punishment and the punished depend on efficiency?
2.2.2. RETRIBUTIVE
The retributive view states that the severity of the penalty should equal the
offenders culpability: the punishment should fit the crime. This implies the
following.
First, retributive theory is the only theory which connects punishment with
desert and so with justice. For only as a punishment is deserved or
undeserved can it be just or unjust.2 Second, one must determine that the
accused actually committed the crime. For if punishments are fixed with
33
reference to past guilt one cannot (logically) punish the innocent. And, thirdly,
in assessing past culpability reference may be made to the 'causes' of the
offence. Some of the causes may be regarded as 'morally acceptable'
justifications - punishments may take account of mitigating factors. In sum
punishers should be concerned with those being punished, and not the effect
of their penalties on others: "punishment can never be administered merely as
a means of promoting another good .... for one man never ought to be dealt
with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another". F. ZIMRING
and G. HAWKINS (1974).
2.2.3. REHABILITATIVE
This view holds that punishment should alter the offender's future behaviour:
the probability of a convicted offender committing future offences should be
reduced. Thus punishment should increase the future opportunity cost of
crime for convicted offenders only. This effect could be incorporated in the
social loss function by inclusion of the present discounted value of future
benefits3 and costs of punishment. However, the deterrent effect works only if
people act 'as if' they are rational. In contrast: "much crime and deviant
behaviour may actually be caused biochemically and thus be truly irrational
irresponsible behaviour" H.E. KELLY (1979); crime may be the outward sign of
some physiological disorder - the offender can no longer be assumed to act
'as if' he or she is rational.4 Such offenders need medical treatment,
rehabilitation (ex post) and not punishment (ex ante or ex post) acts as the
'deterrent'. So in some cases treatment (i.e. altering the individual's
physiology) should be substituted for punishment. On 'efficiency' grounds the




This view states that the law reflects society's norms: "every system of law
stands in closest possible relation to the ideas, aims, and purposes of the
society to which the law is to apply" W. ULLMANN (1966). No aggregation of
people can function without some norms or conventions of behaviour and the
law is the means by which these norms are translated into legal obligations
and rules to which all should obey. From this viewpoint then, the purpose of
law should be the promotion of 'social cohesion'; ideally the law should induce
'undeterred compliance' (i.e. adherence to the law even if p and f are zero).
Thus laws would be effective if there were no punishments: punishment is a
corollary not of law but of law breaking. However given 'law breaking',
punishment is necessary. But punishment's central role is not to deter 'through
fear' but rather to reaffirm norms of behaviour - punishment is a means of
giving public recognition and encouragement to these norms in order that
social cohesion (i.e. allegiance to these norms) is maintained.5 Finally, in this
view, 'law breaking' is a result of the inadequate socialization to society's
norms - the offender either does not know or does not accept certain legal
rules. Therefore the 'solution' to crime is not punishment, for punishment is
only the means by which a divided society maintains itself. The solution' is a
change in the structure of society. The circumstances that cause 'inadequate
socialization' should be altered: "public efforts to diminish or prevent socially
undesirable conduct ought to be directed against the conditions which
promote such conduct" J.F. DOYLE (1967). This would involve the
determination of a set of values to which all members of society should and
would subscribe, i.e. an ideal society.
In sum, order may be fundamental to society, law may be fundamental to
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order, but ideally enforcement is not fundamental to law - there should be no
role for punishment to fulfil. Thus the use of punishment is indicative of some
basic flaws in society which punishment alone cannot correct.
The above shows there is no single accepted justification for punishment. If a
legislator's justification is reductive (i.e. utilitarian), but the sentencer's is
retributive and the penal agent's is rehabilitative, whose is 'the justification'.
However, the above views do not stand in independent relation to one
another. As shown below, some of the aims of punishment may be
compatible, some incompatible.
2.2.5. RETRIBUTIVE in relation to UTILITARIAN
Retributive justice may be imposed as a constraint when setting 'optimum'
punishment levels. This may involve:
i. legal safeguards to protect the innocent from being
punished6
ii. a maximum punishment level for each offence type
iii. allowance for mitigating factors in determining punishment
levels
iv. non-detention of potential offenders (detention would
involve punishments for crimes that have not been
committed).
Further, punishments imposed beyond these retributive limits may be
destructive: they may alienate those who believe in justice, bring the law into
disrespect, and thus interfere with the goal of prevention: "the justice and
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decency of the law and its enforcement are not simply desirable
embellishments, but rather the indispensable conditions of respect for law and
civil peace in a free society". Final report of the NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (1969).
2.2.6. RETRIBUTIVE in relation to REHABILITATIVE
The retributive states that: "a wrongdoer has a right to be punished"
H.B. ACTON (1969). Punishment signifies individual responsibility and therefore
'guilt' - treatment does not: "responsibility is best considered an artificial
construct or myth we impose on people to influence or determine their
behaviour in a direction we conceive desirable" S. HALLECK (1979). Retributive
and rehabilitative views are not compatible. Behaviour control via medical
treatment is not acceptable: an individual cannot be made 'better' if he is not
'sick' in the first place. And behaviour control via rehabilitative training (i.e. all
non-medical treatment which increases the expected monetary and psychic
returns from future legitimate ventures) is not acceptable: punishment is
deserved. However, if physiological causes are accepted as 'mitigating factors'
retributive justice may view medical treatment as the appropriate 'punishment'.
In this case offenders are innocent.
2.2.7. REHABILITATIVE in relation to UTILITARIAN
As outlined above the rehabilitative view is compatible with the utilitarian:
behaviour control should be optimal.
2.2.8. REHABILITATIVE in relation to the EXPRESSIVE
These views are not compatible. The rehabilitative wants to change the
behaviour of the individual offender. Whereas, in the expressive case: "the
target is not the delinquent act, nor the individual who commits it, but the
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framework inside of which the delinquent is initiated and nurtured";7 the
'behaviour' of society should be changed.
2.2.9. EXPRESSIVE in relation to the UTILITARIAN
The expressive view shifts the emphasis of crime control from p and f - as
changes in offences are regarded as relatively independent of p and f8 -
towards measures to eradicate u - the causes of crime which are 'rooted in
the overall social system': "the causes of most forms of deviance are in
society (family, community, school, economic system) - therefore prevention
and cure must lie in the community and not artificially created agencies
constructed on a model of individual intervention" S. COHEN (1979); the
circumstances that cause 'inadequate socialization' should be altered. This
may be compatible with the utilitarian approach. The marginal cost of these
changes could be equated with the marginal benefits derived from reduced
offences. This assumes concensus about 'causes' and the value of costs.
2.2.10. EXPRESSIVE in relation to RETRIBUTIVE
The expressive view may be compatible with the retributive: 'mitigating
factors' could include 'inadequate socialization'. This would indicate the need
for a modification of social structures.
The above may be further amalgamated. Either, physiological causes can be
identified (rehabilitative), the 'innocent constraint' is adopted (retributive), and
treatment is optimal (utilitarian). Or, 'inadequate socialization' (expressive) is
regarded as a mitigating factor (retributive) and social reform is optimal
(utilitarian). Each position above provides a justification and motive (s) for
punishment. As a result each position also provides an explanation of the
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C.J.S. itself. However their relevance in practice depends on the reaction of
people to actual punishment levels. For just as no pronouncements on the
efficiency of existing C.J.S. practices can be made without looking at what
these practices hope to achieve, then no pronouncements on what
C.J.S. practices hope to achieve can be made without looking at what they
actually achieve. Paradoxically peoples reactions can only be interpreted in the
light of theory: "direct measurements depend upon theoretic assumptions"
M.A. COHEN quoted in M. BLAUG (1981). In turn what theoretical model to
adopt depends on the above positions. This may be illustrated by analysing
the affects on the basic economic model that result from consideration of the
'other roles' of punishment. This assumes (to reiterate chapter 1) at least
partial acceptance of the economic approach in determining C.J.S. policy.
2.2.11. RETRIBUTIVE CONSTRAINTS9
Retributive theory states that only the guilty should be punished. As indicated
above this implies the imposition of the following constraints in the utilitarian
model: legal safeguards; maximum punishment levels and mitigation.
Legal safeguards to protect the innocent from being punished leads to two
additional costs in the original social loss function: the cost of erroneous
convictions, and the cost of legal safeguards to prevent such convictions. The
social loss from erroneous conviction (R), which include the direct cost to the
innocent person convicted, and the indirect cost of the reduction in societal
welfare due to the 'unjust' punishment, may be assumed to be a function of
the probability of wrongful conviction (pr), punishment per offence (f) and the
total number of offences committed (O):10
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Rpr, Rf, Rq, > O;
(25a)
increases in the severity of (unjust) punishment or the numbers of people
being wrongfully punished (through increases in pr or O) increases the social
cost of mistakenly punishing the innocent. The probability of wrongful
conviction may be assumed to be a function of the probability of conviction
(p) and the level of legal safeguards (a):
Pr = f(p. a) ;
(26)
where
9pr > 0 9pr < O ;
9p 9a
(26a)
for a given level of offences and costs of apprehension, increases in p
increase the likelihood of wrongful conviction whereas increases in legal
safeguards to prevent conviction of the innocent (as reflected by higher values
of a) lead to reductions in pr. Finally, the costs of apprehension and conviction
may be assumed to be positively related to a :
Ca > O
(27)
i.e. the costs of apprehending and convicting a given percentage of offenders
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at a given level of offences will be lower without legal safeguards than it
would be with them. Thus, the social loss function may be respecified:
L = D(O) + C(0, p a) + R(pr,fO) + bpfO
(28)
and the first order conditions for social loss minimization, given (5a), are:
D' + C' + R' + Rfof = " bpf (1 -lf )
(29)
D' + C' + R' + (Cp + Rpr ) ip = - bpf (1 - lp )
(30)
Relative to the original optimum conditions (8a and 9a), the marginal cost of
reducing f and p - in equations (29) and (30) - is reduced by a factor of Rf1/Of
and Rpr3pr/8p . 1/Op respectively (i.e. as f and p fall the severity of unjust
punishment and the probability of an innocent person being punished fall) and
it is increased by a factor of R' (i.e. as f and p fall offences increase therefore
more innocent people are punished). If the relative effect of the R function is
negative, (from the innocent but potentially wrongly convicted viewpoint the
marginal cost of being mistakenly convicted increases as p and f rise whereas
the rise in marginal benefit from reduced offences that results decline), then
the social losses from 'unjust' punishment are more sensitive to changes in p
and f than a change in O and therefore:
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D' + C' > D' + C' + R' + Rf of
(31)
D' + C' + Cp ip > D' + C' + R' + (Cp + RPr
(32)
relative to the original optimum, the new optimum level of offences will now
be HIGHER and the new optimum level of p and f will be LOWER.11 Hence the
cost of protecting the innocent is a higher level of offences.12
The second retributive constraint that may be imposed is 'maximum
punishment' (fmax). Assuming that social loss minimization is the overriding
principle that governs C.J.S. policy, (otherwise f will always be set at f max)
optimum conditions are as follows. The original social loss function is now
subject to the constraint:
' *""" ^max >
i.e. punishment levels cannot exceed the maximum level of punishment set by
retributive limits. The social loss function may therefore be reformulated:
a = D(O) + C(0,p) + bpfO - X(f - fmax) ;
(33)
and the first order conditions for a minimum are now:13
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Q = D'Of + C'Of + bpfl0f + bpO - X > 0 f -j& - X = 0, f > 0
(34)
= f - fmax < 0 Xf- fmax =0, X > O;
(35)
given f* is the original unconstrained optimum level of punishment, if f* <
fmax ('e- the optimum level of 'deterrent' punishment falls below the
maximum level of retributive punishment) social losses may still be minimised
(i.e. $r = O, X = 0) This also holds if f* = fmax: the optimum level of 'deterrent'
punishment is equal to the maximum level of retributive punishment. However
if f* > fmax social losses cannot be minimized. In this case punishment levels
will be set below the original optimal level at fmax and the offence level will
therefore be higher than the original level (i.e. > O, X > O). Thus X
represents the shadow price of justice and "the demand for justice is not
independent of its price", R.A. POSNER (1975). The 'price' of imposing
maximum punishment levels is therefore not only a HIGHER level of offences
(compared with the original optimum level), but also an excess of the marginal
costs of criminal activity over the marginal costs of enforcement: > 0. But
of course a retributive limit on punishment is imposed precisely because: "no
excess of social benefits over social costs would be permitted to justify
punishing the offenders as a means of some greater social good."
R.C. COFFEE (1978).
The final retributive constraint is that of 'mitigation' - punishers should set
punishment levels with reference to offender's 'culpability'. If account of
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'mitigating factors' is regarded as 'price discrimination' it may be incorporated
into the loss function. This assumes the following. One, that it is possible to
separate the 'total market' for offences into 'submarkets' that differ
significantly in terms of their 'elasticity of demand' for offences. And two,
these differences are related to differences in 'culpability'. For example, for a
given offence, offenders who 'intend' to commit a 'crime of passion' may be
less responsive to a given expected punishment, than those who intend to
commit a 'premeditated crime'. In the same instance, the former may be
regarded as less culpable than the latter: "if some people perform a prohibited
action with calculated deliberation and others perform the same action on
impulse or in passion, we regard the former as morally worse and as
deserving a heavier penalty", C.W.K. MUNDLE (1954).
In the simple case of two submarkets (Oi and 02), the social loss function may
be respecified:
L = 0(0! + 02) + 0(0! + 02,Pi,p2) +bp1fl01 + bp2f202 ;
(36)
to take account of the (assumed) differences in responsiveness, (i.e. efn = cf2
and £p1( = ep2). The first order conditions for social loss minimization given
(5a) are:
D'i +2 + C'1+2 = - bpif! 1 - = - bp2f2 1 - ^-f2
(37)
D'i+2 + C'i+2 + Cp-j op! + Cp25p2 - bp^! . 1 ^p! - -bp2f2 . 1 - ^p2
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(38)
i.e. the marginal cost of enforcement in each submarket should equal the
marginal cost of total offences. Further, if the 'elasticity of demand' is more
inelastic in market two than market one, then,
1 > ef-| > ef2
(39)
1 > ep1 > ep2 '
(40)
and therefore
0 > 1 ~ If1 > 1 ~ lf2
(39a)
0 > 1 Ip1 > 1 ~ lp2
(40a)
which given (37) and (38) implies:
Pl*1 > P2^2 '
(41)
expected punishment levels will be LOWER in those markets where the
'elasticity of demand' with respect to p and f is inelastic relative to other
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markets. Thus f-] > f2 and p-j > p2 14 which corresponds with retributive
theory, although not for the same reasons. The retributive believes that the
less culpable deserve a smaller punishment, whereas the economic approach
dictates a lower sentence, since a higher expected punishment would not
minimize social losses - the marginal costs of enforcement would exceed the
marginal costs of criminal activity.
2.2.12. REHABILITATIVE CONSTRAINT.15
As outlined above the rehabilitative view - that offender's future behaviour
should be altered - can be incorporated into the social loss function. This is
achieved by inclusion of the present discounted value (P.D.V.) of the future
costs and 'benefits' of 'punishment'. Thus, if:
I = P.D.V. of the net cost of imprisoning current
period offenders
B = P.D.V. of the net cost of crimes committed by
current offenders after their release
t = intensity of rehabilitative 'training'
f = duration of punishment and therefore
'training'
N = O.p.f., total number of man years training
6 = fixed rate of social time preference;
where
I = f(t, N, 6)
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(42)
B = f(t, N, 6) ;
(43)
and
l-t> 'n > 0 ;
(44)
i.e. increases in the intensity or duration of training increases the P.D.V. of the
net costs of imprisonment. Whereas,
Bt,BN < O \
(45)
increases in the intensity or duration of training are 'beneficial' in that they
reduce the P.D.V. of the net cost of future crimes: less (future) crimes are
committed as a result of rehabilitative training. The social loss function may
be respecified:
L = D(O) + C(0,p) + l(t, N, 6) + B(t, N, 3) ;
(46)
thus the first order conditions for social loss minimization given (5a) are:
48
D' + C' - - pf(l|\i + Bn) 1
(47)





equations (47) and (48) do not differ from the original optimum conditions (8a)
and (9b) if it is assumed that b = lN + BN > 0. Thus the rehabilitative view
only 'imposes' an additional optimum condition - (49). Rehabilitative training
should be optimal: the net marginal cost of providing this training (lf) should
be equal to the net 'marginal benefit' realized by the reduction in future crimes
that such training produces (~Bt).
These conclusions however implicitly assume that imprisonment, viewed as a
period of investment in human (i.e. offenders) capital only pays 'positive'
returns from the point of view of society (i.e. B < 0). Typically however a
prisoner will experience both 'positive' investment through rehabilitative
training and 'negative' investment through a 'criminogenic effect': "in prison
the period of human capital formation ordinarily makes the convict even more
adept at earning easy money in property crimes" A. KROHM (1973). So if
recedivism predominates B > 0 and over all values of p and f, b > 0.
Moreover, even if investment does yield positive returns this may reduce the
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deterrent effect of imprisonment for potential offenders. For if rehabilitative
training increases the opportunity cost of crime for released offenders by
increasing the expected monetory and psychic returns from legitimate
ventures, then it may reduce the opportunity cost of crime for potential
offenders. Should this occur, given:
0 = f(t... ) where 90/9t > 0
(50)
then
D' 90/9t + C'90/9t + lt + ln {90/91 . pf) + Bt +Bn (90/9t . pf) = O
(49a)
i.e. relative to the original optimum (49) net marginal costs are increased due
to increased present offences and net 'marginal' benefits are increased by the
increase in total training that results.
2.2.13. EXPRESSIVE CONSTRAINT
The expressive holds that the conditions which cause crime (u) should be
altered. This view may be incorporated into the economic approach as follows.
Assuming that u can be identified:
O = f(u....) where Ou > O;
(51)
and further, these causal conditions can be alleviated (i.e. 'reduced') by an
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increase jn the resources devoted to 'remedial social programs' (Sp):
u = f(Sp) where uSp < O :
(52)
and finally, the cost of increasing resources devoted to these programs is
positive:
C = f(Sp) where CSp > 0 :
(53)
then the social loss function may be reformulated:
L = D(O) + C(0,p) + C(Sp) + bpfo
(54)
The first order condition for social loss minimization with respect to Sp given
(5a) is:
(D' + C' + bpf) Ou = -CSp 1/9u/3Sp :
(55)
i.e. the marginal cost of increasing social programs directed at alleviating the
causes of crime should be equated with the marginal benefit derived as
reflected in costs from reduced offences.
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2.3. Conclusion
In contrast to previous economic models of the C.J.S. the above shows that
different views about the purpose of punishment, other than deterrence, may
be incorporated into the original social less model. In turn, such
incorporations provide a set of different perspectives from which to interpret
actual practices. In doing so however the problem arises of obtaining 'the
optimum' (as opposed to a series of alternative optimum practices). For since
th C.J.S. serves other goals apart from deterrence, any conflict among these
goals cannot be resolved on utilitarian grounds alone: economic theory cannot
prescribe what values one should adopt; punishment levels based on the
economic approach alone may be 'efficient' but this does not mean one will
wish to implement them. Thus it is only through general acceptance of one,
or more of the above constraints that determines what it is one should try to
minimise using the framework of the social less function (and this assumes
acceptance of this rational framework in the first place).
While it is possible therefore to progress from the limited perspective of
previous economic analyses, the apparent indeterminancy of the resultant
theoretical models might appear to justify such limitation. But to understate,
or ignore altogether, the problem of resolving different choices of the
C.J.S. purpose, because of the absence of consistent views about the role of
punishment will inevitably limit the acceptance, and part that economics
should play in determining C.J.S. policy. It may not be possible to prescribe
'the optimum' system, but whatever the ethical constraints of the society in
which the C.J.S. operates, it is possible to predict the outcome of alternative
views, and their difference in terms of efficient resource allocation, through
the analytical framework of the social loss model.
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In short it is theoretically possible to use this framework to assess the
efficient allocation of C.J.S. resources without necessarily assuming that
offenders respond to changes in expected punishment. However, in the
context of economic analysis, the social loss model proposed does depend
fundamentally on this response. From this narrower perspective therefore the
issue of deterrence is still crucial: is there a negative correlation between




ECONOMETRIC STUDIES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter Three provides a critical analysis of previous econometric studies of
the Criminal Justice System.
To complement Chapter One and Two the links are outlined between the
formal (prescriptive) economic theory and applied (descriptive) economic
models. Concentration is therefore placed on the role of a priori theory in
determining the empirical specification of the supply of offences function.
Obviously a separate, but not unrelated issue, concerns the demand for
criminal justice system services. Traditionally econometric studies have either
incorporated an aggregate 'production function' within a simultaneous model,
or focussed entirely upon disaggregating police production processes within a
recursive rather than simultaneous framework. In this study the former
approach is adopted both from choice (i.e. the importance of the assumed
response to punishment) and practical necessity due to the insufficiency of
data concerning actual police practices. As D.J. PYLE (1983) concluded, the
development of the police production function has largely foundered because:
"the data which investigators have been working with is inferior to the
techniques which are available. Any further progress must be in the
refinement of data rather than techniques".
From the assessment of the links between the formal and applied (supply)
models, in conjunction with a summary of the results obtained, a detailed
analysis is undertaken of the problems involved in determining the existence
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(or not) of a deterrent effect. It is concluded that many of these problems
occur because of the paucity of formal theory in providing a basis for
empirical specification - initial theoretical assumptions therefore also constrain
economists ability to model the C.J.S. itself.
In light of this conclusion and the problems outlined, comment is made on the
validity of economic models in contributing to actual policy decisions. Not
surprisingly, in the context of this study, it is argued that despite all the
problems, economics should play a role in determining short term policy.
Finally, and more obviously, by outlining such problems, potential rectification
in the present study is increased.
3.2. ECONOMETRIC MODELS
The linkage between formal and applied models is direct: theory provides the
basis for empirical specification: "all observations are really interpretations in
the light of theory", M. BLAUG (1981); i.e. there is no thief unless somebody
thinks so. Hence as a result of the economic theory of crime models of the
C.J.S. and analysis of deterrence have the following three common attributes.
3.2.1. AGGREGATE CRIME RATE FUNCTIONS
Economics is concerned with examining the results of people's actions not
explaining the actions themselves. The economic theory of crime therefore
does not attempt to explain why any one individual commits crime, instead it
focusses attention exclusively on the opportunities that confront offenders
(through changes in p, f, and u). Models of psychological processes which
describe how environmental inputs effect criminal behaviour directly are
bypassed in favour of aggregate crime rate functions which only attempt to
measure the effects of observed sanctions and (some) socio-economic
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variables. Differences in individuals tastes for crime are ignored because in
theory tastes are assumed constant. This does not preclude that peoples
actual attitudes to committing crime are different. Rather it assumes these
preferences are stably distributed and unrelated to observable changes in the
measurable incentives that confront all potential offenders. Consequently
changes in p, f, and u must account for changes in aggregate crime levels and
be modelled accordingly.
3.2.2. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION SPECIFICATION
This is used in order to emphasize and allow for the assumed theoretical
feedback mechanism of crime upon the criminal justice system and vice versa.
For in the economic model, C.J.S. activity is not only determined by, but is
also a determining factor of the level of crime (i.e. Co, Cp > O and Op, Of <
O). The inputs of the C.J.S. are combined to produce an output: expected
punishment. The allocation of these inputs and their effectiveness via output
levels is therefore determined by while simultaneously being a determinant of
offence levels.
3.2.3. LOG-LINEAR SPECIFICATION
This is used for two reasons. First, the deterrent effects of punishment and
the certainty of punishment are not additive: in the absence of 'infinite fines',
punishment with no probability of enforcement has no deterrent effect and
vice versa. Second, to determine the relative effectiveness of sanctions, Ep
and Ef, and therefore their correspondence with the theoretical predictions of
the economic model (i.e. 1 > ep > ef at the 'optimum' - see chapter one).
The results obtained from models adopting these attributes are well
documented elsewhere: D. BEYLEVELD (1978); A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, and
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D. NAGIN (1978) and D.J. PYLE (1983). In summary they indicate:
(a) a consistent and significant negative relationship between
crime rates and arrest rates, clearance ratios and sentence
lengths, with elasticities of offences with respect to those
variables tending to fall within the range of 0 and -1;
(b) an elasticity of offences with respect to the probability of
certainty larger than that with respect to the probability
and level of punishment;
(c) significant, although not always consistent, relationships
between crime rates and measures of opportunity cost and
illegal gains with elasticity values that indicate potential
offenders may be more responsive to these factors than
punishment variables; and,
(d) no consistent relationship between expenditure and crime
rates and arrest ratios, implying within the limitation of an
aggregate 'production function', that changes in crime
levels have differing impacts upon the efficiency of police
forces at different times.
While these results are broadly consistent with the predictions outlined in
Chapter One before they may be considered as useful with regard to
determining the actual response of potential offenders, the accuracy of the
methods used to obtain such results has to be analysed. Do such methods
demonstrably overcome the conceptual and practical problems they face?
Examined below are the difficulties that result from adoption of the basic
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attributes above. For only from examination of these problems, common to all
studies, is it possible to decide whether such research provides results that
should influence policy decisions. Furthermore their investigation provides a
foundation for this study and a basis for comparative analysis.
3.3. IDENTIFICATION
In Becker's theoretical model, C.J.S. resources display diminishing marginal
productivity (i.e. Cpp > 0 and C00 > 0). This implies that, ceteris paribus, a
'random' increase in offences will reduce the probability of conviction, and,
ceteris paribus, an increase in the resources devoted to apprehension and
conviction will increase this probability:
p = f(0, c)
(56)
where
PQ <0, pc > O;
(56a)
however, if the above holds any observed negative association between crime
rates and sanctions may be a result of PQ < O rather than Op < 0. Further, if
it is assumed that the purpose of the C.J.S. is 'to deter crime', any random
increase in offences will lead to an increase in the resources devoted to the
C.J.S. (in order to return to 'the optimum'). Again this effect has to be
separated from any deterrent effect, before changes in 0 can be attributed to
changes in C.J.S. resources via p. Thus, at minimum, the following
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relationships hold:
0 = f(p, f, u), 0p,0f < 0
{5, 5a)
c = f(0, p), CQ. Cp > 0
(2, 2a, 2b)
p = f(0, c), P0 < 0, pc > 0;
(56, 56a)
the identification problem: "is that of separately identifying these relationships
from a data sample in which they are compounded by the operation of the
interactive system described;" B. J. HILTON (1981) i.e. how does one separate
what causes changes in O from what results from changes in O? The solution
is to impose 'identification restrictions'. Unfortunately the economic theory of
crime gives no indication what to include or exclude from the above
relationships. It is this lack of formal theory which makes decisions about
identification of necessity appear arbitrary, although not necessarily incorrect:
"statistical inference unsupported by economic theory applies to whatever
statistical regularities and stable relationships can be discerned in the data.
Such purely empirical relationships when discernible are likely to be due to the
presence and persistence of underlying relationships, and (if so) could be
deduced from the latter"; T.C. KOOPMAN (1953).
Three kinds of identification restrictions have typically been used to identify
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the crime rate function:
1. Socio-economic and demographic measures
2. Crime rates other than the one under investigation
3. C.J.S. expenditure
Some critics e.g. F.M. FISCHER and D. NAGIN (1978), believe there is no basis
for using (I). Restrictions should be based on a priori grounds. But since the
economic theory of crime gives no indication as to what should be excluded
then there appears to be no 'validated' grounds upon which to exclude (I). So
for example there may be no grounds for excluding: unemployment rates of
males between 35-39, I. EHRLICH (1973); fraction of non-whites in the
population, P. PASSEL and J.B. TAYLOR (1977); and the proportion of the
population that is middle class, R.A. CARR-HILL and N.H. STERN (1979). In this
view using (I) is at best arbitrary and at worst data mining. Using (2) depends
on the validity of assuming that other crime rates have no direct effect on the
crime being examined. While a reasonable assumption in some cases - e.g.
minimum wage law-violations, L.C. THUROW and C. RAPPAPORT (1969) - it
does not appear feasible when investigating other crime types (e.g. theft). As
already noted (in chapter one) these crimes may have substitutes and/or
complements. Use of (3) does appear valid. First it is only through the
'output' of the C.J.S. and not the inputs that a deterrent effect is expected.
Second, although the allocation and the level of these inputs are assumed to
be influenced by the crime rate, due to local and central government
budgetary cycles current expenditure may be assumed to be largely
predetermined by the crime rates of prior periods.
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Given that: exclusion is based on relative not absolute terms, identification
restrictions cannot be tested using the data generated by the model
investigated; and a limited number of empirical variables available, then it
might well appear that restrictions are somewhat arbitrary and that results
could therefore be biased. However to dismiss all econometric results on
such grounds is not valid. The strength of the economic approach over
alternatives lies in its ability to accommodate the analytical problems involved
in stressing the complex nature of the C.J.S. Given the simultaneity problem
absolute certainty of econometric results can never be claimed. Rather their
relative consistency and likelihood, having taken account of this problem, is.
However, given existing criticism, this study uses alternative restrictions
namely: lagged crime rates and prison capacity rates.1 The validity of the
existing framework may therefore be judged by whether or not significantly
different parameter estimates result.
3.4. CONTROL VARIABLES
In theory the crime rate function is not only dependent on p and f but also u
('other factors'). Thus u itself has to be specified in order to eliminate
potential distortions in the measurement of any 'deterrent effect'. Inspection
of (6c):
U|(Y,) < (1 - pJUrfYj) + pUj(Yj— f) ;
(6c)
would suggest that any factors which increase U|(Y|) (i.e. increase the
opportunity cost of crime), or reduce Uj(Yj), ( i.e. reduce the potential gains
from crime) will reduce the number of offences committed since the number
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of people for which (6c) holds will fall.2 Thus it is necessary to introduce
measurable proxies for 'opportunity cost' and 'potential gains' into the
aggregate crime function. Further, if 'tastes are assumed constant' it is only
differences in individuals's objective circumstances (i.e. differences in the
'opportunities' for criminal endeavours) that need be accounted for by these
proxies. Alternatively, if taste variables are introduced it must be assumed
that people also differ in their 'subjective' circumstances (i.e. people differ in
their attitudes towards crime and hence have different 'subjective' utility
functions). However, the choice of what 'taste variables' to include in u, must
be based on, at least partial, acceptance of an alternative theoretical model of
criminal behaviour. For, again, the economic theory of crime can give no
indication as to what 'taste variables' to use: tastes are assumed constant.
Thus the first problem involved in deciding what to include in u is as follows.
Either one accepts that 'tastes are assumed constant' on the grounds that the
validity of the economic model depends on the relevance of its predictions
alone. Or one accepts that tastes may play a causal role (on the grounds that:
"... you cannot make 'other variables' go awav by just ignoring them. If they
really are casual factors in the problem, they are still operating, and
identification by selection merely leaves the scientist, attributing part of their
effect to the variables he decided to include", B. WARD (1972)), and therefore
base one's empirical specification on an amalgam of theoretical models
thereby incur the resultant problems of conflicting specification and
identification.3
Having made the choice between constant and differing tastes, the aggregate
control variables used tend to fall into four groups.4 Where tastes are assumed
constant only 'opportunity cost' and 'potential gain' measures are necessary.
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These have included:
1. OPPORTUNITY COST: % unemployed; real personal
disposable income per capita; % of families below half of
the median income; % earning less that $3000 (I960);
estimates of permanent real income per capita; proportion
of the population that is 'working class'; % of negroes; %
of non- whites; total rateable value per acre; average per
capita assessed valuation of property; median school years
completed; % males married; and infant mortality rate.
2. POTENTIAL GAINS: per capita income; median income; % of
families below half of the median income; % earning less
than $3000 (1967); gini co-efficient; total consumer
expenditure; unemployment rate; population density per
square mile; proportion of the population living in cities of
25,000 or more (USA 1960); proportion of the population
living in cities of 20,000 or more (Florida 1971): population
per occupied household; % of women in labour force; % of
houses valued at greater than $20,000 (New York 1972);
average property values; average rateable values; combined
receipts of wholesale, retail and service establishments;
median education; % of population in manufacturing
occupations; and the weight of the lightest T.V. set.
Where studies have attempted to account for changes in 'tastes', the above
have been supplemented with measures for 'the propensity to consume
offences' and 'social conditions':
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001. PROPENSITY TO CONSUME OFFENCES: proportion of the
population between 15-30; proportion of the population
between 15-24; % of the population that is male;
unemployment rate of urban males 14-24; % of married
males; % of families with both husband and wife; % of
night time population under 25; % of the population aged
65 or over; and the sex ratio of 15-49 years old.
002. SOCIAL CONDITIONS: time trend; % of blacks; % of foreign
born; ratio of net-non white immigrants in previous ten
years to total population; unrelated individuals per
population; dummy variable for Southern U.S. States; and
average temperatures.
Several problems arise from the use of these control variables.
First multi-collinearity: there appear no directly separable measures of
opportunity cost and potential gains. For instance does the unemployment
rate measure the 'opportunity cost of crime'; as it rises crime rates would be
expected to rise. Or does it measure the potential gains of crime - as it rises
crime rates would be expected to fall. Second, a priori judgements and data
limitations determine which control variables are used. However exclusion of
some variables may bias results. Serial independence only holds if the effects
of excluded variables are assumed to vary randomly over time. With reference
to excluded socio-economic and demographic variables this may appear
unreasonable - they may only change gradually with time. Third, in time
series estimation structural homogenity is assumed: the underlying structure
of social attitudes is assumed to be constant. Is this plausible? For example,
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P. PASSEL and J. B. TAYLOR (1977) compared I. EHRICH'S (1973) 1935-68
U.S. murder rate equation with an exactly similar specified 1935-62 equation.
An F-ratio test was significant at the 99% level - the hypothesis of structural
homogenity was rejected. Obviously some studies have attempted to counter
this problem by introducing (3) and (4). However as already stated this leads
to problems of conflicting specification and interpretation.
Judgement is essential therefore in determining what control variables to use:
"Where a variable is excluded the implied judgement is that the arguments for
including it are weak or non-existent. We have no alternative to making such
judgements if we are to estimate". R.D. CARR-HILL and N. STERN (1979). So
initial agreement as to what control variables measure what is unlikely. As a
result reliance upon judgement alone is inadequate. To counter the above
problems it is necessary to compare different studies results. Accumulated
empirical verification of a control variables direction of effect provides a basis
for agreement as to what it measures. Furthermore, since different studies
use different statistical techniques, time periods, areas investigated, and
control variables comparisons should also indicate the robustness (or not) of
any particular measures predictive power. Finally, attention should be drawn
to the purpose of econometric studies of the C.J.S. It is to discern evidence of
any marginal deterrent effects over the range of penalties typically imposed.
Any such evidence therefore provides a basis for short term ('short-cut') policy
proposals for a GIVEN legal framework and a GIVEN society via the reduction
of the OPPORTUNITIES to crime. But by focussing on the short term impact of
the changes in the C.J.S. it cannot provide an overview of the effects of long
term social change. Obviously the longer the time period considered the more
fundamentally important these social changes may be, and so the less useful
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the whole economic approach becomes. However by implication and purpose
these forces (i.e. (3) and (4)) lie outwith the scope of econometric studies.
3.5. CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY INDEXES
In Becker's theory, potential criminals are assumed to have 'perfect foresight' -
objective measures of sanction levels are assumed to accurately reflect the
population's perceptions of these sanctions. This implies that current indexes
of certainty and severity should be used as measurable proxies for p and f.
However there are various arguments which oppose this view suggesting
instead that objective punishment levels may differ from perceived levels, and
therefore that:
pa = f (p....)
(57)
fa = f (f....)
(58)
where:
Pa = actual perceived certainty of punishment
fa = actual perceived punishment
First, if 'deterrence' is viewed as a mechanism of information transmission,
there may be reasons for substantial delays in the transmission of this
information (e.g. delays in court cases, changes in police procedures unknown
to the public etc.). Secondly, subjective and objective assessments of p and f
may never be identical. As already noted (in chapter one) punishment may
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have 'social consequences'. So if statutory punishment does underestimate
actual perceived punishment then estimates of the elasticity of statutory
punishment will undermeasure the elasticity of 'total' punishment.5
Alternatively, LERICKSON, JENSEN and GIBBS (1972) postulate that individuals
perceive expected punishment in terms of 'what ought to be' - expected
punishments for 'serious' crimes should be relatively high and are therefore
believed to be irrespective of their objective values. Others argue that
expectations about future sanction levels are relevant in determining potential
offenders perceptions.
The relevance of these arguments in determining any 'deterrent effect' is as
follows. If the assumption of perfect foresight is dropped then: "unanticipated
increases in law enforcement activity cannot reduce the level of criminal
activity except through an incapacitating role" K.I. WOLPIN (1978); only
perceived changes in p and f (i.e. through pa and fa) can be of 'deterrent
value'. In sum empirical formulations based on the assumptions of perfect
foresight may not provide an appropriate test of deterrence. But on the other
hand how is it possible to determine which changes in p and f are 'perceived'
and which are not? The choice of alternative theoretical models of
expectations is numerous: 'There is one set of correct expectations based on
complete knowledge .... but there is an endless variety of incorrect ones",
M. BLAUG (1981). The 'appropriate' formulation is of necessity based on a
subjective choice - on an aggregate basis potential offenders estimates of
sanction levels are unknown.
Given the above various indexes have been used:
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1. CERTAINTY: number of arrests per population; number of
arrests per reported crime; number of convictions per
reported crime; number of prison admissions per reported
crime; number of admissions in year t per number of
average reported crimes (t - 1 to t); average number of
admissions (t to t -5) per number of average reported
crimes (t -I to t +4); number of convictions per reported
arrest; and percentage of known offences cleared by arrest.
2. SEVERITY: mean sentence length of those released in year
t; median sentence length of those released in year t;
mean sentence of those sentenced in year t; and two,
three, four and five year moving averages of sentence
length.
In deciding on the choice of index further practical problems arise. First, it
must be assumed when using aggregate data that objective measures of
sanction levels accurately reflect the populations perception of these
sanctions. As stated above which index meets this requirement is a matter of
subjective choice. For example, T. ORSAGH (1979) argues that expectations
about future sanction levels are relevant. Whereas others question the use of
data which relates measures of certainty and severity to past crime rates: this
appears to violate the logic of deterrence whereby: "reduced criminality or
deviance is expected to follow the imposition of a certain or severe
punishment", T.G. CHIRICOS and G.P. WALDO (1970). Secondly, sanction
variables and offence rates should refer to the same population. As P.J. COOK
(1977) notes average prison sentences are applicable only to adult offenders,
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so they should not be related (as they are in most U.S. studies) to adult and
juvenile offence rates. Further C. F. MANSKI (1978) questions whether
offenders are homogenous enough in the sanctions they face to justify
macro-crime supply functions. For example the probability of expected
punishment for murder may range from near zero (gang land executions) to
near one (family murder). Furthermore, official punishment, although similar in
length may not be similar in effect due to differences in the 'consequences of
conviction' upon each offender, and differences in individual prison regimes.
Third, and finally, it is difficult to account for multiple crimes committed by the
same person. Indexes only yield the probability of all crimes cleared. The
probability per individual crime is not known.
The problem of how to model expectations in unlikely to be resolved -
potential offenders expectations of punishment are unknown. The use of
current (or near current) indexes in this study is therefore justified on the
following (subjective) grounds. Any systematic gaps between perceptions and
reality would presumably force potential offenders to revise their perceptions
in the direction of actual levels. Secondly, the effects of incapacitation can be
accounted for (see below). Thirdly, K.L. AVIO and C.S. CLARK (I976) found
when crime rates fell the average sentence of current releases increased
because the prison population became heavily weighted with 'long- timers'.
They avoided this problem (of spurious correlation) by using current sentence
data. Finally, as T.G. CHIRICOS and G.P. WALDO (1970) pointed out the logic
of deterrence implies that reductions in crime are likely to FOLLOW changes in
expected punishment. Without monthly data the lags in the effect of changes
in punishment cannot be clearly specified. However current annual indexes
will to some extent incorporate this 'follow on' effect, and clearly the effect of
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changes in expected punishment is likely to diminish the further back past
punishment levels are related to current crime rates.
Turning to aggregation. By definition aggregate crime rate functions involve
the use of average sanction data. While this had led critics to question the
relevance of specifying an aggregative model given "no formal bridge between
cosmic utility analysis and national supply functions"; KLEIN ET AL quoted in
B. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN and D. NAGIN (1978), the econometric approach
cannot specify the e'fects upon any particular individual or group passing
through the C.J.S. The alternative - splitting potential offenders into 'relatively
homogeneous groups' - while heoretically possible is practically implausible.
For while the expectations of these groups towards changes in C.J.S. policy
and resultant response to these expectations may be modelled in theory, in
practice this assumes a prior knowledge of actual sanctions faced per group,
and therefore the division of the relevant population set of potential offenders
into relatively similar groups by crime type.
Finally in 'macro' studies, the problem of multiple crimes must be noted. In
'micro' studies6 it may be possible to correct: R. THALER'S (1977) clearance
rate defines a crime cleared only if a criminal is arrested specifically for that
offence.
3.6. INCAPACITATION
Given prison sentences any negative association between crime and sanctions
may reflect the combined effects of deterrence and incapacitation. For the
length of a prison sentence, confinement incapacitates the convict from
committing any criminal act(s) he or she might otherwise have chosen to
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undertake. If incapacitation does reduce crime then omitting this factor will
upwardly bias the deterrent effect of formal sanctions.
Various models have been developed which show that, by assuming a level of
crime that would have been committed had imprisonment been avoided, it is
possible to isolate the deterrent from the incapacitative effect.7
There are two problems with the above. First, accurate estimates of the
incapacitative effect depend on the ability to predict - 'the propensity to
consume offences'. Given: prisoners may commit no further crimes; any
future crimes committed may be independent of the previous crime type;
differences in prisoners future crime rates; and differences in future crime
rates over time, accurate prediction is unlikely. Secondly incapacitation may
be ineffective if imprisonment causes 'replacement'. For example D.F.
GREENBERG (1975) states that imprisonment of a supplier in the illegal goods
market will have no incapacitative effect: market demand will attract new
entrants: "Economic law is not suppressed by legislated law", A.A. ALCHAIN
(1972). It is concluded therefore that incapacitation effects should be
computed for a range of likely future offence levels.
3.7. RECORDING EFFECT
As should already be apparent the data used in econometric studies is rarely
equivalent to the concepts used in theory. This is particularly true in the case
of the crime rate. In theory 0 is the actual level of offences, Oa. The
measurable aggregate proxy of Oa is the recorded level of offences, Or. In
practice it must be assumed that Oa is accurately represented by Or. Oa need
not necessarily equal Or, but it must be assumed that at any point in time any
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differences in measuring Or are random over jurisdictions, and over time Oa
and Or are directly proportional to one another. This assumption may be
invalid if a 'recording effect' operates.
This effect represents all the processes which may be believed to generate
changes in Or independently of Oa. These processes may be split in two.
First the majority of crimes are reported by the public. So for example: the
introduction of the 999 telephone system; increases in insured property; lower
public tolerance of crime; and increases in victims perceived effectiveness of
the C.J.S., may cause more crimes to be reported independent of any changes
in actual levels. Second, reported crime has subsequently either to be
recorded or not. This data is compiled by the people who are consequently
evaluated by it. As a result the statistical reliability of such data is unknown.
There are incentives to reduce (increase) the level of recorded offence rates in
order to manipulate C.J.S. policy; "data is collected during the operation of a
system only with a view to using it to formulate and control the
implementation of policy. Those on whom the policy is going to operate or
who are going to be controlled during its implementation have an obvious
incentive to supply information that will ensure that the system operates in a
fashion conducive to their interest", B. HILTON (1981). On the other hand,
changes in criminal law (changing the range and definition of crime), and
increases in the efficiency of recording practices may independently lead to
increases in the level of recorded crimes. However, whatever the underlying
causes proponents of the 'recording effect' believe that all these processes
may be adequately represented in theory by the assumption: increases in
police activity lead to increases in the proportion of crimes recorded.9 Thus,
whereas Oa is a function of p (ceteris paribus);
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Oa = f(p ....) ;
(5)
Or is a function not only of p but also C (i.e. the cost of resources, devoted to
the C.J.S.):
Or = f(p, C....);
(59)
and given (56a):
30r/30c = |^. & +
(59a)
where is the 'deterrent effect' and 30r/3c is the 'recording effect'.
Obviously Or cannot exceed Oa so beyond a given level of C
< 0;
(60a)
i.e. Or will accurately reflect Oa. However below this level of C:
> 0 ;
(60b)
increases in the resources devoted to the C.J.S. leads to an increase in Or. If
the 'recording effect' predominates:
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I?- fe * Itr > 0:
(59b)
0r will not accurately reflect Oa: Or rises as Oa falls. And even where the
'recording effect' does not predominate Or may still not accurately reflect Oa.
For example
(59c)
the deterrent and the recording effect may cancel each other out: 0r remains
the same as 0a falls. Or:
(61)
the 'true deterrent' effect is underestimated because of the recording effect: 0r
falls at a slower rate than Oa.10 Thus when the recording effect is assumed to
exist Or is unlikely to accurately reflect 0a. However the extent to which the
recording effect alters estimates of the 'true deterrent effect' is unknown: Oa
is unknown. So again, the 'appropriate' relationship between Oa and Or is of
necessity based on a subjective choice.
Before reviewing the possible bases of this choice it is necessary to examine
the potential effect of recording bias on econometric results. Where the
recording effect is assumed to exist11 differences in measuring recorded
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offences may be non-random over jurisdictions so those which report a
relatively high (low) proportion of crimes will tend to have a relatively low
(high) computed clearance rate. Furthermore if actual and recorded offences
are not directly proportional to one another over time decreasing clearance
rates may be caused by increased police activity not crime. Accordingly
relationships between recorded and actual offences should be tested to
determine the relative deterrence and recording effects.
The actual extent to which any recording effects alter estimates of the 'true'
deterrent effect is not likely to be known given that the 'true' crime rate is
unknown. However inferences about the relative influence of the deterrent
and recording effects can (and should) be made. On the basis of experimental
and questionnaire studies appropriate proxies (e.g. 'proportion of serious
crimes') may be introduced into the aggregate crime rate function to
determine and separate the influence of deterrence and recording on the
recorded level of crime. While complete accuracy in measuring these separate
effects is not expected their incorporation provides a necessary control on the
estimates and policy conclusions derived about the efficiency of
C.J.S. practices. The alternative view, that no inferences can be made about
the true crime rate from the recorded crime rate, offers no basis for policy
conclusions at all.
3.8. SEVERITY EFFECTS
In Becker's theory 0 is directly related to f, but f is not directly related to
O. However since the 'output' of the police (i.e. certainty of punishment) is
expected to be determined by crime, as well as being a determining factor of
crime, the same may hold for the 'output' of the penal system, severity of
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punishment; i.e:
f = f(o )
(62)
Prison sentences, f, may be a function of the crime rate, 0, for two opposing
sets of reasons.
3.8.1. POSITIVE SEVERITY EFFECTS
There may be a positive relation between crime rates and punishment
because, given discretion in sentencing sentencers who believe in the
deterrent role of punishment may attempt to 'compensate for' increases in
offences by increasing punishment levels. Further, increased punishment may
lead to increased receividism: i.e."the possible existing deterent effect of
severity on the general crime rate may be hidden by a backlash effect of
punishment on those punished", C.H. LOGAN (1972). Finally, the greater the
certainty of punishment the lower the punishment level because of
plea-bargaining12 and notions of 'just' punishment levels.13
3.8.2. NEGATIVE SEVERITY EFFECTS
Even in the absence of deterrence, there may be a negative relation between
crime rates and punishment. Short-run constraints may force sentencers to
lower sentence levels when crime rates increase. Given successively higher
crime rates causing crowded prison conditions, lower prison sentences and
the greater use of fines probation and suspended sentences may result.
Secondly higher crime rates may lead to lower punishment levels in order to
"try to avoid alienating too large a portion of the population from the society
by labelling them and their associates as deviant and thereby risking the
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fundamental stability of the society": A. BLUMSTEIN and J. COHEN (1973). The
stability of society therefore depends on the maintenance of a constant level
of punishment: increases in crime rates may be 'compensated' by falls in
punishment risk.
Acceptance of the above implies a direct relationship between f and 0 should
be postulated to isolate the positive and negative effects of crime upon
sentence length from the deterrent effect of sentence length upon crime. For
example P. PASSEL (I975) proposed the testing of the positive severity effect
by regressing punishment with crime rates "given the discretion built into the
system at each level it is plausible that, other things being equal, more
convicted murderers will be sentenced to death the higher the perceived
murder rate".
Within a full 'macro' model incorporation of these effects implies an additional
equation and identification restriction(s) - identifying (a) measurable factor(s)
which effect(s) sentence length but not crime rates. Measures of prison
capacity appear appropriate assuming that potential offenders are unaware of
its effect on severity.14 However if the level of punishment is constant as
A. BLUMSTEIN and J. COHEN (1973) propose, an alternative explanation of any
negative association between crime rates and imprisonment risk arises:
increases in crime 'cause' falls in imprisonment risk, crime deters punishment
and not vice versa. This view cannot therefore be incorporated into the
economic model of the C.J.S. Isolation of the other effects proposed is
however necessary and sufficient to determine any evidence of deterrence -
they do not imply that the deterrence hypothesis is invalid.
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3.9. AGGREGATION BIAS
Since this study proposes the use of cross-section data it is necessary to
outline this potential problem. D.F. GREENBERG, R.C. KESSLER and
C.H. LOGAN (1981) note that aggregation may lead to spurious correlation -
increased crime in one area may be related to lower punishment risk in
another. They thus proposed the use of city as opposed to US state data.
Other solutions have included: rural-urban split, R.A. CARR-HILL and N. STERN
(1979) and omission of randomly selected areas to test if deletion
'substantially' effects the co-efficients of the remaining data, W. VANDAELE
(1978). It is concluded that such tests for aggregation bias should be imposed
in this study.
3.10. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of econometric
research of the C.J.S. Stress has been placed on the problems that arise as a
result of (necessarily) founding such research on the economic theory of crime
and punishment. The reason being that the results and policy implications
derived cannot be judged useful unless these problems are outlined - such
research must be seen to account for all the criticism levelled at it. While
conclusions as to its worth are subjective the following judgements are
offered. At worst, such research provides a coherent and consistent
framework within which future debate and analysis of the efficiency of
C.J.S. practices can take place. At best, it provides a substantive foundation
for present policy decisions by allowing relatively accurate predictions to be
made about the response of (potential) offenders to changes in C.J.S. policy.
However given the (above) problems of adopting the economic approach it is
fair to assume that, at present, the actual results obtained from emperical
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research lie somewhat nearer the former end of this spectrum: "the fact that
there are important limitations of the data and difficult methodological issues
yet to be resolved should caution the reader against forming policy
conclusions from any point estimate even if it passes 'conventional' tests of
significance", K.I. WOLPIN (1978).
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CHAPTER 4
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: APPLIED MODEL
4.1. Introduction
Chapter Four provides an outline of the applied model subsequently used to
test for the existence of deterrent effects across the Scottish Criminal Justice
System over the period of 1970 to 1978.
Whereas the previous chapter indicated the general problems involved in
modelling the Criminal Justice System, this Chapter concentrates on the
specific problems encountered in modelling the Scottish system; the
constraints placed upon the model by the general problems are however noted
throughout. Emphasis is therefore placed upon the variables used, their
consequent transformation in light of the local government organisational
changes that occurred in 1975, and finally the implications which may be
drawn (for modelling the Scottish system) from the apparent changes in each
variable. While, at this point, such changes are not explicitly related to one
another, it is concluded that the estimation and interpretation of the applied
model should account for: the apparent differences in Scottish system
practices over different crime classes; the effects of the 1975 reorganisation;
and the socio-economic differences across Scottish regions.
4.2. Scottish Criminal Justice System
Scottish and English criminal law and procedures are not comparable: The two
systems remain separate and - a unique constitutional phenomenon within a
unitary state - stand to this day in the same juridical relationship to one
another as they do individually to the system of any foreign country'; REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1974).
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Scottish police neither initiate nor conduct prosecutions; this is the job of the
procurator fiscal.1 Jury trials are less frequent: in Scotland the accused has no
right 'to opt' for jury trial. Clear-up rates are not comparable: in Scotland the
accused cannot ask for 'offences to be taken into consideration'. Sentences are
different: there is no English equivalent to the 'not proven' sentence available
in Scotland. Criminal statistics differ: in Scotland the classification of each
offence, where possible, is based on the outcome of judicial proceedings, not
on the initial classification by the police; 'crimes' in Scotland are not
equivalent to 'indictable offences' in England; and age ranges start at 16 in
Scotland as opposed to 17 in England. Finally, the changes in Scottish and
English legislation affecting criminal statistics have not been equivalent. Thus,
the Scottish Criminal Justice System should be modelled independently of its
English counterpart.
As a result there has been no econometric analysis of the Scottish
C.J.S. Previous studies have (necessarily) analysed only the English C.J.S:
CARR-HILL and STERN (1979); PYLE (1982) and WOLPIN (1978). However, there
would appear to be some relative advantages in undertaking a study of the
Scottish C.J.S. In particular, with regard to the problems of relating offenders
to crime types (Certainty and Severity Index, Chapter Three), legislative change
and plea bargaining (Recording Effects, Chapter Three) and the underlying
purpose of the C.J.S. (Chapter Two). These advantages are:
(a) a greater congruence between offences and sentences
since:
(i) each offence (where possible) is classified
according to trial outcome: "the initial
classification of each crime or offence is
determined by the police according to the
circumstances surrounding the event: where
relevant this initial classification is amended
later to take account of subsequent court
proceedings. At the end of each year the
number of crimes and offences recorded during
this year is adjusted for those found not to have
been a crime" SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH
DEPARTMENT: CRIMINAL STATISTICS SCOTLAND
(1981)
(ii) offences cannot be 'taken into consideration':
"the practice (in Scotland) is to include in one
indictment or complaint all outstanding charges
on which there is sufficient evidence to proceed,
and there is no way in which one or more
charges may be libelled and other offences taken
into consideration. Any charge that rests on the
admission of the accused alone is not included
in the indictment or complaint"; SCOTTISH HOME
AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT AND CROWN OFFICE
(1975).
(b) relatively few legislative changes affecting criminal
statistics: "there has been very little legislation affecting
criminal statistics in Scotland compared with England and
Wales. There has been no important changes in
classification (such as that brought about by the Theft Act
1968) or new sentences (such as the suspended sentence)",
M WALKER (1981).
a theoretically distinct separation between the roles of
police and prosecutor. In Scotland the police never
prosecute. The rate of conviction/aquittal is not therefore
directly dependent upon police actions. Thus this data is
not compiled by the people who are consequently
evaluated by it, thereby reducing the problem of recording
effects. Furthermore, taken together with (a) ii above, it
would appear that the incentive to 'plea-bargain' is lower
in Scotland. Since the Scottish police force do not
prosecute they cannot be evaluated by convictions as
opposed to their English counterparts who do and are, and
thus have an incentive to plea-bargain (by taking offences
into consideration and lowering certain punishment). In
practice fiscals do 'negotiate pleas' but: "by negotiating
pleas the fiscal is aiming for the result which would have
been achieved had the accused been found guilty on all
the charges as originally libelled while avoiding what he
regards as a time wasting costly exercise which may not
always produce the just result" S.R. MOODY and J. TOMBS
(1982).
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(d) a theoretical similarity between the basis of Scottish
criminal law and the economic 'social loss' model. In
Scotland prosecutions are (nearly) always public. They are
conducted with reference to the 'public interest': "in
[Scottish] criminal law, emphasis is placed less upon the
wrong done to the individual but rather upon the wrong
done against the community as a whole, its peace, order
and well being". SCOTTISH OFFICE (1981) The economic
model also emphasizes this interest - it defines those
conditions which minimize the social (i.e. communities) loss
from crime.
Given these relative advantages it is now necessary to comment on the
(independent) Scottish C.J.S. in more depth.
The period considered is 1970-78. The main changes affecting the Scottish
C.J.S. over this period are:
(a) On 15th April 1971, Part III of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 was brought into operation. A new system of
Children's hearings replaced the former juvenile courts and
the age at which a person ceased to be (legally) defined a
child was reduced from 17 to 16. In addition, the new
system dealt with persons aged over 16 (but not yet 18)
who were already subject to a supervision requirement.
These changes did not directly affect the recording of 'the
incidence of crime' or 'the clear-up rate'. However, they
did remove the practical relevance of the age 17 as a
division for the purposes of age-grouping. And it was
noted that: 'a change in the nature of the arrangements
made for dealing with children must, in itself, be likely to
have an effect on the nature of child crime brought to the
attention of the police (and thus recorded as crime) which
does not reflect any real change in the incidence of
juvenile delinquency'. SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH
DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL STATISTICS SCOTLAND 1971
(1971).
(b) On 16th May 1975, the Local Government (Scotland) Act
1973 came into operation. This led to the following
changes: a reduction in the number of police forces from
20 to 8; the introduction of standardized methods of
recording offences; the replacement of existing Justice of
the Peace Courts and Burgh (or Police) Courts by District
Courts and the assumption by Procurator Fiscals of all
prosecutions in these courts; and an increase in the
maximum fine impossible in summary courts (other than
the Sheriff Court) from £50 to £100. The major effect of
these changes was a once and for all increase in the
recorded level of crime. As a result of new, simplified and
computerized recording arrangements: 'less serious or clear
cut incidents of crime which previously went unrecorded in
those areas employing cumbersome reporting systems is
now recorded'. SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH
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DEPARTMENT; CRIMINAL STATISTICS 1975 (1976).
The effects of these changes in modelling the Scottish C.J.S. are incorporated
in the outline below of the model itself.
4.3. Model
The model of the Scottish C.J.S. proposed adopts the three attributes common
to previous studies: aggregate functions, a simultaneous equation framework,
and log- linear specification. The latter is used (to reiterate Chapter Three)
because the deterent effects of punishment are assumed not to be additive,
and to determine the correspondence of results with Becker's initial
theorectical predications.
The basis of the model comprises the three relationships previously outlined
in Chapters One and Three, namely:
(a) The Crime Rate Function 0 = f(p,f,u)
(5)
(b) The Certainty Function p = f(o,c,....)
(56)
(c) The Expenditure Function c = f(o,p,....)
(2)
In addition, to account for the (potential) problems outlined in Chapter Three
of recording effects, differences in perceptions, and severity effects, three
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other relationships are postulated:
(d) The Recording Effect Or = f(p,c,....)
(e) Differences in perception
pa = f(p...)
fa = f(f....)





On the basis of the above the following log-linear relationships are specified:
i) BASIC MODEL
Or = c^Pt + a2p2 + a3F + ZjUotj x\ + <V-(a'0-a0)D +ei
(a1)
Pi = BiOr + B2@gfe] + 2"=3Bi xf+ 60 + e2
(b 1)
E = + . t + Y^ +Z[L3Y,X? + Yc + e3
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(d)
; which in turn are supplemented by:
ii) Recording effort
Or = OtPt + a2p2 + a3F + Z"=4 x-
- (l+a^ifiTpn + S20v + e4) + a0 + (a'0+a0)D + e-,
(d 1)
iii) Differences in perceptions
PiP+ = 4>i Pi +"i Z{S0 <t>i = 1
p2P+ = 4>i p2+"i 2i=o = 1
Fp+ = E"0 (jjj Fp+-i E^0 <J>i - 1
iv) Severity efforts






Detailed discussion of each of these functions (a1 to f1) in terms of their
relation to theoretical counterparts (a to f), required data specifications,2 and
indicative trends over the sample period (1970 to 1978), are outlined below.
4.3.1. CRIME RATE FUNCTION
0 = f (p, f, u)
(5)
0r = a,p, + a2p2 + a3F + Znj=4 a, x;1
+ ao + (a'o - ao) D + e-,
(al)
While in theory the economic model of crime is implicitly applicable to all
crime types, this study focuses on Scottish property crimes. These offences
were chosen as the motivation for these types of crimes would appear, a
priori, more likely to be pecuniarily based than say, murder, and thus the
measurable proxies for 'opportunity cost' and 'potential gains' more readily
available. Consequently:
Or =
Annual recorded crimes (class II and III) per capita
per police area. Class II crimes are defined as:
'crimes against property with violence'; and Class
III crimes are defined as: 'crimes against property
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without violence'.
These classifications (Class II and III) are based on pre 1979 definitions; 1979
published data which is based on a revised crime coding cannot be
transformed to these definitions and was therefore not included. Furthermore
Or excludes 'juvenile crime' for the following reasons. First the change in
arrangements made for dealing with children (as discussed above). Second
the irrelevancy of the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable of juvenile
crime; as indicated below this variable is subsequently used as a measurable
proxy for the 'opportunity cost' of adult crime. Finally, as a result of regional
reorganisation in 1975, the absence of juvenile crime data for the years 1975
and 1976: "Arrangements for juveniles from 1971 operated satisfactorily from
the inception of the new arrangements until 1975. From 1975, however,
following local authority and police reorganisation it became apparent that the
information being received was incomplete and did not adequately represent
the number of children dealt with .... [as a result] no national statistics on
children dealt with or named are included in this volume." CRIMINAL
SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT: "CRIMINAL STATISTICS,
SCOTLAND 1975" (1976).
Changes in Or over 1970 - 1978 in terms of the separate (02 and 03) and
combined (023) levels of class II and III offences are 'indicated at Appendix A
Table 1A. As is apparent over 1970- 78 023 increased throughout all regions.
This trend was replicated for both 03 and 02 (with the exceptions of Northern
and Tayside). The relative rates of crime per capita across regions remained
consistent. On average Strathclyde and Lothian experienced the highest levels
90
of all offences. Tayside was the next highest. Below Tayside, Central
experienced higher rates of 02 and 03 than Fife whereas on average Grampian
had lower levels of 02 and higher rates of 03 resulting in a level of 023
between Central and Fife. Dumfries and Northern experienced the lowest
levels of all regions. In all cases except Strathclyde the proportion of 02 to
023 was always lower than fifty per cent.
The overall increase in 023 was presumably in part due to the 1975
reorganisation. As stated previously new standardized methods of recording
were introduced. Table 2A provides an indication of the potential affect of this
standardisation. In only two cases the annual average change in Or for
1970-74 was above 1974-75: Central (+2% overall) and Fife (+7% overall).
Similarly the annual change in Or for 1975-78 was above 1974-75 for the
same two cases: Central (+3% overall) and Fife (+ 3% 03 only). Since no
amalgamation took place in these areas in 1975 either the affect of
reorganisation upon Or was relatively minimal (and) or the recording of crimes
was relatively more extensive in these areas over the whole period. In all
other cases the increase in Or for 1974-75 was above that for 1970-74 (on
average 15% overall) and 1975-78 (12%).
In specifying the probability of capture (P), it is initially assumed that, in line
with the conclusions drawn in Chapter Three, current indexes of certainty (and
as indicated below severity) are appropriate. Moreover as published statistics
separate total apprehensions from subsequent detentions (P) should be




Ratio of annual recorded crimes for which one or
more persons were apprehended, cited, warned or
traced to the number of annual recorded crimes
by class of crime and police area.
P2
Ratio of the (weighted average) number of people
convicted and sentenced for detention to the
number of people proceeded against by police
area and class of crime.
Changes in PI over the sample period are indicated in Table 3A. Overall, with
one exception (Northern) P1 fell for all crimes and regions during 1970-78,
with in all cases the average clear-up rate for 02 being lower than for 03. In
addition although not exactly reversed the relative ranking of PI appears
generally opposite to Or. Dumfries, Fife and Northern experienced the highest
levels of P1 over all offences. Central and Grampian the next highest, and
finally Tayside, Lothian and Strathclyde the lowest rates.
As in the case of a rise in Or falls in PI from 1974 may in part be due to
reorganisation: "many of the crimes which were unrecorded prior to
regionalisation were unsolved cases. When these were included in the [1975]
recording system the number of crimes made known increased but the
number of cases cleared up did not, consequently the detection rate fell".
SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT: CRIMINAL STATISTICS SCOTLAND
1978 (1979). However while this may be the case for all crime classes the
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effect upon P1 is not as clear cut. Contrary to expectations in three cases
(Central, Grampian and Lothian) the general clear up rate remained stable or
increased over 1974-75. Given, in these cases, that it is not expected that
crimes cleared would rise at the same or greater rate than the number of
crimes recorded either some of the offences recorded as a result of
reorganisation were not "unsolvable" or the clear up rate for "solvable" crimes
increased by a greater percentage than shown in Table 4A.
In all other cases P1 did fall. However without knowledge of the number of
unsolved crimes recorded as a result of reorganisation it is not possible to
determine if these falls in Pt are due to this effect.3
With regards to P2. As stated above this variable is a weighted average.
Although data concerning the number of people proceeded against whose
cases are disposed of within the year are published by police area and type of
crime, data concerning the number of people convicted and the number of
convicted people sentenced for detention is only published on a national basis.
As a result P2 is derived as follows:
For any given police area I:
76 . ocsn osisn^n = 1 upm . QpSn ocsn
p2| -
Zn=1 °P'n • §§§£
where
n
= sub category class of crime
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opln
= number of people proceeded against in area I
sub category class of crime n
opsn
= number of people convicted in Scotland for sub
category class of crime n
opsn
= number of people proceeded against in Scotland
for sub category class of crime n
osisn
= number of people convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment in Scotland for sub category class
of crime n.
The (six) published definitions of n, and their unpublished sub category
definitions are outlined in Table 5A. Obviously, Class II type 20 crimes (i.e.
where n = 3) fall outwith the definition of 'economically motivated offences'.
However since the proportion of such crimes proceeded against is negligible,
inclusion of this category is unlikely to bias results. For example, the annual
average percentages of Class II type 20 crimes to all Class II crimes for each
police area are: Central 0.08%, Dumfries and Galloway 0%, Fife 0.04%,
Grampian 0.06%, Lothian and Borders 0%, Northern 0.09%, Strathclyde 0.13%
and Tayside 0.07%. Clearly, however, it would be preferable to regress each n
separately - the motivation, incentives and disincentives for each n may be
significantly different - however this is not possible given that offence rates
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are only published for Class II and Class III crimes.
The changes in P2 are illustrated by Table 6A. With one exception (Northern)
P2 showed little change over 1970-78. However this masks the fact that over
all regions P22 (i.e. the conviction rate for class II crimes) increased whilst P23
(conviction rate for class III crimes) decreased, However in all cases the
average conviction rate was (as expected) higher for class II 'crimes with
violence'.
Finally, between 1974-75 P2 fell: the highest fall occurred in Fife (-8%) the
lowest in Central (-1%). Except for Dumfries this fall was less than the annual
average per region over 1975- 77. Furthermore in all cases it was at least
10% less than the annual average regional fall over 1972-73. Again the
degree to which reorganisation affected P2 is unknown given no information
about the percentage of "less serious or clearcut incidents" proceeded against.
But on the basis of the above the 1974-75 change does not appear relatively
different.
As already indicated above, in specifying sentence length (f) it is assumed that
current indices of severity are appropriate hence:
f3 =
Ratio of the (weighted) total length of annual
current sentenced for persons sentenced to
detention to the weighted average number of
people sentenced, by class of crime and police
area.
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Since data concerning sentence lengths is also only published on a national
basis F3 has to be derived in a similar manner to P2. So for any given police
area I:
E®=1 opln . ojgn" • wsisn
PI =
|n ocsn oslsn
^n=1 "P"1 ■ opsn- ocsn
where opln, ocsn, opsn, osisn, are as above for P2 and:
wsisn =
the national median current sentence length for
sub-category class of crime n.
Median sentence lengths are used because the distribution of average current
sentence lengths is skewed to the right: mean sentence lengths are 'pulled up'
by a relatively few high sentences so the majority of sentences fail below the
mean.
Changes in F over 1970-78 are illustrated by tables 7A and 8A. Except for
Northern F changed relatively little during 1970-78. However this masks two
underlying trends. First F2 (i.e. for Class II crimes) increased over 1970-78
(except again for Northern) whilst over all regions F3 (Class III crimes)
decreased. Second whilst F3 decreased gradually over the whole period, F2
increased over 1970-75 but fell (marginally less) over 1970-78. In all areas
however the average levels of F2 were higher than F3. In addition due to
weighting the average values of F remained similar for all areas. However F2
varied more: there was a 22% difference between the highest and lowest
levels of F2 but only a 6% difference for F3.
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Finally, reorganisation involved a change in prosecutors. As a result
sentencing practices may have altered: "On 16th May 1975 the Justice of the
Peace Courts and Burgh Courts existing immediately before that date ceased
to exist and were replaced by District Courts one for each of the new district
and island areas within the meaning of the local Government (Scotland Act)
1973 ... Prior to 16th May 1975 prosecutions in Justice of the Peace Courts
and Burgh Courts were undertaken locally by appointed justice of the peace
fiscals and burgh prosecutors respectively; a similar arrangement by which
prosecutions were undertaken by locally appointed district prosecutors existed
for a year thereafter in some District Courts pending the assumption by
Prosecutor Fiscals of all prosecutions in the courts" SCOTTISH HOME AND
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL STATISTICS SCOTLAND 1977 (1978).
If these changes did cause an alteration in sentencing it is more evident for F2
than F3 (Table 8A). Over 1974-75 F3 changed little (in five areas it remained
constant) whereas for F2 four regions had increases of over 20% (Central,
Dumfries, Grampian and Lothian), two areas had no change (Fife and Tayside)
and Northern experienced a 15% fall. However none of these changes (except
Northern) were sustained: over 1975-78 F2 fell throughout.
In determining control variables (i.e. X;1 in (a1)) it is assumed, to reiterate the
conclusions derived in Chapter Three that tastes are constant and therefore
that only differences in 'objective' circumstances need to be accounted for in
the Crime Supply Function. The choice of 'objective' proxies available however
is severely limited: in contrast to national statistics relatively few economic or
social indications are published on an annual Scottish regional basis.




Annual unemployment rate per police area to
measure the 'opportunity cost' of crime.
I =
Annual total net real personal income per capita
per police area to measure the 'potential gains'
from crime.4
With regards to U, the normal data source is the Department of Employment
Gazette. However over 1970-74 unemployment rates were (obviously) not
published on a 1975 regional basis. Two additional sources were used to
obtain this information.
1 - In 1978 the Scottish Office completed a retrospective analysis of the new
regions (SCOTTISH ECONOMIC BULLETIN, No 15, 1978) which included 1970-74
June unemployment rates. However the June unemployment rate is normally
below the annual average unemployment rate so the following adjustments
were undertaken. Each regions June unemployment rate was adjusted
upwards by the percentage difference between the annual average
unemployment rate and the June unemployment rate of the local employment
office areas which fell within the region concerned.5 Table 9A illustrates these
offices per region.
2 - These transformations were only necessary for 1970-72. From 1973
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annual average unemployment rates for new regions were published in the
Scottish Abstract of Statistics. This data also provided evidence of the
suitability of the previous adjustments. Comparison of 1973/74 rates using 1
and 2 showed on average a difference of only 0.22 per centage points.
From 1975 U was derived directly from the Gazette. Table 10A illustrates the
changes in U over the whole period. Over 1970-74 U fell in all areas except
Central (+ 0.5) and Strathclyde (no change). Two opposing trends were
evident: a rise in all areas except Northern over 1970-72 (on average + 1.34
per centage points) followed in most cases by a larger percentage fall (on
average -2.II per centage points). Over 1974-78 unemployment rose
continually. For all areas except Northern the rise in U was greater over
1974-76 (+2.61 per centage points on average) than 1976-78 (+ 1.25 on
average). As a result over the whole period unemployment increased in all
areas.
Relative rates remained generally consistent. Due to the North Sea oil related
developments the lowest rate of U occurred in Grampian. On average the
second and third lowest rates were in Lothian and Central. Over 1970 - 78
Dumfries and Galloway experienced the fourth highest average level. However
during this period Dumfries' relative position changed. It had the fourth
lowest average rates 1970-74 but the second highest 1975-78. Except for
this change the next highest levels of U occurred in Tayside, Fife and
Northern. Finally, given the contraction in heavy manufacturing Strathclyde
(generally) suffered the highest levels of U.
Data for I, the proxy for potential gains, was obtained from the following
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sources:
1. 1969/70-71/72 SURVEY OF PERSONAL INCOMES: net
income totals by old Scottish counties. This was
transformed to a new region basis as shown in the first
two columns of Table 11A.
2. 1971/72-74/75 SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS: net
income totals by planning region. These totals, where
necessary, were readjusted as given by the last three
columns of Table 11 A. Readjustments were derived by
weighting planning region income totals by the proportion
of total employed in the relevant police authority.6
3. 1975/76-1978/79: INLAND REVENUE STATISTICS (1975) and
Survey of Personal Incomes (1976-1979): net total incomes
by new Scottish regions.
4. 1970-78 CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE ANNUAL ABSTRACT
OF STATISTICS : annual average retail price index for the
United Kingdom adjusted to 1970 = 100. This index is
used since no separate Scottish index was available.
Since all data except (4) is given by tax year it had to be proportionally
readjusted: 9/12 of any tax year being allocated to the reference calendar year,
3/12 to the next year.
The changes in I over 1970-78 are illustrated by Table 12A. The following
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trends were evident. Firstly over 1970-74, except for Dumfries and Galloway
(-7%) I rose by an average 11%. Over 1974-78, except for Fife (-10%) and
marginally Strathclyde (-0.5%), I rose again, on average by 8%. Thus for the
whole period I rose in all areas, on average by 13%. Secondly, comparison of
1970-74 average levels with 1974-78 indicated that in all cases except
Central7 the annual average net income per capita was higher over 1974- 78
than 1970-74. Excepting Central then the overall trend in I was one of
continued rise. Finally relative income levels amongst regions remained
broadly stable: Lothian, Tayside, and Central consistently experienced the
highest average levels per capita; Strathclyde, Fife8 and Grampian the next
highest, and Dumfries and Northern the lowest.
Finally to account for the impact upon recorded crime rates of the
implementation of the local Government (Scotland) Act in 1975 a dummy
variable D is introduced into the Crime Rate function where:
D +
dummy set equal to zero for the years 1970-1974
and one for the years 1975-1978.
However, as indicated in Chapter Five, alternative dummy variables are
subsequently used to account for the possibility of any aggregation bias.
4.3.2. CERTAINTY FUNCTION
P = f(0, c)
(56)
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P1 = 82 Or + 82 E + EP=3 Bj xf+ Bo + e2
(b 1)
In theory, the probability of capture in a function of the actual level of crime,
and the resources devoted to maintaining arrest rates given this crime rate.
(56). To model this relationship it is therefore necessary to introduce Or, and
a measure of resource costs, into the certainty function (bl). The measure
used is:
E =
Actual annual per capita real police expenditure
per police area.
Clearly however, to reiterate the conclusions drawn in Chapter Three,
aggregate expenditure is a poor proxy for the resources used to 'produce' PI.
Police expenditure may not reflect other C.J.S. resources affecting the certainty
function (e.g. differences in procurator fiscal practices). Arrests are subject to
the discretion of individual police forces via the allocation of their resources to
other crimes and activities, and (any) differences in recording practices. Finally
the separate contributions of labour and capital are not isolated. Thus it
would be preferable to disaggregate expenditure by crime and resources
utilised. However, as also noted in Chapter Three, lack of data constrains the
use of any alternative formulation: over 1970 to 1978 Her Majestys Chief
Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland Annual Reports published expenditure
levels for regional force as an aggregate basis only. In light of the above, it is
necessary to conclude therefore that the relationship between certainty and
expenditure should be interpreted with particular caution.
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E was derived by revising actual (as opposed to estimated) annual expenditure
per financial year (ending April) per police area to real terms per calendar year.
Table 13A illustrates changes in E over 1970-78. Regional levels of E
increased throughout the whole period in all cases excepting Central (+ 19%)
and Fife (+27%) by between 39% to 45%. In all cases the rate of change of E
was greater over 1970-74 compared to 1974-78 excepting Dumfries (20% and
25% respectively). This reflects the joint influence of higher rates of inflation
and a reduced commitment of government funding to regional councils in the
latter period. Finally the relative levels of E remained comparatively stable,
Central, Dumfries, Fife and Grampian recording on average the lowest levels of
E (under £6 per head of population) Lothian, Northern, Strathclyde and Tayside
receiving the highest levels of E (over £7 per head of population).
Finally in order to separately identify the Certainty function from the set of
equations postulated it is necessary to introduce a control variable. As the
formal economic theory does not provide a basis from which to chose such a
variable, and given the relative lack of available Scottish regional data, the
control variable used is:
Pd =
Population density (per square kilometre) per
police area.
It is assumed that the higher Pd the lower PI as high density populations
increase potential criminals anonymity and mobility: "the more densely
populated a given locality, the greater the likelihood that anonymity will be
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preserved by a law breaker, and hence the smaller the probability of his being
apprehended"; N.Y. GREENWOOD AND W.T. WADYCK; (1973). In addition
experimental studies (as outlined by B. LATANE and J. DARLEY (1970)) indicate
that the larger the number of witnesses to a crime the less likely any
individual will intervene or alert the police. Finally it may be argued that Pd
reflects the ability of the police to respond to crime since the police force is a
'public good' and hence, ceteris paribus, the demands upon a force for all its
services rises as Pd rises. However, it should be noted that Pd may also
reflect differences in the 'crime-mix' between rural and urban areas. Urban
areas tend to have both higher levels of Pd, and a higher proportion of violent
to total offences; as the police typically devote more time to solving violent
crimes, such crimes tend to have higher clear-up rates.
Changes in Pd are illustrated by Table 14A. In all cases except marginally
Lothian (-0,75%), Pd increased continuously throughout 1970-78. The largest
rise occurred in Tayside (+ 18%) the lowest in Dumfries (+ 1%). In addition
the relative levels of Pd remained stable, however the range of Pd across
regions was particularly marked - the lowest levels, 0.03 and 0.09 occurring in
Northern and Dumfries respectively, with the highest 1.04 occurring in Fife.
4.3.3. Expenditure Function
C = f (O, P)
(2)
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E = Yt Or+ + Y2P1 + Z"=3 YiXp + Yc + e3
(cl)
As already argued in Chapter Three E should be excluded from the crime rate
function because it is only through the 'output' of the police, namely Pv that E
is assumed to influence Or. In turn in order to identify this function, E is
assumed to be predetermined (via budgetary cycles) by prior crime rates:
Or+_ !
One year lagged annual recorded crimes per
capita per police area.
With regard to control variables two were chosen:
'r =
Annual actual per capita real total rate income per
police area.
Pd =
population density (per square kilometre) per
police area.
IR is assumed to represent the budget constraint upon E: Scottish police
forces being under local as opposed to central government control.
Furthermore since Or is expected to be positively corelated with I (in the crime
Rate Function), it is assumed that not only do higher levels of lR allow for
higher levels of E, but also that higher levels of E will be demanded, i.e. the
income elasticity of demand for police protection is expected to be positive
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(assuming that expenditures on safeguarding property do not shift from public
to private protection as income increases).
IR is estimated by revising actual annual regional expenditure per financial year
(ending April) to real terms per calendar year. Since 'actual' regional
expenditure statistics were not published by cities, counties and large and
small burghs over 1974/75, expenditure totals for this period were weighted by
the annual average relative proportion of total 'actual' expenditure per region
over 1973/74 and 1975/76. Changes in lR are illustrated at Table I5A. In all
cases lR increased between 1970-78; the proportionate change in lR being
greater over the period 1970-74 compared to the period 1974-78 (and in the
case of Fife, a decline occurred of 6% in this latter period). On average
Northern, £115, experienced the highest levels, with other regions levels
clustered around an average level of £95.50.
The second control variable chosen, Pd, is assumed to account for any
dis/economies of scale in the cost of providing police services. As
W.J. BAUMELL (1963) postulated, the cost of externalities is likely to rise more
rapidly than the population since the probability of human interaction
occurring over a unit of space increases as Pd increases.
4.3.4. Recording Effect
Or = f (p,C....)
(59)
Or = cXtPt + a2P2 + ot3 F + Z"=4 otj Xj1
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- (1 + aO [6t Pn + 62Ov + E4] + a0 + (a'0 + a0) D + e,
(d1)
To account for the 'recording effects' discussed in Chapter Three it is assumed
that in the original crime rate function (a1) that:




Annual 'actual' crimes per capita per police area
Pia +
Annual 'actual' detection rate by class of crime
and police area.
, and that the ratio between the actual crime level and the recorded crime
level is given, in log-linear form by:




Annual actual number of police personnel per
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capita per police area.
Ov =
Ratio of annual recorded class II crimes to the
total annual recorded class II and III crimes per
police area.
so given that, again in log-linear form:
Pia + Oa = P1 + Or
(dii)
Pia and Oa may be substituted out of the original crime rate function (al) to
yield dl above.
The two variables, Pn and Ov, are assumed to reflect the (potential) influence
of recording effects on the following grounds. Firstly increases in Pn are
expected to increase both the reporting of crime as : "more policemen are
likely to increase the recording rate not by observing more crimes themselves
and by making it easier or more worthwhile for a citizen to report them
"R. THALER (1977). Secondly, it is expected that the more 'violent' the crime
mix the more likely Or is to accurately reflect Oa; as R.F. SPARKS et al (1977)
survey of London crime victims indicated: "notifying the police is mainly a
function of the objective seriousness of the incident in commonsense terms".
Data for Pn was derived from Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary for
Scotland's Annual Reports. Pn includes all male and female regular police
officers recorded per force as at 31st December of each year. Additional
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employees (e.g. Traffic Wardens) were not included: public perceptions of the
benefits of reporting crime are assumed to depend only the number of police
officers available.
The changes in the number of police officers per 1000 capita are recorded in
Table 16A. In all areas the number of police officers per capita increased over
1970-78. The largest rise occurred in Dumfries + 27% the lowest in Fife 1%.9
Comparison of average levels of P ower 1970-74 and 1974-78 indicate that for
all areas except Dumfries the increase in police officers per capita was higher
in the former period. Finally the relative levels of police per capita remained
stable. Strathclyde, Lothian, Tayside and Northern respectively employed the
highest levels power capita (over two police officers per 1000 population
1970-1978). Grampian, Fife, Central and Dumfries police areas employed the
lowest levels (below two police officers per 1000 population).
With regards to Ov, the ratio of Class II to total Class II and III crimes. Table
17A illustrates changes over 1970-78. Except in the case of Dumfries (+ 8%)
and marginally Lothian (+ 1%) and Strathclyde (+ 2%) the regional levels of Ov
declined over 1970-78. In addition, excepting Fife the absolute changes in Ov
was greater over 1970-74 than 1975-78; the direction of change being
negative for all areas except Dumfries (+ 28%) and Lothian (+ 3%) over
1970-74 and Northern (+ 8%) over 1975-78. However the relative levels of Ov
remained stable. Central Belt areas recorded proportionally more violent
crimes than elsewhere, and in all cases except Tayside10 the change in OV
over 1974-75 ran counter to proceeding trends. Coupled with the relative
stability of Ov after 1975 this indicates a change in recording practices and/or
a change in the actual number of Class II crimes committed.
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P1f+ = Z£0 4>i PI +-i z£0 <|>i = 1
(el)
P2P+ = Z"0 <j,i P2 +-i l"0 <t>i = 1
(e2)
FP+ = (|>i FP +- i Z~0 4>i = 1
(e3)
As there may be delays in the transmission of sanctions data and because
deterrence implies past demonstrations of punishment effect the present
conduct of potential offenders it is assumed that expectations (about expected
punishment) are generated by a distributed bag on past values of recorded
levels of certainty and punishment levels, i.e. P1P+, P2P+ and FP+ are the
perceived detection rate, conviction rate and average sentence length in period
+ by class of crime and police area respectively. The restrictions placed on
the lag structure (over el to e3 above) are described by <j>.
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Obviously the ( simple) autoregressive models postulated assume that it is
delays in the transmission of data that generate differences between actual
and expected punishment. This implies that potential offenders are 'locked in
by the past' and therefore ignore current conditions in making their predictions
(except insofar as past demonstrations of punishment influence present
expectations). It would be preferable, as outlined in Chapter Three, to
postulate a set of alternative prior information sets for sub classes of the
potential offender population. However given the theoretical basis of "cosmic
utility analysis", this would (necessarily) involve the incorporation of
alternative, and in more cases conflicting, criminological and
non-criminalogical behaviour models.11
4.3.6. The Severity Effect
f = f(o ....)
(62)
F = Tii Or + n2 U + ri0 + e5
(f1)
In order to account for any (potential) severity effects it is assumed that an
appropriate control variable is that of
U = prison utilization index
; since the existing prison capacity acts as a short-run constraint upon
sentences it is expected that F will be negatively related to U in order to
relieve the pressure on prison capacity.
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However in determining the appropriate prison utilization ratio no theoretical
basis is apparent - the effect of other sentences, the influence of regional
capacities, and the time horizon involved all may, potentially, influence
sentencers actions. As a result two alternatives are suggested: general
capacity (PUG); and regional capacity (PUR).
PUG: General prison utilization ratio. In order to account for the influence
upon present sentence rates of both previous years and the current number of
offenders sentenced for ail offences:
PUGo,IM = So,x + So,
Po, n
0 = 1,2
n = 1970 .... 1978





= general prison utilization for all
offences of type 0 in year n.
= number of offences of type 0 sentenced
in year x with median sentence length
still current in year n
= number of offence type O sentenced in
year n
= total prison places for all offences of
type 0 in current year n.
The type of offences which were matched to Class II and Class III crimes were
related to the court in which they were proceeded against: "in Scotland there
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are three criminal counts: these are the High Court of Justiciary, the Sheriff
Court and the District (or summary) court. Broadly speaking the High Court
deals with the more serious crimes, the Sheriff Courts with the less serious
offences, and the District courts with minor offences". SCOTTISH OFFICE
(1981). Accordingly crimes proceeded against in the High Court of Justiciary
and Sheriff Courts were matched to Class II offences and those proceeded
against in the District or Summary Courts were matched to Class III offences.
The Scottish prisons which predominantly held offenders in these categories
are listed in Table 18A.
It is apparent, from Table 19A, that over 1970-78 although the prison places
available for offenders sentenced for serious crimes declined (PU2G increased
by 46%), there was no overall constraint upon availability (the average level of
PU2G being 0.78). In contrast, the average level of prison utilization for less
serious offences was 1.059 - on average there were insufficient prison places
available in prisons designated to hold offenders convicted for all 'less serious'
crimes, despite increases in prison places (+32.5%) and a resultant decline in
PU3G of 37% over 1970- 78. However added together the combined effect of
these two trends was marginal: the general prison utilization for all crimes fell
by 3% over 1970-78, with the average level of utilization being 0.89.
PUR: Region prison utilization ratio. In order to capture the potential effect of
present regional prison place availability upon current sentences across each
region:
PURa = DPPa a = 1 8
PPa
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PURa = Annual regional prison utilization ratio for
police area a, prisons and other offender
institutions.
DPPa = average annual daily prison population for
all classes of offences in police area a
prisons and other offender institutions.
PPa = average annual prison places available
in police area a, prisons and other offender
institutions for all classes of offences.
The institutions appropriate to each police area are outlined in Table 20A;
prisons for general as opposed to local use had places allocated to each
region according to that regions relative proportion of convictions. Changes in
PURg are illustrated in Table 21A. It is apparent that in all cases except
Dumfries (0.68) the average level of PUR lies above 1.0. The apparent
inconsistency between these levels and PUG results from two effects. Firstly
PUR includes prison inmates awaiting trial, and secondly, PUG is calculated on
the assumption that the probability of an offender being imprisoned is equal
over all months in the year; in contrast PUR reflects the influence of seasonal
fluctuations in sentencing.
Despite these differences, PUR does illustrate relative differences in regional
prison capacity ratios - on average the highest levels of PUR occurred in
Lothian, Northern and Strathclyde (1.38, 1.33, and 1.25 respectively) whereas
the rest of the regions, except Dumfries, all experienced lower levels
approximately equal to 1.0. Finally, the relative changes in PUR across regions
followed no consistent pattern. Over the whole period PUR decreased in five
regions, the largest fall in Lothian (-34%) while in the other areas, namely
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Dumfries, Northern and Tayside, PUR increased. Similarly changes over
1970-74 and 1974-78 were apparently unrelated: in only one area, Strathclyde,
did PUR change in the same manner over the two periods (decreasing by -19%
and -4.5% respectively).
4.4. Conclusion
It is apparent from the preceeding data analysis that for Scotland as a whole,
over the period of 1970 to 1978, class II and II crime rates rose (Class III
proportionally more), and correspondingly, detection rates fell. The response
of the C.J.S. to these (presumably) related trends differed over classes: both
conviction and sentence rates rose for Class II crimes whereas they both fell
in the case of Class III offences; constraints upon Class III prison places, as
opposed to the apparent Class II availability may offer a partial explanation. In
conjunction (and possibly in response to the rise in crime levels) expenditure
per force, and the number of police officers employed, also rose throughout
the period. Finally the identified proxy for gains, real income, rose throughout,
whereas that for opportunity cost, unemployment, only progressively increased
after 1974.
It is also clear that the reorganisation of local government in 1975 may be
regarded as a 'cut-off' point between the preceeding and later time periods.
While the full implications of this change upon model structures are analysed
in the next chapter, the disproportionate rise in offence rates over 1974 to
1975, and the reduction in the rates of increase in rateable income,
expenditure, and police numbers, all suggest that the apparent increases in
recorded (and possibly actual) crime levels, and the ability of the C.J.S. to
respond to these increases, may have altered after reorganisation.
115
Finally, it is evident that there are distinct regional differences across Scotland,
in terms of both the levels of crime experienced, and attendant levels of
C.J.S. resources and socio-economic conditions. In broad terms, the highest
levels of crime, police per capita, expenditure, both income levels, prison
regional capacities, and the lowest levels of detection occur in the two urban
groupings of Lothian and Strathclyde, and Grampian and Tayside, whereas the
lowest levels of crime, etc. occur in the two rural groupings of Central and
Fife, and Northern and Dumfries.
In conclusion therefore, the estimation and analysis of the C.J.S. model
outlined requires the incorporation of the above, namely, differences across
classes, the effects of reorganisation, and apparent regional variations.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1. Introduction
The purpose of Chapter Five is to provide an overview and analysis of the
estimations obtained using the model of the Scottish Criminal Justice System
developed in the previous Chapter. A staged analysis is adopted whereby
estimations for the whole of Scotland, as well as both crime classes, are
contrasted with results using separate classes and regions. It is necessary
however, in order to place this analysis in context, to outline the approach to,
and constraints upon, model specification and estimation procedures.
The approach adopted, as implied by Chapter Four, is to combine all a priori
information available, develop a general decision framework, and then
undertake estimation. While this would suggest sequential testing procedures
(either from the most 'general' model, or alternatively 'restricted' model
versions outlined) there are obvious problems in the use of such procedures.
Firstly there is no apparent natural ordering of hypotheses (particularly in the
case of the crime supply function), some of the models are non-nested (for
example aggregate functions compared to Class II functions) and thirdly some
of the proxies postulated are clearly poor approximations to ideal conceptions
(for example, expenditure). Finally, in light of the results outlined, there would
appear to be limited value in undertaking formal exhaustive test procedures.
Paramount constraints are data quantity and quality. The use of pooled data,
and thus cross-section time series analysis, is dictated by the relatively small
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annual sample size of eight police force regions (interpretation is assumed to
be that of a time series of cross sections in line with the 'short-term' policy
implications inherent in the economic approach - see Chapter Three).
Moreover while elimination of the structural change caused by reorganisation
would be preferable, the redefinition of offences after 1978, and the limited
data set per region over 1970 to 1974, and 1976 to 1978, again results in the
intractable problem of degrees of freedom given the general decision
framework adopted. Finally the lack of juvenile and disaggregated expenditure
data, as well as reorganisation obviously place severe constraints upon data
quality, and therefore the robustness of the results obtained.
From the above it is clear that the type and depth of analysis is limited by the
data set available and the general framework adopted. As a result emphasis is
placed upon the changes upon the general framework which may be inferred
from the initial data analysis in Chapter Four (i.e. reorganisation, and
differences over crime types and regions), and where possible, changes where
specific results conflict with a priori theory. It is assumed that these changes
require more examination whereas results which conform with theory do not,
given the previous theoretical analysis and the conformity of previous studies
results with this analysis.
Finally, it is concluded that on balance the results obtained from the analysis
outlined do not provide a sufficient basis from which to derive policy
conclusions concerning the actual operation of the Scottish system.
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5.2. Approach
Initial estimates are derived from analysing the functions outlined in Chapter
Four (i.e. (a) to (f)) across both crime classes (aggregated crime rates) and all
Scottish police authorities (aggregate regional structure). Three different
model structures are used:
Model One
Crime Rate function with and without recording effects
Certainty function.
Model Two




Crime Rate function with and without recording effects
Certainty function
Expenditure function
Severity function using both prison indexes.
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However before examining the results obtained from these model structures it
is necessary to outline the approach taken to aggregation.
While data constraints dictate the use of pooled date, the choice of testing is
not clear cut since observations over the period of 1970 to 1978 form three
interdependant groups: offences (two crime classes); regional (eight police
authorities) and structured (pre and post local Government (Scotland) Act,
1975). Discussed below are the significance of these differences and the
procedural steps taken to account for them within the general model
structures.
5.2.1. Crime Rates
A priori Class II crimes (crimes against property with violence) and Class III
crimes (crimes against property without violence) may be aggregated.
Although definitionally precise the actual category of crime recorded depends
on a series of factors which may cloud the difference between classes.
Firstly, the category of crime recorded depends on a police officer's judgement
of the circumstances reported to him or her. Variations are inevitable: "there
are no hard and fast rules to cover classification of every criminal act and to
this extent the classification depends on the subjective judgement of the
investigating police officers". SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL STATISTICS 1977 (1978).
Secondly, this classification may be altered by the procurator fiscal. Again
variations, across fiscals and regional offices, result. For example, as indicated
by the quotes of various fiscals to S.R. MOODY & J. TOMBS (1982), differences
between fiscals: "who knows what is standard ... we do not really have clear
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guidance on this .... it should be more or less the same in all offices but some
people are working with a different understanding of the concept of
seriousness from others." In addition, differences between offices; "there are
bound to be regional variations, as in the Western Isles context behaviour A is
really serious, behaviour B is not serious. In Edinburgh, it is the other way
round".
Finally, classification may be altered during court proceedings. The actual
difference between Class II and III crimes is therefore vague. In contrast the
effect of regional differences and structural change may be more clear.
5.2.2. Regional Differences
Scottish regions are distinct: the initial data analysis presented in the previous
chapter revealed differences on the basis of all variables used. For example,
the mean per capita value of Class II and III crimes ranged from 0.019
(Dumfries and Galloway) to 0.049 (Strathclyde); police personnel from 0.0017
(Northern) to 0.0024 (Strathclyde) and real income, at 1970 price levels, from
£410.73 (Northern) to £522.19 (Lothian and Borders).
In addition since police forces in Scotland are under local and not central
government control, police strategies are determined by each local Chief
Constable. Their response is determined by regional conditions and the
resources they command; both these factors differ over forces. This may be
illustrated by the case of Strathclyde. Historically it has experienced both the
highest per capita crime rates and police personnel. Concurrently the region
established the first Scottish regional crime squad, flying squad, support unit,
and fully computerized monitoring system.
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5.2.3. Structural Differences
On the 16th May 1973 local government areas in Scotland were reorganised.
A priori all endogenous variables used in the model structures outlined may be
affected.
Crime Rates
Reorganisation reduced the number of Scottish police forces from twenty to
eight and resulted in new, standardized methods of recording crime being
introduced. As previously stated this is likely to have led to less serious or
clear cut crimes being recorded causing a (potential): "increase in the statistics
of crime when compared with previous years." SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH
DEPARTMENT, SCOTTISH CRIMINAL STATISTICS 1975 (1976).
Certainty Rates
As a result of less 'clear-cut crimes' being recorded after 1974: "many of the
crimes which were unrecorded prior to regionalisation were unsolved cases".
SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT, SCOTTISH CRIMINAL STATISTICS
1979 (1981). So if after 1974 the rise in recorded crime led directly to a fall in
the number of crimes cleared up, ceteris paribus, detection rates would fall.
Police Expenditure
1975 marked the beginning of central government's attempts to reduce
Scottish local government expenditure. Since this time central government
grants as a percentage of total local expenditure have continually fallen. In
1975 Central Government planned to reduce the new Scottish authorities total
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expenditure by 16.4% between 1975 and 1982 using: "the leverage implicit in
the grant system to enforce these spending cuts"; D. HEALD (1982). Police
expenditure did not remain unaffected - in 1975 real expenditure per capita on
regional forces fell on average by -0.48%, and while it rose again thereafter
the annual average increase was reduced to 2.99% over 1975 to 1978
compared with 4.75% over 1970 - 1974.
Sentence Rates
Prior to 1975 the fiscal service presented cases in the Sheriff Court only: local
authority solicitors dealt with all the business of burgh justices of the peace
and stipendary courts. After 1975 Procurator Fiscals undertook all
prosecutions in these courts. This may have led to a change in the allocation
of cases to different courts and thus the sentences imposed. As MOODY and
TOMBS (1982) noted Procurator Fiscals tended to be critical of the lay judiciary
on four counts: lack of legal knowledge; absence of professional training; lack
of court experience; and finally (as a result) 'too lenient sentences'. Prior to
1975 such attitudes could not practically impose upon case allocation, but
after 1975: "our examination of these attitudes adopted .... suggests that such
evaluations are critical to the distribution of business between summary
courts." For example they quote a Procurator Fiscal who stated: "we might
feel that there are evidentual complexities or something which they might not
be able to cope with terribly well and we would want a Sheriff to deal with
this although on the face of the actual offence it is District Court material."
In contrast to crime classes, therefore, it is apparent from the above that on
aggregate, regional differences and structural change may have a significant
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affect on model structures. Initial analysis confirmed this: in the majority of
cases (see Table B1) F-tests for each function rejected the hypothesis that
pooled regional co-efficients were the same. Accordingly dummy variables
were introduced to (potentially) account for these significant differences
across regions. Initially two types of dummy variables were used.
Regional (DR)
To account for potential differences in the regional levels of endogenous
variables over the WHOLE sample period, dummies for seven regions were
introduced into pooled equations (for each function) with the 'reference' region
being Northern. The value of each regional dummy being one over its own
sample for 1970 to 1978, and zero over all other sample points.
Regional-Structural (DFtX)
To account for potential differences in the regional levels of the endogenous
variables as a RESULT of structural change1 dummy variables for seven
regions FROM 1975 were introduced, again with Northern as the reference
region. The value of each regional dummy being one over its own sample for
1975-1978, and zero over all other sample points.
To test the hypothesis of equality of all aggregated regional co-efficients
using both these types of dummies, F tests, similar to the above, were carried
out on each function. Results of this co-variance analysis are presented at
Table B2. It is apparent that across all functions the introduction of one of the
above dummy variables allows estimation on an aggregate (i.e. crime and
regional) basis. For three functions the hypothesis is rejected for one of the
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dummies: DRX in the case of the crime rate without recording effects and the
expenditure rate, and DR in the case of the certainty rate. However in both
other cases - the crime rate with recording effects and the severity rate - the
hypothesis of equality of all co-efficients is not rejected for either set of
dummies.
While the above indicates (except in the case of the certainty function) that
regional differences over the whole period, rather than structural change after
1975 predominate, since initial results (should) provide an instrumental basis
for further analysis and thus explanation, the choice of the 'appropriate'
dummy was left open; estimation proceeded for all functions where the
hypothesis of equality was not rejected.
This openendedness however leads to various 'dummy combinations'; across
models one to three and it is therefore necessary to estimate a series of
difference model types. These model types are presented at Table B3.
For example in the case of model one three model types are estimated:
Functions Dummy Variables
(i) Model One A




(ii) Model One B




(iii) Model One C





Thus to reiterate, initial results are based on the following:
- aggregated crime classes and regions:
- four functions: and
- three model structures, and consequent 'dummy model
types';
5.3. Initial Results
All model structures were subject to two stage least squares regression
analysis. Across these stuctures, type A {regional dummies for all functions
except certainty) provided the most relatively consistent and statistically
significant results. Detailed discussion of this model type, therefore, provides
a basis for comparing both general trends across the other model structures
and further analysis. Type A model structure co-efficient results are presented
at Table One; analysis of these results is given below.
5.3.1. Crime Rate Function
Across the model structures (in Table One) both probability co-efficients tend
to be consistent with theorectical prediction; both are generally significant
with (negative) elasticity values of less than one. However contrary to
BECHER's original optimum conditions (Chapter One) and previous studies
results (Chapter Three) the elasticity of certainty (ranging from -0.14 to -0.32)
is less than the elasticity of conviction conditional on capture (-0.44 to -0.52),
indicating that offences, and therefore those who commit offences, are more
responsive to an increase in the probability of imprisonment conditional upon
capture than an equal increase in the probability of capture itself. Moreover
sentence lengths co-efficients while significant are positive (+0.62 to +1.12)
implying that reductions in punishment levels would result in a fall in offences
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greater to than those resulting for any equivalent proportionate increase in the
probabilities of capture.
While it may be tempting to draw certain policy conclusions from these
results, on the basis that a redistribution of resources away from the prison
service towards the police force would, ceteris paribus, reduce offence levels
for the crime classes analysed, such conclusions should be tempered by the
previous analysis of the affects of crime rates upon sentence rates. A priori,
this affect may be ambiguous: the output of the penal system namely the
severity of punishment, may be determined BY crime (through sentences belief
in deterrence and receividism affects - see Chapter Three) as well as being a
determining factor OF crime. Of the model structures estimated only Model
Three attempts to isolate these two effects, but even in this case there is no
evidence of an isolated deterrent effect (the Model Three Crime Rate Function
elasticates values with respect to sentence lengths are +0.68 and +1.12
respectively). It is more tempting therefore to conclude, within the context of
the theorectical analysis of this study, that a positive severity effect would
appear to predominate.
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TABLE ONE : CD-EFFICIENT VALOES
MODELS ONE TO THREE TYPE A RESULTS
MODEL ONE (A)
L023 = -7.74 C -0.14 LP1 -0.44 LP3 +0.79 LS +0.47 LIN +0.38 LU
(-12.96)** (-0.89) (-4.72)** (3.94)** (4.64)** (6.33)
R2 = 0.93
LP1 = -4.85 C -0.89 LO +0.40 LEP +0.04 LPD
(-9.36)** (-9.37)** (3.19)** (2.09)*
R2 = 0.72
MODEL TWO (A)
L023 = -7.54 C -0.22 LP1 -0.52 LP3 +0.62 LS +0.40 LIN +0.31 LU
(13.30)** (-1.79)* (-5.57)** (3.47)** (4.04)** (5.66)**
R2 = 0.92
LP1 = -5.40 C -0.98 L023 +0.51 LEP +0.06 LPD
(-8.13)** (-8.22)** (3.11)** (2.24)**
R2 = 0.70
LEP = -0.09 C -0.05 L023L -0.18 LP123 +0.90 LRI +0.67 LPD
(0.08) (0.08) (-2.56)** (6.67)** (2.98)**
R2 = 0.88
MODEL THREE (A) LPUG
L023 = -7.59 C -0.32 LP1 -0.49 LP3 +0.68 LS +0.42 LIN +0.29 LU
(-12.91)** (-2.44)** (-5.08)** (3.28)** (4.04)** (5.09)**
R2 = 0.93
LP1 = -5.IOC -0.93 LO +0.45 LEP +0.05 LPD
(-7.56)** (-7.64)** (2.75)** (1.89)*
R2 = 0.68
LEP = -0.11C -0.005 L023L -0.27 LP1 +0.93 LRI +0.74 LPD
(-0.09) (-0.06) (-2.59)** (6.33)** (2.98)**
R2 = 0.87
LS = -0.80 +0.02 LO -0.22 LPUG
(-2.25)** (0.19) (-1-10)
R2 = 0.1
tO.01 = ** to.05 = *
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MODEL THREE (A) LPUR
L023 = -7.53 C -0.29 LP1 -0.46 LP3 +1.12 LS +0.48 LIN +0.31 LU
(-11.49)** (-1.97)** (-4.26)** (4.16)** (4.07)** (4.89)**R2 = 0.91
LP1 = -5.05 C -0.92 LO +0.44 LEP +0.05 LPD
(-7.57)** (-7.65)** (2.79)** (1.85)* R2 = 0.68
LEP = -0.13 C -0.01 L023L -0.28 LP1 +0.94 LRI +0.74 LPD
(0.10) (-0.12) (2.60)** (6.30)** (2.98)** R2 = 0.87
LS = -0.49C +0.08 LO -0.06 LPUR
(-2.40)* (1.40)* (-0.74) R2 = 0.01

















Annual recorded crimes (class II and III) per
capita per police area (Or)
Ratio of annual recorded crimes for which one or
more persons were apprehended to number of annual
recorded crimes per police area (Pi)
Ratio of number of people convicted and sentenced
for detention to the number of people proceeded
against (P3)
Ratio of total length of current sentences for
persons sentenced to detention to the average
number of people sentenced (F3)
Annual total net real personal income per capita
(I).
Annual unemployment rate (U).
Actual annual per capita real police expenditure
(E).
Population density per square kilometre (PD)
One year lagged annual recorded crimes per capita
(Or +-1).
Annual actual per capita real total rate income
(Ir)
General prison utilisation ratio (PUG)
Region prison utilisation ratio (PUR)
Note: Detailed analysis of each variable, by reference
to the variable parenthesis (e.g. Or) is given at
Chapter Four.
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Control variables, income and unemployment, are consistent with initial
expectations: both co-efficient values are significantly related to the crime rate
(ranging from +0.46 to +0.48 and +0.29 and +0.38 respectively). Increases in
the potential gains from crime (income) therefore appear to 'generate' greater
increases in crime than an equivalent percentage rise in the opportunity cost
of crime (unemployment). However in contrast to the generalised results of
previous studies neither appear to exert a significantly greater affect than the
deterrent variables analysed.
5.3.2. Certainty Rate Function
As indicated in Table One, co-efficient values for all Type A structures are
significant and, excepting population density, consisted with theoretical
expectations. Offence rates are negatively related to certainty; increases in
the offence rate lead to near proportionate falls in the probability of capture
(offence rate co-efficient values range from -0.89 to -0.98). Expenditure
co-efficient values are positive and significant. Thus while a poor proxy for
the resources devoted to the crime classes analysed, it would appear that an
increase in the overall level of real expenditure devoted to all police resources
resulted in an increase in police output (i.e. the probability of capture) for
these classes. Unfortunately as already discussed in Chapter Four, the overall
impact (expenditure co-efficient values range from +0.40 to +0.51) cannot be
separated in terms of individual labour or capita inputs.
Finally, population densities are positively related to certainty, ranging in value
from +0.05 to +0.06. While the result may be interpreted to reflect the
influence of differing crime mixes across regions, it is more likely to be a
result of economically depressed regions declining population levels higher
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rates of crime and therefore lower probability of capture. In either case
however this result is contrary to the initial expectation (outlined in Chapter
Three) that higher population densities reduce the likelihood of capture.
5.3.3. Expenditure Rate Function
Over both models two and three, real expenditure per capita per police force
is significantly but negatively related to the probability of apprehension (with a
co-efficient value of between -0.27 and -0.28). This is counter-intuitive; in
theory costs increase as the probability of conviction increases. Moreover an
alternative theoretical explanation - that of a predominant recording effect -
does not appear to hold either. The prediction that increases in certainty
reflect reduced costs (i.e. lower costs reduce police resources increasing
certainty by recorded offences falling proportionally more than crimes cleared
up) is not consistent with the results that expenditure co-efficients are
positively related to certainty (certainty function), while being unrelated to
recorded past offence levels (expenditure function).
This latter result - that past offence levels appear to have no statistically
discernible effect upon expenditure - is also counter to theoretical prediction.
If it is assumed that previous crime rate levels are the relevant reference
(since expenditure levels are planned at the beginning of the financial year in
advance of annual actual crime levels), then as crime rates rise over time it
would be predicted that additional resources would be needed in order to
maintain a given level of apprehension. This relationship however is not
apparent from the results obtained.
Finally, both exogenous variables, rateable income and population density, do
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accord with theorectical prediction. Both co-efficient values are positively and
significantly related to expenditure reflecting a positive income elasticity of
demand for criminal justice services (co-efficient values of +0.93 and +0.94
respectively) with diseconomies of scale in the production of these services
(+0.74 in both cases).
5.3.4. Severity Rate Function
As indicted in Table Two, both prison utilization indexes are statistically
insignificant. In addition, for the general index function (PUG) no relationships
are discernible, and while for the regional index (PUR) offence levels are
positively related to sentences ( +0.08 co-efficient value) the same relation
holds for the crime rate function. It is apparent therefore that on its own, and
within the initial model structures, the severity function provides no evidence
of capacity constraints influencing sentence rates, nor any evidence of a
separate deterrent effect; as indicated above a positive severity effect appears
to predominate
5.4. Initial Conclusions
It is apparent that across the model types analysed the crime rate and
certainty rate functions do provide limited evidence of deterrence but the
expenditure and severity functions neither alter the above nor add any clear or
predictable impact themselves. Moreover outline investigation of the other
model types examined, using recording effects and regional structural
dummies, further reduces the (a priori) implications which may be drawn from
initial results. While police per capita and the proportion of violent offences
are in most cases positively and significantly related to offence rates,
suggesting the potential influence of recording effects, their introduction
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reduces the statistical significance of the deterrence variables used.2 In
addition as initial variance analysis indicates the introduction of a regional
structural break after 1974 appears to provide less consistent results in
comparison to accounting for regional differences across the whole period.
Given the above, and the theoretical framework from which they are
interpreted, results which are inconsistent with theoretical prediction (i.e.
sentence lengths in the crime rate function, and probability of apprehension in
the expenditure function) or insignificant (i.e. past offence levels in the
expenditure function) necessitate further explanation. It is appropriate
therefore given initial data constraints to determine whether an explanation is
provided by using alternative model stuctures. Since initial results are based
upon both aggregated crime rates and regional structure resultant alternatives
are as follows:
(a) though on the margin actual definitional differences
between classes may be vague, on aggregate (as indicated
in Chapter Four) there may be differences in the practices
adopted to deal with them. Relaxing the assumption of
aggregated crime rates therefore, results in disaggregating
classes and analysing them separately for Scotland as a
whole.
(b) As already discussed regional and structural differences
would appear to be significant. Relaxing the assumption of
aggregated regional structure therefore allows analysis of
(any) differences in practices and structural change
amongst regions for aggregated crime rates.
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(c) Finally, relaxing both the above assumptions together
allows analysis of any inter-regional differences over
separate class types.
5.4.1. Disaggregated Crime Rates
The basis for estimation of Scottish disaggregated crime rate functions is
equivalent to that upon which the initial findings derived from aggregate rate
functions are based except that:
- offences are analysed separately, and not together by class
type:
- and, the proportion of violent to non-violent offences is
(necessarily) excluded as an explanatory variable.
Furthermore, since aggregate regional differences and structural change may
still have a significant affect upon model structures, co-variance analysis
similar to that for aggregated classes was undertaken for all functions across
both class types. The results obtained from this analysis, and the resultant
estimated model structures, are discussed below by crime class type.
5.4.2. Class II Crimes
Using the same F-tests as outlined at Table B1 the hypothesis of equality of
all pooled regression co-efficients without dummies was rejected for each
function (see Table B4). Inclusion of the two sets of dummy variables in each
function provided the results shown in Table B5. As is apparent, across the
majority of functions, there is only one set of dummies namely regional
dummies (DR) where the hypothesis of equality of all pooled co- efficients
with dummies is not rejected, although in the case of the severity function the
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hypothesis was not rejected for either set of dummies and model three
therefore has two types as given in Table B6. In the case of the crime rate
function with inclusion of a recording effect the hypothesis was rejected for
both sets of dummies. (For disaggregated crime classes this effect is
assumed to be represented by police per capita per region only). Inclusion of
the recording effect therefore prevents estimation of an aggregate Scottish
class II crime rate function indicating instead a difference across regions for
both recording practices and/or responses to Class II crimes and the necessity
therefore to estimate disaggregated regional functions.
In contrast to the aggregate results outlined previously the estimates derived
from Class II functions are relatively poor; the inferences which may be drawn
across the two sets of results was therefore limited. As indicated in Table B7
the only significant and consistent relationship between endogenous variables
holds for offence rates and the probability of certainty in the crime rate and
certainty functions. However no statistically significant results are discernible
between:
- offence rates and the probability of imprisonment and
punishment levels;
- certainty rates and expenditure
- expenditure and the probability of capture
- severity and offence rates and prison utilization
Thus while the control variables of unemployment and income in the crime
rate function, and rateable income and population density in the expenditure
rate function, are all significant and positive and therefore consistent with a
priori expectations it is difficult not to draw the overall conclusion that Class II
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estimates provide little evidence of the initial theoretical predictions
postulated. Whether this is a result of misspecification (possibly resulting
from differences in the practices or constraints upon responding to Class II
rates as implied by the broad trends discernible in the basic data as outlined
in Chapter 4) remains open to question given the problems in formulating and
estimating a model within the original theoretical framework and available data
sources.
5.4.3. Class III Crimes
Adopting the same F-tests as those for Class II functions, the hypothesis of
equality of all pooled regression co-efficients (without dummies) was rejected.
Subsequent co-variance analysis of all aggregated functions, using both sets
of dummies, provided the results given at Table B8. As indicated for both DR
and DRX the hypothesis of equality was not rejected for any function except
expenditure (where DRX was rejected). Resultant 'model types' are given at
Table B9.
In comparison to Class II results, Class III estimates are relatively more
consistent with initial theoretical predictions, and therefore do allow inferences
to be drawn between these estimates and initial aggregate results. Across the
model types estimated for Class III crimes the most consistent and statistically
significant results were obtained for type C models (which, similar to the
aggregate model type A, include regional dummies for all functions except
certainty). Results for these model types are presented at Table Two.
Interpretation, by function, is discussed below.
137
5.4.4. Crime Rate Function
As outlined in Table Two across all model structures there are no significantly
inconsistent co-efficient values: deterrent co-efficients are negative and, with
the exception of sentence rates in models two and three, significant
throughout. Like the aggregated results reported in Table One, the elasticity
values of significant deterrent variables tend to be opposite to theoretical
prediction - the elasticity of capture (ranging from -0.25 to -0.31) being less
than that of conviction (ranging from -0.35 to -1.01) and in the case of Model
One, less than that of sentence lengths (-1.19). In comparison to aggregate
results Class III estimates therefore indicate relatively little difference in the
degree of responsiveness of changes in deterrent variables with the notable
exception of severity rates. For in contrast to an apparent dominance of a
positive severity affect over aggregated Class II and III crime types,
disaggregated Class III severity estimates indicate either a deterrent effect
(with a co-efficient value of -1.19 in Model One) or no apparent discernible
influence at all (models two and three). As outlined previously (in Chapter
Four) over the period studied Class III, as opposed to Class II crime rates, were
subject to prison capacity constraints. As outlined in Table Two, Model three
estimates do indicate a negative and significant effect upon prison sentences
of increases in Class III offences (-0.18 for LPUG and -0.24 for LPUR).
Accordingly in contrast to aggregate results, Class III sentence rates would
appear to be subject to a negative severity effect; however, the corresponding
deterrent effect, if any, remains unclear.3
The control variable results, in terms of directional influence and co-efficient
values are similar to aggregated estimates; both are significant, and as
expected positively related to crime rates, with the impact of changes in
TABLE TWO : CO-EFFICIENT VALUES
MODELS ONE TO THREE TYPE C RESULTS
MODEL ONE (C)
LO 3 = -9.64C -0.25 LP13 -0.35 LP33 -1.19 LS3 +0.45 LIN +0.21
(-14.75)** (-1.43)* (-1.81)* (-2.67)** (3.96)** (3.45
R2 = 0.85
LP13 -3.77 C -0.59 L03 +0.26 LEP -0.03 LPD
(-6.59)** (-5.84)** (2.23)* (-1.71)*
R2 = 0.52
MODEL TWO (B/C)
LO 3 = -9.62 C -0.31 LP13 -0.79 LP33 -0.16 LS3 +0.45 LIN +0.16 LU
(-15.29)** (-2.22)* (-3.78)** (-0.33) (4.08)** (3.04)**
R2 = 0.89
LP13 = -3.98 C -0.64 L03 +0.26 LEP -0.03 LPD
(-5.86)** (-5.43)** (1.83)* (-1.50)*
R2 = 0.48
LEP = -0.23 C -0.004 L03L -0.34 LP13 +0.95 LRI +0.73 LPD
(-0.19) (-0.05) (-3.27)** (6.34)** (2.58)**
R2 = 0.88
MODEL THREE (B/C) LPUG
LO 3 = -9.21 C -0.33 LP13 -1.01 LP33 +0.47 LS3 +0.45 LIN +0.18 LU
(-14.81) (-2.31)* (-2.81)** (0.50)** (4.13)** (2.97)**
R2 = 0.88
LP13 = -4.00 C -0.65 L03 +0.26 LEP -0.03 LPD
(-5.87)** (-5.48)** (1.80)* (-1.49)*
R2 = 0.48
LEP = 0.24 C -0.01 L03L -0.35 LP13 +0.96 LRI +0.74 LPD
(-0.20) (-0.14) (-3.44)** (6.28)** (2.60)**
R2 = 0.98
LS3 = -1.87 C -0.18 L03 +0.06 LPU3G
(-8.38)** (-3.43) (1.26)
R2 = 0.43
MODEL THREE (C) LPUR
LO 3 = -9.31 C -0.30 LP13 -0.56 LP33 -0.81 LS3 +0.40 LIN +0.16 LU
(-14.55)** (-2.05)* (-0.71) (-0.36) (3.00)** (2.16)*
R2 = 0.88
LP13 = -3.94 C -0.64 L03 +0.25 LEP -0.03 LPD
(-5.78)** (-5.38)** (1.74)* (-1.52)* R2 = 0.48
LOP = -0.26 C -0.02 L03L -0.37 LP13 +0.96 LRI +0.76 LPD
(0.21) (-0.23) (-3.43)** (6.20)** (2.61)**




tO.01 = ** tO.05 = *
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absolute income levels (+0.40 to +0.45) being greater than that of
unemployment rates (+0.16 to +0.21), and neither have a significantly greater
impact upon observed deterrent effects.
Finally, with the exception of sentence rates noted above, there are no major
differences in co-efficient values across the crime rate function model
structures estimated, suggesting as subsequent results (see below) confirm,
that the introduction of the expenditure and severity functions provide little
evidence of significant simultaneous effects upon initial model formulations.
5.4.5. Certainty Rate Functions
As Table Two indicates all co-efficient values are significant with crime rates
negatively related to certainty (co-efficient values range from -0.59 to -0.64)
expenditure positively related (+0.25 to +0.26) and population density
negatively related (- 0.03 throughout). In contrast to aggregated results
therefore the impact of changes in both offence levels and expenditure is
proportionally lower (compared to aggregate estimates the change in Class III
certainty rates for a given change in offence rates and expenditure is around
30% to 40% less) indicating that over the range of Class III crime rates
analysed changes in both these variables appear to have less impact upon
police efficiency. In addition, while for Class III crimes there is an apparent
reduced likelihood of capture in more densely populated areas this result
clearly conflicts with aggregated results and therefore the validity to be placed
on this particular effect in the case of Class III crimes should be interpreted
with caution. Finally, as in the case of Class III crime rate function
co-efficients, values for the certainty function do not tend to vary across
model structures.
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5.4.6. Expenditure Rate Function
Similar to aggregated results, Class III expenditure function estimates are not
consistent with theoretical prediction. Over the sample period the cost of
supplying police resources (expenditure) does not appear to be related to the
final output of these services (Class III offence levels). Moreover expenditure
levels are negatively related to certainty (ranging from -0.34 to -0.37)
suggesting that increases in the efficiency of the use of resources (via
increases in certainty) are related to reduced expenditure. Finally neither of
these results is consistent with other function values outlined above, namely
expenditure being positively related to capture in the certainty function, and
certainty being negatively related to offences in the crime rate function. There
appears therefore no evidence to support theoretically predicted changes in
expenditure, nor given these other results, the predominance of a recording
effect.
Finally, both central variables are consistent and significant: rateable income
and population density are positively related to expenditure, with values
ranging from +0.95 to +0.96 and +0.73 to +0.76 respectively. Since both these
ranges are similar to aggregated values (0.93 to 0.94 and 0.74 - see Table
One) the income elasticity of demand for criminal justice services as well as
the apparent diseconomies of scale in the production of these services does




As Table Two illustrates, while the level of offences is negatively and
significantly related to sentences (-0.18 and -0.24 respectively for general and
regional prison indexes) in neither case are prison utilization co-efficients
significant. There is some evidence, as discussed above for the crime rate
function; of a predominant 'negative severity effect' for Class III crimes i.e.
endogenous increases in offence levels increasing the marginal costs of
enforcement and therefore reducing the optimum level of sentences.
Moreover, if this is the case, prison utilization indexes should also (for the
same reason) be negatively related to sentences; this result is not apparent.
As discussed previously, disaggregation of crime classes allows analysis of
any differences across class types for Scotland as a whole. On this basis it is
clear that Class III estimates are relatively more consistent than those for
Class II. However this very result prevents any broad conclusions being
drawn. For example, in isolation, Class III results would suggest, on the basis
of initial theoretical predictions concerning the ranking of deterrence
evaluations, that the reallocation of a given level of C.J.S. resources away from
court and prison services towards the police would, by increasing the
probability of capture reduce social costs (as of course did previous
aggregated results). However such a conclusion cannot be made in isolation,
especially given that similar offence types (Class II crimes) exhibit little or no
evidence of being subject to any of the theoretical effects postulated. Against
the background of an economic model of the C.J.S. which should allow
generalised conclusions to be drawn concerning both crime types it would
thereby be inappropriate to base policy conclusions solely upon the more
consistent Class III estimates.
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Notwithstanding the above, and therefore before deriving any final conclusions,
it is necessary to determine what the effect is upon initial model estimations
of allowing for regional differences over both disaggregated and aggregated
class types. Again such analysis might allow for, at least partial, explanation
of the above differences.
5.4.8. Inter-Regional Results
The basis for estimation for both aggregated and disaggregated inter-regional
functions is equivalent to that upon which the previous aggregated and
disaggregated estimations were derived except that:
- The sample size is reduced to regional pairings; and
- an alternative dummy variable (DOC) is introduced to account
for structural change.
As indicated from the previous analysis in Chapter Four there are apparent
differences in the levels of socio-economic, criminal, and demographical
variables across Scottish regions To determine whether these differences alter
initial results, procedures similar to those used for aggregate regional
functions are adopted. Namely testing the hypothesis that pooled regional
co-efficients, in this case for each given regional grouping, are the same.
F-tests (using the F-statistic given at Table B1) were undertaken for all
combinations of alternative groupings of two, three and four regions. Only in
the case of specific two region groups was the hypothesis of pooled
co-efficients not rejected, i.e. the hypothesis was rejected for some or all of
the other grouping over all eight regions. These paired groups are: Northern
and Dumfries; Grampian and Tayside; Lothian and Strathclyde; and Fife and
Central.
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Although the initial hypothesis of equality of all pooled co-efficients was not
rejected for these pairings, in light of previous results the following
(alternative) dummy variable was introduced into each function:
Structural Dummy (DOX). To account for a potential change in the level of
endogenous variables over each regional pairing after 1975 a single dummy is
introduced with a value of zero for the reference region over 1970-1974 and
one over 1975-1978.
Not surprisingly (given the above) the hypothesis of equality of all paired
regional co-efficients using this dummy was not rejected either. The resultant
'dummy combinations' across models one to three for both aggregated and
disaggregated classes are given at Table B10.
Compared to previous estimations the results obtained from these model
types, across both aggregated and disaggregated class types are relatively
poor. To illustrate inter-regional results for the crime rate function are
presented in summary format at Tables B11 to B12. As is apparent from these
tables, in general it is only in the cases of Northern and Dumfries and
Grampian and Tayside that any more than one co-efficient value is significant.
Even in these cases there is little evidence of any deterrent effects - for
example only aggregated results for both these regional groups indicate a
significant deterrent effect for both certainty and the probability of conviction.
Thus interregional function estimates provide little or no evidence consistent
with theoretical expectations. While the degree to which these results reflect
the relatively small sample size of regional pairings (18 for model one, and 16
for models two and three therefore reducing the degrees of freedom to within
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a range of 4 to 12) as opposed to the lack of any deterrent effects on an
individual regional basis remains unclear, the inferences which may be drawn
concerning inter- regional as compared to aggregated effects are obviously
severely limited.
5.5. Final Conclusions
In the light of the (above) lack of evidence of specific regional differences it is
only possible to compare and comment upon aggregated and disaggregated
results for the eight regions namely Scotland as a whole. Unfortunately as
indicated in the introduction to this Chapter direct comparisons are not
possible. Model structures differ; aggregated offence estimates include the
proportion of violent offences as an explanatory variable, disaggregated
models do not; aggregated offence functions include DRX as an instrumental
variable Class II models do not; and finally Class II models also exclude
estimation of any recording effect.
Of course, these differences may be indicative in themselves of potential
variations in the motivation of offenders or practices used to deal with crimes
over the classes analysed, and as such indirect comparisons (for example,
differences in apparent positive and negative severity effects over Class II and
III crimes respectively) are therefore constructive. Thus by function, broad
trends, comparisons across models, and conclusions concerning results are
reviewed below. Due emphasis is given to the broad set of model types
analysed and therefore unreported results, since while they provide less
evidence consistent with initial expectations, they do illustrate the context in
which reported results were chosen and therefore the confidence which may
be placed upon their validity.
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5.5.1. Crime Rate Function
Three broad trends emerge across the classes:
(i) Statistically significant and consistent results, obtained
using Class III crimes, regional dummy explanatory
variables and excluding a recording effect (as for example
Table One results)
(ii) Statistically significant but inconsistent results; obtained (in
the majority of cases) using aggregated classes, regional
dummies, and without inclusion of both recording effect
variables. Inconsistency occurs in all cases because
sentence rates are significant but positively related to
offences; and
(iii) statistically insignificant though consistent results; obtained
over the majority of Class II models, and in the case of
both aggregated and Class III models when a recording
effect is present. Results are insignificant because either
deterrent, or control variable co-efficients are not
significant.
It is necessary to comment upon (ii) and (iii) as they contradict theoretical
prediction, and therefore undermine the validity of (i). In the case of (ii) it is
generally aggregate sentence rate co-efficients which are inconsistent; Class
III rates tend to be negatively related to offence rates, and Class II rate co¬
efficients while generally positive also tend to be insignificant. Various
explanations arise: sentence rates are incorrectly specified; aggrigations bias;
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and predominant positive severity effects. To assess the likelihood of the
latter effect it is necessary to examine any evidence of the former effects
through alternative specifications and inter-regional analysis.
Various lags were introduced into initial models, including static extrapolative,
distributed and adaptive expectational structures. Over all deterrent variables
(namely detection, certainty of punishment, and sentence length) resultant
estimations were generally insignificant. Moreover where co-efficient values
were significant, the directional value of lagged variables did not differ from
initial estimations.4 So while it may be argued as in Chapter Four that present,
as opposed to past punishment levels, are the appropriate reference index for
potential offenders, over aggregate estimations a positive severity effect still
predominates. Further, as already indicated above, inter-regional results
provide no contradictory evidence to this conclusion.
In the case of (iii), it is clear that when introduced the recording effect reduces
the significance of other variables. Since police per capita, and where
introduced the proportion of violent offences, are both statistically significant
for aggregation and Class III functions inclusion of a recording effect appears
valid, but concurrently the role of recorded deterrence is reduced - changes in
expected punishment may be a result not a cause of changes in recorded
offence levels.
5.5.2. Certainty Rate Function
As in the case of the crime rate function, estimations differ according to crime
class. For both aggregate and Class III crimes, co-efficient values are broadly
consistent and statistically significant, while for Class II values results are
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generally insignificant (excepting offence rates). While it is unclear from
inter-regional analysis whether these differences are a result of varying
regional practices or structural change, in light of crime rate function results,
and also the different directional values of population density co-efficients
across aggregate certainty function results (positive) compared to Class III
results (negative) it may be concluded that variations across crime classes (i.e.
motivation and general C.J.S. policies) provide an explanation. In short, Class II
functions may be incorrectly specified.
5.5.3. Expenditure Rate Function
Two broad trends are apparent:
(i) Over disaggragated classes, with regional explanatory
dummies and excluding recording effects, control variables
(population density and rateable income) are consistently
and significantly related to expenditure BUT no other
variables are significant; and
(ii) In the case of all other model structures results are similar
to (ii) EXCEPT that the probability of capture is generally
significant but negatively related to expenditure.
There is therefore no clear differentiation across classes: all results are
relatively poor. Lagged offence rates do not appear to be a determinant of
expenditure levels, and the probability of capture where significant is
inconsistent. As stated previously, in contrast to crime rate function results,
these estimations are unlikely to be due to a predominant recording effect.
Thus given no apparent differences between regions expenditure levels appear
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to be set without reference to either the efficiency of the resources used or
the output derived from these resources.
5.5.4. SENTENCE RATE FUNCTION
Across ail classes there is no evidence of a prison utilization capacity
constraint upon sentence rates. So while the relation between sentences and
offence rates coincides (not surprisingly) with crime rate results - limited
evidence of a positive severity effect on aggregate; a negative severity effect
for Class III crimes; and no relation in the case of class II results, initial
predictions concerning the influence of prison utilization appear unfounded.
In light of the above it is concluded that although there appears to be limited
evidence of deterrence (albeit not at optimum levels) in the case of the crime
rate and certainty functions, the potential influence of recording practices and
positive severity effects, the apparent differences across classes (and possibly
regions) as well as the lack of supporting evidence over the expenditure and
severity functions does (or should) not allow any firm policy conclusions to be
drawn from the estimates outlined. Policy conclusions that is from the
context of the theoretical predictions of the basic economic section has model
outlined in Chapter One. It remains, as recommend in the next chapter, to
determine whether policy conclusions may be drawn from alternative model




The purpose of Chapter Six is to p ovide a brief overview of the main
conclusions of the study and recommendations for further work.
6.1. The main conclusions of this study are as follows:
1. Previous theoretical models of the Criminal Justice System
have been constrained by the assumption that punishment
is a price; predicting the efficient allocation of criminal
justice resources does not necessarily depend on
acceptance of this assumption (Chapter One);
2. Punishment is believed to fulfil other roles apart from
deterrence; incorporation of these other roles into the
economic model does not allow the determination of 'the
optimum' allocation of Criminal Justice resources. (Chapter
Two);
3. The economic theory of crime and punishment does not
provide an adequate basis for empirical specification of the
Criminal Justice System; economic specification of the
Criminal Justice System; economic analysis of such
systems is therefore limited to, at best, short term
(marginal) policy recommendations (Chapter Three);
4. In addition, differences in class practices, local government
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reorganisation, and apparent regional variations may all
specifically affect the modelling and analysis of the
Scottish Criminal Justice System over 1970 to 1978
(Chapter Four); and
5. The models estimated, and the results obtained, are
inconclusive; no policy conclusions should be drawn about
actual Scottish system practices.
6.2. Recommendations
Given the above conclusions, the following recommendations for future work
in this area are suggested:
1. the (further) development of theoretical models which
assume that punishment is not a deterrent. The testing
and comparison of the resultant predictions against both
economic models and actual practices to determine the
relevance of the economic theory.
2. Given the above, the further review and analysis of the
Scottish Criminal Justice to determine if the apparent
inconclusive estimations obtained are a result of incorrect:
theoretical foundations; transformations and/or
specification.
NOTES
Chapter One - Notes
1. G.B. VOLD (1958); while this definition describes deterrence
in general, there are, however, numerous specific
definitional categories, for example: "particularised
deterrence": takes place when a sanction for a particular
type of offence deters that particular type of offence only;
'generalised deterrence': takes place when a sanction for a
particular type of offence deters a variety of offences,
including the intended type of offence; 'selective
deterrence': takes place when a sanction for a particular
type of offence deters offences other than the intended
type of offence". D BEYLEVELD (1978).
2. e.g.: "the crime of providing pornography has no easily
discernible victim; certainly the purchasers do not generally
see themselves in this way. If there are victims they are
presumably the public at large and, the Festival of Light
notwithstanding, the detriment to each individual member
of the public is normally insufficient to stimulate much
concern"; J.R. SHACKLETON (1978)
3. i.e.
Jjjii = Ui(Yi - f) - Ui(Yi) < 0
-p Ui (Yi - f) < O
4. S.R. ZALBA; and: "crime (prohibited by criminal code) is the
outward manifestation or sign of some disorder in the
personality and character ..." J.R. REES both quoted in
P. WARE (1979)
5. "It is the consistency with experience of the implied
expectations from the maximizing rational behavioural
postulate that is the test of the power of economics as a
social scientific discipline when employed for the analysis
of criminal activity by aggregates of individuals"
S. ROTTENBERG (1973)
6. e.g. "So called 'short-cuts' to crime control .... may be
regarded as a very unambitious approach to the problem.
They only attempt to reduce the opportunities and
temptations to crime instead of tackling its fundamental
causes. But this is an economic study, and in the present
state of knowledge, measures which alter opportunities and
temptations possibly offer the simplest surest and least
expensive methods of control"; R.L. CARTER (1974).V "The
sentencing system may simply not be capable of
compensating for the social ills of the wider society";
Presidents Commission (1967)
7. "Economic view concentrates on the perceived costs and
benefits of the decision to commit an offence for the
individual (and their probabilities) whereas criminoiogy view
takes these for granted and focuses attention on
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socio-demographic factors determining the weights which
the individual attaches to the consequences of his actions
and the way their costs and benefits are perceived"
R.A. CARR-HILL & N. STERN (1979)
8. "Understanding is gained either by our finding an
illuminating analogy to the phenomena whose character we
do not understand, or by exposing a hidden mechanism the
workings of which inevitably result in the phenomena that
received explanation" R. HARRE in M. BLAUG (1980)
9. EHRLICH postulates that:
Xa = W + Wj(+;) + W, (+ - +j) - F, (+j)
("ia)
Xb = W + W; (+J + W, (+ - +;)
(iiib)
where:
+ = fixed time budget
W = Wealth not dependant on labour
W| = Wealth from crime
W, = Wealth from legal activity
Fj = Value of fine
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; maximizing expected utility:
= p U' (Xa)(Xa)' + (I - p)U'(Xb)(Xb)' = 0
(iv)
and given W, = W;' (+i) etc, then
Wi - Wl _ -pU'(Xa)
W! = WT - Fi ~ (I-p)U (Xb)
(V)




Wi - Wl > - pU'(Xa)
Wi - Wi - fi (1-p) U'(Xb)
but given at +f = o, Xa = Xb, then (v) may be reformulated:
Wj - W, > pfi
(Va)
; i.e. crimes only take place if the marginal benefit from
offending is greater than the expected cost of punishment.
10. i.e. assuming that p is positive and the utility of wealth is
an increasing function of wealth so that U'(Xa) and U'(Xb)
are also positive, then only increases in p unequivocally
increase the value of:




Wi - Wc - f,
unchanged, so reducing the likelihood that (Va) holds for
values of +i>0. Increases in fi, Wi and Wc all change the
values of (Vb) and (Vc). For example given p, over all
values of +i, an increase in fi reduces Xa from X° to Xa1
and leaves Xb unchanged. Depending on whether an
offender is risk averse (i.e. U'fXg1) > U'(Xa0)) or risk
preferring (i.e. U'(Xa1) < U'(Xa0)) the value of (Vb) will rise
or fall. For a risk averse offenders utility of wealth function
U(X) is concave, U" (X) < 0, for values x if:
U'(Xa1) ^ U'(Xao)
U'lXb ) > U'jXb )
; whereas a risk preferring utility of wealth function is






so since rises in fi do not affect Xb, then U'(Xa°) > U'(Xa°)
a) < U'(X°) is equivalent to (viii). In both cases, given an
increase in fi, the value of (Vc) falls. Thus risk avoiders
would therefore offend less, but it is uncertain in the case
of risk preferrers what would occur (since the values of Vb
and Vc both fall). For changes in W| and W-) no predictions
are possible. If W, rises (falls) Xa and Xb increase
(decrease). If W; falls (rises) Xa and Xb decreases
(increase). The changes in (Vb) are indeterminate. For
example given a fall in Wj, for risk avoiders:
is equivalent to (vii), and U'(X





so it is unclear if (vii) still holds. Changes in (vie) are still
however clearcut. Assuming that (some) wealth is derived
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from labour (legal and, or illegal) the value of (vie) falls
(rises) respectively. But given the indetermancy of (Vb) no
overall directional changes arise.
11. i.e. given
Op < O , Of < O
(5a)
dividing (8) by Of yields:
D' + C' + bpO of + bpf = 0
(xia)
and dividing (9) by Op:
D' + C' + Cp ip + bpO op + bpf = O
(xiia)
, and given, by definition,:
ef = o . Of
(xiiia)
and
ep = § • Op
(xiiib)
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then (8) and (9) may be reformulated as (8a) and (9a)
12. An alternative interpretation is the analogy between (8a)
and (9a) and a monopolists maximum profit condition. For
monopoly profits are maximised where:
MC = MR = p(1 + )
(xiv)
, for society losses are minimized where:
MC = MR = -p(1 - ^p)
(xv)
the differences being that 'price' or 'average revenue' bpf is
negative and split in two. Accordingly ef and ep are
inelastic at the 'optimum' reversing the usual profit
maximising condition of elastic demand.
13. i.e. recasting (8a) and (9a)
bpf
ef =




D'+ C'+ Cp ip + bpf
158
(xiib)
; and since all the terms of the expression for ef are
positive
- see (2b) and (3) it follows that:
0 < ef < 1
(xvi)




; so given (8a) and (9a) and that:
D' + C' > D' + C' + Cp 1/Op
(xviii)
; then
- bpf (1 - ) > -bpf (1 -ip )
(xix)
; and therefore a necessary condition for social cost
minimization is that:
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1 > ep > ef > 0
(10)
However this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition;





14. i.e. from (6b) the percentage change in expected utility
from an increase in p is:
" tjr1 • or (Ui (Yi) - Ui (Yi - f)) . ^
(xxia)
; and from f is:
" IF ■ Ui =(PUi' (Yi - f)) ■ Si
(xxib)
hence if:




Ui (Yi) - Ui (Yi-f) 6; > pUi' (Yi-f) {j,
and therefore:
Ui (Yi) - Ui (Yi-f) > f Ui' (Yi-f)
15. i.e. since f Ui' (Yi - f) meassures the difference in utility
between the gradient of Ui (Yi-f) at U (Yi), and U (Yi) - Ui
(Yi-f), for (11) to hold Ui' (Yi) > Ui' (Yi-f) and hence Ui" >
0.
16. Although not I. EHRLICH. From (7) a percentage change in
expected utility from an increase in p is:
|EU/9ti







and from f is:
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9EU/3ti f - n f(h—^ EU P EU
(xxv)
so if:
p (1 - X) (w; - Wt) - f > -pf
(xxvi)
then X >1, i.e. U'(xb) > U'(xa) and therefore U" (x) > 0 ; all
offenders are "risk preferers" at the optimum.
17. Unlike (11) where comparative differences in utility are
measured at a given level of utility Ui (Yi), (11a) measures
differences at Ui (Yp + G) - left hand side - and Ui (Yp) -
right hand side. Consequently no direct comparisons
between Ui' (Yp-f) and Ui' (Yp - G) are possible; for some
values of G, Ui' (Yp- f) > U'i (Yp - G) whereas for other
values, Ui' (Yp - f) < Ui' (Yp - G) for the same utility of
wealth function. Furthermore given decreasing absolute
risk aversion as wealth increases, higher actual levels of
present income and wealth imply that as G rises, offences
will also rise. Hence the more likely that the inequality
(11a) will be reversed at higher given levels of present
income, wealth and potential gains.
18. i.e. where b - 0, the original optimal conditions (8,9)
became:
Lf = Of (D' + C') = 0
Lp = Op (D' + C) + Cp
; since it is assumed that Of is strictly negative for all f>0,
then (D' + C') must equal zero for (xic) to hold. But if this
is the case, for (xiic) to hold, p has to be reduced, and
hence apprehension costs (since Cp > O).
19. i.e. if:
R = f (f, 0 )
where:
Rf , R„ 0
then condition (8b) becomes:






given Rf > o, then (xviii) holds only at some finite level of f.
20. This term covers: "those consequences which follow from
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a sentence but are not formally part of it and are not
specified in the sentence as pronounced". J.P. MARTIN &
D. WEBSTER (1971). If statutory punishment (fp) does not
equal actual perceived punishment (fa), given
zr-i ci *i
represents all the (opportunity) costs consequent on
conviction, including fp then:
fp = f(fa) where fp = b,fa
fa = f(I"=i CjXj) where fa = ^=1 CjXj
so
fa = fp + IP=2 CjXj
(xxix)
and
fp = b^fp + l^2 CjXj)
(xxx)
so
fp = t - bl (X i=2Ci xi)
(xxa)
and assuming o < ^ < 1 (i.e. fp is some proportion of fa)
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then fp is increased by 1 /I—bi — statutary punishment
ALONE undermeasures the actual value of perceived
punishment.
21. i.e. beyond the 'optimum' level of f, Lf > o i.e.
(D' + C') Of + bp 3^ > 0
(xxxi)
so given either
(D' + C') 0f < 0
(xxxii)
for (xxi) to hold when b < o then:
9 <OgO <0
(xxxiii)
i.e. where ef > 1, or alternative given ef< 1 so (xxiii) is
positive then for (xvii) to hold:
D'Of > C'Of + bp 9(0f)/9f
(xxxiv)
i.e. where D' < o. Finally there may be no optimum - ef >
1 or D' < o are not sufficient conditions for (xxi) to hold.
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22. i.e. the maximum level of f that an apprehended offender
(a) will confess at being obtained by solving:
Ua (Vp - f) = P2Ua (Yp - f) + (1 - p2) Ua (Yp)
for f.
23. e.g. if the complementary effect predominates:






Lfao - D'a + C'a = -blPafao(l4fa )
(xxxvii)
Lfa| = D'a + C'a + [C]' = -blPafa,(1- ifa )
(xxxviii)
given
D'a + C'a + [C'] > D^ + C'a
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(xxxix)
at any given level of 0a
fal > fao
(xxxx)
However since all offences CANNOT be complements for
each other this effect will not predominate over all offence
levels.
24. Given:
[A] = (Da + Ca + b,pafa)
(xxxxi)
for fc the complementary effect is
[A] $rtr Oaf >0
(xxxxii)
and the substitution effect is
(S) • -j& - icf < o
(xxxxi ii)
But for substitute offences given no complements only
substitute effects occur i.e.
[a] is? • if. ♦ [ci is? • «, < o






26. This assumed that the legal prohibition of "victimless
crimes" is itself a welfare increasing policy; as noted
previously some disagree with this view.
27. "Economic theory .... assumes the dominance of pure
economic interests and precludes the operation of political
or other non-economic interests". M. WEBER quoted in
F. MALCHUP (1978).
Two - Notes
1. This assumes punishment is necessary. But if everyone
shared the utilitarian goal of maximum social utility no
crime would occur: everyone would benefit by the
avoidance of the 'deadweight' social loss of crime.
However economic theory presumes that individual utility
maximization predominates. Maximizing social utility would
have to be adopted as an ethical code: "if we put a
sizeable 0 ['cost of conscience'] into the utility function of
all individuals then violations of the laws will become rare";
G. TULLOCK (1971)
2. "There is no sense in talking about a 'just deterrent' or a
'just crime'. We demand of a crime not whether it is just
but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider
what the criminal deserves and consider only what will
cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him
from the sphere of justice altogether". C.S. LEWIS quoted
in M.K. HARRIS (1974)
3. i.e. the reduction in future offences and therefore the
reduction in future social costs that result.
4. J.E. HALL-WILLIAMS (1982) concluded that of recent
surveys of the British prison population: "Estimates vary
from IO per cent of the population to as high as one
quarter or one third of all prisoners either possessing a
mental history or showing signs of mental disorder or
mental handicap". Furthermore as R.A. FERNANDEZ (1969)
noted for heroin users involved in crime to sustain their
needs the prospect of punishment ceases to be a
deterrent: the use of heroin (or other opium derivates)
leads to metabolic dependence. Society would 'waste'
resources in attempting to control 'heroin related crimes'
via deterrence since they result from the actions of
'irrational' and hence undeterrable addicts.
5. i.e. "punishment does not serve or else serves quite
secondarily in correcting the culpable or in intimidating
possible followers. From this point of view its efficiency is
justly doubtful and in any case mediocre. Its true function
is to maintain social cohesion intact while maintaining all
its vitality in the common conscience". E. DURKHIEM
quoted in A.G. SALEM & W.J. BOWERS (1970)
6. "To the extent that a criminal sanction for a particular
individual is extended or otherwise made more harsh for
the purpose of deterrence, justice is no longer being done
to the individual". M.K. HARRIS (1974)
7. Y.D. LOHMAN (1967); also: "if deviant behaviour is adaptive
in some socio-economic circumstances, according to the
logic implied in the discussion, then we may modify these
contexts, and thereby make the deviance maladaptive".
I. BERG (1969)
8. "To a certain extent of course correctional measures - by
arresting criminals - do diminish the total amount of
criminal behaviour, but this by far is not the only factor.
Correctional intervention into the life of the offender is
only a remedial measure. Some factors are responsible for
the criminal behaviour in the first place. Increases and
decreases in criminality in a given society are thus to a
large extent independent of the quality of correctional
measures". P.P. LEJINS (1978)
9. Retribution is likely to be a constraint rather than a single
goal of any C.J.S.'s policy since: "When the problem is to
find the best system of penalty fixing there is no doubt
that a purely retributive theory would have serious
weaknesses both practically, because it may be very
difficult to decide which crimes are the more serious and
thus deserving of severer punishment and morally because
if deterrent and reformatory considerations are altogether
ignored when the list of penalties is drawn up a great
social good might be sacrificed to achieve a small
improvement in the accuracy of a punishment from the
retributive standpoint" K.G. ARMSTRONG (1961)
10. The following theoretical model is based on J.R. HARRIS'
article: "On the Economics of Law and Order" (Journal of
Political Economy, 1970) and G. TULLOCK'S book: 'The
Logic of the Law" (1971)
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11. This assumes that - bpf and " bPf 1 " 1P remain the
same in both cases
12. The degree to which all offenders 'should' be protected is
given by = 0. Thus either:
Cot- = ~RPr '
(xxxxvi)
the marginal cost of increasing a should equal the
marginal benefit derived. Or, if Oa > 0 (if an increase in a
reduces the likelihood of the guilty being punished and
hence reduces the expected punishment for the guilty),
then
(D' + C' + R' + bpf) Oa = - (Ca, + Rprfe
(xxxxvii)
the marginal cost of increasing a , as reflected by the
increase in costs from increased offences, should be
equated with the marginal benefits, as reflected by the
excess of
- Rpr -1^ over - Ca.
13. These conditions are derived from:




D'l +2 + C'i+2 > D'1+2 + C'1+2 + Cpiop1 + Cp2 Op2
then at the optimum
-
. 1 - Ifi = - bp2f2 ■ 1 ~lf2 = " bpTf 1 1 p2
(xxxxix)
then:
PI _ f2 _ (1 -1/£f2) ^ P2f2 (1- 1/£p2) _
" ~ ~ " > plfl • (t~- 1 /£ p 1) ~ 1P2 ~ rr ~ it - i/bfi)
(L)
therefore p-| > p2, which implies fj > f2.
15. The following theoretical model is adapted from
K.L. AVIOS's article: "Recedivism in the Economic Model of
Crime". (Economic Inquiry, 1975)
Three - Notes
1. There are various alternative identification restrictions
which, contingent on such data being made available, could
be used - police deployment strategies not known to the
public; (apprehension probability); judicial rules relating to
evidence and time delays (conviction probability); and
release programs and sentence rules (sentence length)
2. However, as stated in chapter one if the time allocated to
legal and illegal activity is introduced explicitly into the
utility function then: "no comparative static results are
forthcoming under traditional preference restrictions. This
is true because increasing the relative return to an activity
will cause a wealth as well as a substitution effect" A.D.
WITTE, (1980); i.e. it is necessary to assume the 'normality'
(or wealth independence) of illegal activity.
3. For example in empirical models based on economic theory
alone, the % of non-whites in the population is often used
as a measureable proxy of 'opportunity cost'. Non-whites
tend to be discriminated against in the legal labour market
and therefore have low wages and high unemployment
rates relative to the rest of the population. This would
indicate that they have a low opportunity cost of crime.
However, other theoretical models predict that the % of
non-whites is a proxy not of 'opportunity cost' but of
'tastes' or 'attitudes'. For example 'confict theory': "the
greater heterogeneity in a society be it cultural, ethnic,
racial or religious can weaken the overall commitment to
conformity through the existence of competing normative
systems which may be at odds with the official
institutionalized standards. As the members of society
respond to behavioural codes of different subcultures there
will be a larger variance in actual behaviour and more
chance of deviance". A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN &
D. NAGIN,(1977). Or, alternatively, 'labelling theory': "the
tendency to favour white over black, educated over
uneducated, comes as little surprise to those who contend:
... that the least powerful among us are the most likely to
be 'criminalized', inasmuch as the least powerful are also
more likely to be observed, arrested and prosecuted".
T.G. CHIRICOS, P.D. JACKSON & G.P. WALDO, (1972). Thus
should the % of non -whites be regarded as an
'opportunity cost' or 'taste' variable? And should any
negative association between this variable and the offence
rate be interpreted as a result of differences in 'opportunity
costs' or 'tastes' or both?
4. The following control measures come from a review of
empirical models used by: K.L. AVIO (1979); P.W. BEATON
(1974); T. BORGSTROM & R.P. GOODMAN (1973);
T. BORCHERDING & R.T. DEACON (1972); W.J. BOWERS &
G.L PIERCE (1975); R.A. CARR-HILL & N. STERN (1979);
J.I. CHAPMAN, W.Z. HIRSH & S. SONENBLUM (1975);
T.G. CHIORICOS, P.D. JAKSON & G.P. WALDO (1972); C.T.
CLOTFELTOR (1977); L.E. COHEN (1981); S. DANZIGER 8<
D. WHEELER (1975); I. EHRLICH (1973); B.E. FORST (1976);
E.T. FUJII & J. MAK (1980); M.J. GREENWOOD &
W.J. WADYCKI (1973); B.J. HILTON (1981); D. KENNETT
(1979); L.R. McPHETER 8. W.B. STRONGE (1974);
R. MANSFIELD, J.L. NANENWIRTH & L.C. GOULD (1974);
V.K. MATHUR (1978); D. NAGIN (1981); T. ORSAGH (1973),
(1981); J. PALMER & P. CARLESON (1976); P. PASSEL &
J.B. TAYLOR (1977); L. PHILIPS & W.L. VOTEY (1981);
T.F. POGUE (1975); D.O. POPP & F.D. SEBOLD (1972);
D.J. PYLE (1982); D.L. SJOQUIST (1973); E. SWIMMER (1974);
C.R. TITTLE & A.R. ROWE (1974); N. WALZER (1972);
K.I. WOLPIN (1978); and J.A. YUNKER (1976)
5. i.e. from (xix):
fp + Z[l2
. |0 > gEl.80
0
6. 'micro' refers to studies using unpublished data for specific
offenders within a given region and time period e.g.
R. THALER (1977): property crime Rochester, New York 1972
and A.D. WITHE (1980): past release activities of a random
sample of 641 male ex prisoners North Carolina 1969-1971.
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7. For exmaple D. NAGIN (1978):
given
Ca = actual crime rate
Cp = potential crime rate
X = expected number of crimes committed in period +
p = probability of aprehension and imprisonment per crime
s = sentence length
and
Cp = f (Ca)
(Lii)
where
Cp = Ca + Xps CA
(Liia)
then









ep = fr^ Xps)2 • Cp
(Liva)
ef = fr£ XpS)2 ■
(Livb)
so given (Liib):
ep = ef = crimps)
(Lv)
; by comparing estimates of ep and ef from (Lv) with
original values of e*p and e*f the 'isolated deterrent'
effects are:
1 - and 1 -
(Lvi)
since e*p and e*f measure deterrence and incapacitation
their residuals (Lvi) measure deterrence.
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8. For example the specific case of 'football hooliganism': "As
the scale of control increases, that is, as magistrates
become more ready to sentence offenders and police
become more willing to act (knowing they will obtain
convictions) then by definition there develops an 'objective'
demonstration of the scale of the problem. That is, more
and more soccer hooligans appear in the criminal statistics
and the need for further control is emphasized"; I. TAYLOR
(1972)
9. On the grounds that (1): "it is possible for an increased
size of police force to produce more recorded crimes";
R.A. CARR-HILL & N.H. STERN (1977) and (2): "the number
and behaviour and conspicuousness of the forces of social
control do play a role in determining the perceived
probability of apprehension which is in addition to any
effect through the actual probability"; R.A. CARR-HILL &
N.H. STERN (1979), where the perceived probability is a
determinant of the number of crimes reported by victims
10. This assumes:
Oa = f(p(c)






-|°I = |gr 9p + |0r INDETERMINATE
given these relationships and
Os < x Oa = Or
whereas at
Oa > x Oa = Or













and (59) holds where:
1 > im > 0
(Lx)
and in all cases (58a) holds where
IS - 1
(Lxi)
11. Evidence of recording effects is provided by various
studies, for example: R. THALER (1977) reported a positive
and significant relationship between police density and
recorded crimes; and E.T. FUJII & J. MAK (1980) recorded a
positive and significant relationship between police per
capita and reported offences
12. i.e. as F.M. FISCHER & D. NAGIN (1978) note increased
clearance rates which appear to reduce offence rates may
be due to increases in such practices as reduced recording
and increased plea bargaining (which given the implications
derived in chapter one leads to lower sentences)
13. I. EHRLICH & J.C. GIBBENS (1977) argue that a priori there
should be no such indirect effects if increases in certainty
are 'warrented'. An inverse relationship between certainty
and severity will only be caused by an: "increase in the
perceived social cost of punishment" or "unwarrented
external interference". However if there is a trade-off
between certainty and severity deterrent policies may be
counterproductive. As D.C. BALDUS & J.W.L. COLE (1975)
note, in I. EHRLICH'S (1973) empirical murder supply model
if a 'percent increase in execution risk produces more than
a .175 per cent fall in the conviction rate there is a net
increase in homocide
14. Furthermore given sufficient data incorporation of this
relationship not only helps to isolate the deterrent effect
but also provides a basis for policy conclusions regarding
the role of prison capacity in determining sentence length.
Couple this with estimates of the relevant deterrent effects
of different prison systems and the foundation is provided
for the efficient allocation of resources within the penal
system
182
Chapter Four - notes
1. Who has to decide: "whether an offence has been
committed in law. If there is a sufficient evidence in law
to prove it. The police do a good job but they are not
lawyers, and you have got to know the legal requirements"
quote from a procurator fiscal in S.R. MOODY & J. TOMBS
(1982)
2. Since the sample period, 1970-78, includes the
reorganisation of police authorities on the 16th May from
twenty old into eight new regions, all data priorto 1975
(unless stated otherwise) is aggregated as shown inthe
table below.
OLD POLICE AUTHORITIES 1970-1974 AND EQUIVALENT
NEW POLICE AUTHORITIES 1975-1978
1970-74 1975-78
STIRLING AND CLACKMANNAN CENTRAL
DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY
FIFE FIFE
CITY OF ABERDEEN, SCOTTISH NORTH
EASTERN COUNTIES
GRAMPIAN
BERWICK ROXBURGH AND SELKIRK, CITY OF
EDINBURGH, AND LOTHIAN AND PEEBLES
LOTHIAN AND BORDERS
INVERNESS, NORTHERN, ROSS AND CROMERTY NORTHERN
ARGYLL, AYRSHIRE, CITY OF GLASGOW,
DUMBARTON, LANARK, RENFREW AND BUTE
STRATHCLYDE
ANGUS, CITY OF DUNDEE, PERTH AND KINROSS TAYSIDE
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SOURCE: SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS NUMBER SIX (1976)
3. However if it is assumed that clear-up rates remained
constant over 1974-75 the difference between the rate, of
change of recorded crimes and crimes cleared up would
indicate the percentage increase in recorded crimes 'due'
to the introduction of unsolvable cases in 1975. Hence
'the' increases in unsolvable cases for 02, 03, and 023
respectively would be: Dumfries and Galloway - 8%, 22%;
19%; Fife 0%, 3%, 2%; Northern -; 8%, 3%; Strathclyde
36%, 16%, 25%; and Tayside 10%, 11%, 10%.
4. Alternative proxies for 'potential gains' include estate duty
returns and rateable property values. However in the
former case the regional division is assessed according to
where the estate is dealt with, which depends upon the
domicile of the deceased and not upon where the property
is situated. While in the latter case, rateable values are not
necessarily in direct relation to the 'value' of the goods
which may be potentially stolen (an extreme example being
non-nuclear power stations).
5. For example, according to the Scottish Office data the
1970 Grampian June unemployment rate was 3.0 per cent.
According to the Department of Employment Gazette the
June rate for Aberdeen (excluding the temporarily
unemployed) was 2.4 per cent, and the annual average rate
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2.89 per cent. The percentage difference between the
Aberdeen June and annual average is 20.42 per cent so the
Grampian June rate was adjusted upwards by 3 x 1.2041 to
3.61
6. For example:
NET TOTAL INCOME FIFE =
[N.T.I.P.A; Edinburgh Borders and Tayside x E: Fife]
E: Fife, Lothian Borders and Tayside
N.T.I.P.A. = Net Total Income per Planning Area
E. = Total Employed per Police Authority
(Department of Employment Gazette,
Employees in Employment plus
unemployed for local areas adjusted
downwards by annual average
unemployment rate)
7. In Central the average annual level declined by 5% from
£522.82 to £497.28
8. However over 1976-78 Fife's relative position changed: by
1978 Fife's average income level was the lowest in
Scotland
9. The above average rise in Dumfries resulted from an
increase in police employed set against a population
decline whereas in Fife police employment levels remained
stable but population levels increased
10. For Tayside Ov declined throughout 1970-75
11. While such incorporations are rejected within the context
of the study they are not rejected as a basis for future
research - see Chapter Six
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Chapter Five - Notes
1. A priori this assumes equality of all regression co¬
efficients over 1970-74. Unfortunately lack of degrees of
freedom, given the sample size per region of five, prevents
the direct testing of the equality of co-efficients over this
period
2. For example in comparison to Model A results, the
following estimations were obtained for comparable model
structures including recording effects:
Model One (B)
L023 = 0.16C + 0.07 LPI - 0.43 LP3 + 0.71 LS + LPPC
(0.1) (0.62) (-5.22)** (+429)[**] (+5.8)**




L023 = -1.80C - 0.11 - 0.52 LP3 + 0.54LS + 0.77 LPPC
(-0.97) (-1.01) (-5.31)** (+3.43)[**] (3.18)**
+ 0.37 LOV + 0.32 LIN + 0.27 LU
(2.66)** (3.37)** (5.38)**
R2 = 0.95
Model Three (C| LPUG
L023 = - 1.41 - 0.12 LPI - 0.52 LP3 + 0.41 LS + 0.83 LPPC
(0.77) (-1.09) (-5.28)** (2.25)[*J (3.13)**
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+ 0.39 LOV + 0.30 LIN + 0.26 LU
(2.76)** (2.98)** (5.20)**
R2 = 0.95
Model Three (C) LPUR
L02.3 = -2.88C -0.14 LPI -0.51 LP3 +0.72 LS +0.63 LPPC
(-1.36) (-1.24) (-5.14)** (3.21 )[**] (2.24)*
R2 = 0.94
As is apparent therefore while both police per capita (LPPC)
and the proportion of violent offences (LOV) are both
positively and significantly related to offence levels
throughout (ranging from + 0.63 to 1.00 and + 0.25 to +
0.39 respectively) the probability of certainty is not
significant and sentence rate estimates indicate a positive
severity effect. On this basis therefore, as indicated in the
final coinclusions of Chapter Five, when introduced,
recording effects appear to predominate over any assumed
deterrent influence of probable punishment.
3. As is the case when including a recording effect; the
following estimates were obtaiuned for comparable model
structures to these at Table 2 except with inclusion of a
recording effect:
Model One (G)
L03 = +1.52C +0.28LP13 -0.61LP33 -0.20LS3 +1.44LPPC +0.19LIN
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+0.27LU
(0.68) (1.47) (-3.19)** (-0.44) (5.18)** (1.55)* (4.55)**
R2 = 0.88
Mode] Two (F)
L03 = -0.99C -0.009LP13 -0.67LP33 +1.09LPPC +0.24LIN +0.20LU
(-0.45) (-0.06) (-3.47)** (-0.27) (3.82)** (2.23)* (4.02)**
R2 = 0.91
Model Three (F) LPUG
L03 = +1.12C +0.25LP13 -1.09LP33 +1.03L53 +1.35LPPC +0.21LIN
+0.27LU
(0.38) (1.09) (-2.70)** (0.96) (3.61)* (3.86)**
R2 = 0.85
Model Three (F| LPUR
L03 = -0.91C +0.07LP13 -0.31LP33 -1.11L53 +1.12LPPC +0.20LIN
+0.18LU
(-0.39) (0.45) (-0.49) (0.63) (3.68)** (1.50)* (2.84)**
R2 = 0.84
4. Accordingly these results are redundant and therefore to
avoid undue repetition are not reported
APPENDIX A
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TABLE 1A: MEAN ANNUAL RECORDED CRIMES CLASS II (02) CLASS III (03)
AND CLASS II AND CLASS III (023) PER 1000 CAPITA PER
POLICE AREA 1970-1978
POLICE AUTHORITY PER 1000 CAPITA PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1970-78
02 03 023 02 03 023
CENTRAL 12 16 28 +36 +50 +44
DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY 5 13 18 +120 +59 +74
FIFE 9 12 21 +10 +40 +27
GRAMPIAN 8 17 25 +29 +54 +45
LOTHIANS AND BORDERS 16 24 40 +69 +63 +66
NORTHERN 6 13 18 -16 +23 +8
STRATHCLYDE 24 19 43 +72 +63 +67
TAYSIDE 15 19 34 -6 +42 +19
SOURCES: HER MAJESTYS CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY FOR SCOTLAND
ANNUAL REPORTS AND REGISTRAR GENERAL SCOTLAND ANNUAL REPORTS
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TABLE 2A: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN OR: 1974-75 COMPARED
TO ANNUAL AVERAGE CHANGES 1970-74 AND 1975-78
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 1970-74 1974-75 1975-78
02 03 023 02 03 023 02 03 023
CENTRAL +8 +6 +5 +5 +2 +3 +6 +7 +6
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY +11 O +3 +24 +18 +25 +7 +11 +9
FIFE +5 +7 +8 +11 0 +1 -3 +3 +1
GRAMPIAN -1 +5 +3 +24 +12 +7 +3 +4 +7
LOTHIANS & BORDERS +4 +4 +4 +13 +14 +13 +8 +9 +8
NORTHERN -7 +3 O +11 +15 +13 +300
STRATHCLYDE +2 +2 +4 +42 +16 +30 +5 +7 +6
TAYSIDE -4 +2 O +15 +22 +17 +2 +3 +2
192
TABLE 3A: MEAN ANNUAL CLEAR-UP RATE CLASS II (PI 2) CLASS III (P13)
AND CLASS II AND CLASS III (P123) CRIMES PER POLICE AREA 1970-1978
POLICE AUTHORITY CLEAR-UP RATE PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1970-78
P12 P13 P123 P12 P13 P123
CENTRAL 0.33 0.45 0.42 -16 -7 -10
DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY 0.42 0.50 0.50 -32 -18 -23
FIFE 0.43 0.55 0.49 -32 -4 -14
GRAMPIAN 0.29 0.44 0.40 -22 -4 -7
LOTHIANS & BORDERS 0.22 0.41 0.34 -34 -12 -18
NORTHERN 0.40 0.56 0.48 +7 +15 +16
STRATHCLYDE 0.21 0.40 0.30 -35 -23 -28
TAYSIDE 0.23 0.41 0.34 -20 -12 -7
SOURCE: HER MAJESTYS CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY FOR
SCOTLAND ANNUAL REPORTS
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TABLE 4A: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN RECORDED CRIMES. CRIMES
CLEARED-UP AND THE CLEAR-UP RATE 1974-75
POLICE AUTHORITY RECORDED CRIMES
02 03 023
CENTRAL 968
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 24 25 25
FIFE 2 0 1
GRAMPIAN 21 12 6
LOTHIANS & BORDERS 8 13 11
NORTHERN 18 17 17
STRATHCLYDE 45 20 32























SOURCE: AS TABLE 4
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TABLE 5A: CLASSIFIED DEFINITIONS CLASS II AND III CRIMES 1970-78















Theft by opening lock¬
fast places
Housebreaking with







20-1 Flying aircraft to
danger of property














Theft of motor vehicle
22 RESET











27 OTHER CRIMES AGAINST
PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLENCE
26-1 By Officials
26-2 Not by Officials






27-4 Stamp Act 1841
27-5 Public Stores Act 1875
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SOURCE: SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT: CRIMINAL STATISTICS
SCOTLAND 1977 (1978)
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TABLE 6A: MEAN ANNUAL CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR DETENTION RATES
CLASS II (P 22) CLASS III (P23) AND CLASS II AND III (P223) PER
POLICE AREA 1970-78.
POLICE AUTHORITY CONVICTION RATE PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1970-78
P22 P23 P223 P22 P23 P223
CENTRAL 0.24 0.11 0.15 21 -2 -1
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 0.24 0.11 0.14 21 -8 -2
FIFE 0.24 0.12 0.16 24 -6 O
GRAMPIAN 0.25 0.12 0.15 26 -7 1
LOTHIANS & BORDERS 0.25 0.11 0.15 21 -4 0
NORTHERN 0.25 0.12 0.15 14 -9 -10
STRATHCLYDE 0.25 0.11 0.16 21 -2 4
TAYSIDE 0.24 0.11 0.15 21 -3 0
SOURCE: AS TABLE 4
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TABLE 7A: MEAN ANNUAL AVERAGE SENTENCE LENGTHS CLASS ll(S2) CLASS III
(S3) AND CLASS II AND III CRIMES (S23) PER POLICE AREA 1970-78
POLICE AUTHORITY MEAN SENTENCE LENGTH PERCENTAGE CHANGE
(YEARS)
S2 S3 S23 S2 S3 S23
CENTRAL 0.52 0.32 0.41 2 -6 -5
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 0.52 0.33 0.40 2 -6 -3
FIFE 0.48 0.34 0.41 12 -6 3
GRAMPIAN 0.54 0.34 0.42 19 -11 2
LOTHIANS & BORDERS 0.55 0.32 0.42 1 -9 -5
NORTHERN 0.58 0.33 0.44 -20 -11 -20
STRATHCLYDE 0.58 0.32 0.45 4 -10 -2
TAYSIDE 0.51 0.32 0.41 4 -9 -5
SOURCE: SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT: CRIMINAL STATISTICS
SCOTLAND.
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TABLE 8A: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN F: 1974-75 COMPARED TO AVERAGE
CHANGES 1970-74 AND 1975-78
POLICE AUTHORITY 1970-74 1974-75 1975-78
S2 S3 S23 S2 S3 S23 S2 S3 S23
CENTRAL 2 O -3 25 3 15 -20 -6 -15
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 2 -3 0 33 O 13 -23 -3-14
FIFE 26 0 13 0 3 0 -9 -9 -9
GRAMPIAN 10 -3 2 23 0 12 -14 -9 -10
LOTHIANS & BORDERS 4-3 O 22 0 12 -21 -6 -13
NORTHERN 36 -6 9 -15 6 -8 -31 -11 -20
STRATHCLYDE 16 -3 7 17 O 11 -24 -9 -18
TAYSIDE 12 O 2 0 0 0 -7 -9 -7
SOURCE: AS TABLE 7A
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SOURCE: SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS






























































SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT GAZETTES, SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF
STATISTICS 1976, AND THE SCOTTISH ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1978
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TABLE 11A: NEW POLICE AUTHORITIES. EQUIVALENT OLD SCOTTISH
COUNTIES AND PLANNING REGIONS 1970-1975
NEW POLICE EQUIVALENT PLANNING EQUIVALENT ADJUSTMENTS
AUTHORITY OLD COUNTIES REGION OLD COUNTIES

















































































TAYSIDE ANGUS, DUNDEE, TAYSIDE
PERTH,
AND KINROSS
AS ABOVE Adjusted to
exclude Fife
SOURCE: SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS
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TABLE 12A: AVERAGE ANNUAL NET REAL INCOME




DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 466
FIFE 472
GRAMPIAN 466














SOURCES: SURVEY OF PERSONAL INCOMES, SCOTTISH ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS,
AND CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS
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TABLE 16A: POLICE PER THOUSAND CAPITA PER POLICE AREA 1970-1978
POLICE AVERAGE PERCENT- AVERAGE PERCENT- AVERAGE PERCENT-
AUTHORITY 1970-74 AGE 1974-78 AGE 1970-78 AGE
CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
CENTRAL 1.69 7 1.75 -1 1.72 .8
DUMFRIES & 1.69 7 1.94 20 1.82 27
GALLOWAY
FIFE 1.88 2 1.83 -1 1.86 1
GRAMPIAN 1.68 9 1.84 7 1.77 16
LOTHIANS & 2.22 11 2.49 9 2.36 20
BORDERS
NORTHERN 2.05 13 2.37 2 2.15 15
STRATHCLYDE 2.29 14 2.55 8 2.42 22
TAYSIDE 2.10 10 2.23 4 2.17 14
SOURCE: HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY FOR
SCOTLANDS ANNUAL REPORTS
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TABLE 17A: THE PROPORTION OF CLASS II CRIMES RECORDED TO THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF CLASS II AND III CRIMES RECORDED
PER POLICE AREA
AVERAGE LEVEL OF OV % CHANGE % CHANGE % CHANGE








































SOURCE: AS TABLE 16A
TABLE 13A: ANNUAL PER CAPITA REAL POLICE EXPENDITURE
£ PER POLICE AREA 1970-78
AVERAGE LEVEL OF % CHANGE % CHANGE
1970-78 1970-74 1974-78
CENTRAL 5.64 22 5
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 5.63 20 25
FIFE 5.79 17 2
GRAMPIAN 5.85 26 13
LOTHIAN 7.68 32 8
NORTHERN 7.34 36 6
STRATHCLYDE 8.55 31 9
TAYSIDE 7.35 27 18
SOURCE: HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY FOR
SCOTLANDS ANUUAL REPORTS
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TABLE 14A: AVERAGE ANNUAL POPULATION
PER ACRE PER POLICE AUTHORITY 1970-78
POLICE AUTHORITY AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1970-78 1970-78
CENTRAL 0.40 +8
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY 0.09 +1
FIFE 1.04 +5
GRAMPIAN 0.20 +11




SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTRAR GENERAL FOR SCOTLAND
PART II POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS
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TABLE 15A: TOTAL ANNUAL PER CAPITA REAL RATE INCOME
EXPENDITURE PER POLICE AREA 1970-1978
1970-1974 1974-78 ANNUAL AVERAGE
% % ( )
CENTRAL +24 +2 100.0
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY +14.5 +1 88.5
FIFE +24.5 -6 91
GRAMPIAN +21 +4 94
LOTHIAN +23 +10 94.5
NORTHERN +20 +6 115
STRATHCLYDE +33 +4.5 106.5
TAYSIDE +28 O 94
SOURCES: RATING REVIEW: PART FOUR RATE SUPPORT GRANT (1969/70-
1973/74); RATING REVIEW: PART TWO RATING SERVICES
(1974-75); AND RATES AND RATEABLE VALUES (1975-76-
1978/9) C.I.P.F.A.
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TABLE 17A: THE PROPORTION OF CLASS II CRIMES RECORDED TO THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF CLASS II AND III CRIMES RECORDED
PER POLICE AREA
AVERAGE LEVEL OF OV % CHANGE % CHANGE % CHi
1970-1978 1970-74 1974-75 1975
CENTRAL 0.42 -7 2 0
DUMFRIES &
GALLOWAY 0.29 +28 0 -3
FIFE 0.44 -4 0 -9
GRAMPIAN 0.32 -17 7 0
LOTHIAN 0.40 + 3 -2 0
NORTHERN 0.30 -28 0.4 8
STRATHCLYDE 0.54 -4 8 -2
TAYSIDE 0. 34 -13 -5 -5
SOURCE: AS TABLE 13A
210
TABLE 18A: PRISONS. YOUNG OFFENDERS INSTITUTIONS.
BORSTALS. AND DETENTION CENTRES DESIGNATED TO HOLD












































SOURCE: 'PRISONS IN SCOTLAND' ANNUAL REPORTS. SCOTTISH
HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT.
TABLE 19A: THE GENERAL PRISON UTILIZATION RATION FOR SERIOUS


















+ 8 -17 -7.5
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
PRISON PLACES
+ 5 + 32.5 +15
SOURCE: AS TABLE 18A.
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TABLE 20A: PRISONS. YOUNG OFFENDERS INSTITUTIONS.BORSTALS,
AND DETENTION CENTRES. DESIGNED TO HOLD OFFENDERS ON REMAND













































SOURCE: AS TABLE 20A
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SOURCE: AS TABLE 18A.
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TABLE B1: CO-VARIANCE ANALYSIS AGGREGATE FUNCTIONS
WITHOUT DUMMY VARIABLES
To test the equality of all the regression co-efficients the appropriate statistic
is (see A.C. HARVEY 1981):
F = [(CT - e)/n (G - 1)]
[e -(T - nG)]
; which has an F distribution with (nG -n, T -nG) degrees of freedom, and:
CT = Residual sum of squares of pooled data with no
dummies (O.L.S. estimates).
e = Sum of the residual sum of squares for each region.
n = Number of regression parameters for function.
G = Number of regions.
T = Total number of observations.
The results obtained from initial analysis of the hypothesis of the equality of




























1. Crime Rate Function without recording effects excludes
police personnel per capita per region and the proportion















































































































NOTES:WHEREAFU CTIONISNOREGRESSED(SLASTCOLUMOTABLE)CO-EFFICIENTVALUESWILLNECESSARILY BEEQUALTOANOTH RMODELTYP .FOREXAM L ,MOD LTWB,CERTAINTYANDEXPENDI UREFUN TIONS,IS EQUIVALENTTOMODELTWC.THEENDOGENO SA DEXOGENOUSVARIABLESINCLUDINGTHSEOFDUMMIESR ANDDRXA EEQUALFOBOTHFUNCTIONS.
r\j t—* vO
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TABLE B4: Co-Variance Analysis Class II














£ CTDR F Fng-n,T_ng,0.0: Hypothesis
0.2687 5.5333 11.19 2.481 Rejected
0.0779 5.4201 22.25 2.979 Rejected
0.6759 2.3892 3.62 2.28 Rejected
0.0432 0.6037 8.89 2.535 Rejected
0.7086 1.1677 3.12 2.282 Rejected
0.6454 1.3376 2.46 2.282 Rejected
Note
1. Crime rate function with recording effect includes only
police per capita as an explanatory variable.
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TABLE B5:Co-Variance Analysis Class II






























0.2687 0.9553 1.46 2.481 Not rejected
0.0779 0.9169 3/49 2.979 Rejected
0.6759 1.454 1.64 2.28 Not rejected
0.0432 0.1493 1.68 2.535 Not rejected
0.7086 0.8741 0.53 2.282 Not rejected
0.6454 0.9537 1.096 2.282 Not rejected
£ CTDRX F FnG-n,T-ng,0.01
0.2687 4.089 8.12 2.481 Rejected
0.0779 3.777 15.41 2.979 Rejected
0.6759 1.9531 4.56 2.28 Rejected
0.0432 0.3593 5.02 2.535 Rejected
0.7086 0.9343 1.07 2.282 Not rejected
0.6454 0.8968 1.19 2.282 Not rejected
TABLEB6:DUMMYCOMBINATIONSLASSI MODELTHREEFUNCTIONS
TYPEDUMMYVARIABLEPERFUNCTIONFUNCTIONREGRESSED CRIMERATE(LO)CERTA NTY(LP1)EXPENDITURE( )S V Y(LS)LOP1 ADRDR/ BDRDRDRX/
f\) ro uo
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TABLE B7: CLASS II ESTIMATES
MODEL ONE
L02 = -7.62C - 0.42 LP12 - 0.08 LP32 + 0.27 LS + 0.24 LIN + 0.34LU
(-7.33)** (-0.97) (-0.60 ) (0.86) (1.55). (2.19)*
R2 = 0.93
R2 = 0.75
LP13 = -7.41C - 0.75 L02 - 0.25 LEP + 0.55 LpD
(-0.89) (-4.19)** (-1.04) (0.84)
MODEL TWO
L02 = -8.11C - 0.84LP12 - 0.01LP32 + 0.03LS2 + 0.29 LIN + 0.19 LV
(-6.65)** (-2.26)* (-0.05) (0.09) (1.43)* (1.31)*
R2 = 88
Lpl3 = -2.53C - 0.84 L02 - 0.16 LEP + 0.72 LpD
(-0.67) (-4.26)** (-0.33) (0.88)
R2 = 0.70
LEP = 0.23C + 0.02 L02L - 0.16 LP12 + 0.87 LP + 0.70 LpD
(0.19) (0.3) (-1-69) (6.42)** (3.28)**
R2 = 0.90
MODEL THREE (A) LPUG1
L02 = -8.03C - 0.81 LP12 + 0.03 LP32 + 0.12LS2 + 0.30 LIN + 0.23 LU
(-6.68)** (-2.30)* (0.11) (0.32) (1.48)* (1.49)*
R2 = 88
Lpl2 = -2.22C - 0.76 LP12 - 0.21 LOP + 0.66 LpD
(-0.61) (-2.74)** (-0.47) (0.83)
R2 = 0.72
Ltp = -0.92C - 0.13 L02L - 0.41 Lpl2 + 0.83 LR + 0.61 LpD
(-0.45) (-0.75) (-1.53) (4.44)** (1.99)**
R2 = 0.82




1. As model three (a) LpUR and model three (b) LpUG and
LpUR estimates are similar to the above results they are
not repeated.
226
TABLE B8: Co-Variance Analysis
Class III Functions with Dummy Variables













0.2171 0.5317 0.83 2.481 Not rejected



































TYPE A(E) B(F) C(G) D(H)
TABLEB9:DUMMYCOMBINATIONSCL SSII AGGREGATEFUNCTIONS MODELON DUMMYVARIABLEPERFUNCTION CRIMERATE(LO)CE T INTY(LP ) DR DRX DR DRX
DR DR
DRX DRX




TYPE A(D) B(E) C(F)
DUMMYVARIABLEPERFUNCTION
CRIMERAT(LO)CERTAINTY(LPI)EXPENDITURE(L ) DR DRX DRDR DR DRX
DR DR DR
FUNCTIONREGRESSED LOPILE / ✓/ /
MODELTHR E




TABLE BIO: DUMMY COMBINATIONS
INTER-REGIONAL ANALYSIS
MODEL ONE
TYPE DUMMY VARIABLE PER FUNCTION FUNCTION REGRESSED
CRIME RATE (LO) CERTAINTY (LP) LC> LP
A - / /
B - DOX ^ ^
DOX








table bio: dummy combinations
inter-regional analysis
model two
pype dummy variable per function function regressed
crime rate (lo) certainty (lp) expenditure (lep) lo lp lep
a - - - / / /
b - dox / / /
c dox - - / /
d - dox ^
crime rate (lo/lppc) certainty (lp) expenditure (lep)
e - - - / / /
f - dox - / / /
g dox - - / /
h - dox j
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Table bh: dummy combination
inter-regional analysis
model three
type dummy variable per function function regressed
crime rate certainty expenditure severity l0 lp lep ls
(lo) (lp) (lep) (ls)
✓ ✓ ✓ /




crime rate certainty expenditure severity lo lp lep ls
(lo/lppc) (lp) (lep) (ls)
/ / / /




TABLEBll:INTER-REGIONALC IMR TFUNC ION DISAGGREGATEDCRIMELASS S SUMMARYOFMODELNTOHREE RESULTS
VARIABLES LP1LP3LSL P3LSLP31 3SLP3 LINUILININ/LUI (LPPC))(LPPC))(LP C)(L
LP13SP1LP3L LS3 LINUI (LPPC)(LPPC)(LPPC)( )
OTHERS
NO/DU
A13B13 a23b23 A33gB33g A33rB33r
ALL OTHER MODEL TYPES
GR/T
A12B12J
ALL OTHER MODEL TYPES
LB/SR F/ST
ALL MODEL TYPES ALL MODEL TYPES
1LINsignificant
rv> ro
TABLEB12:INTER-REGIONALCRIMERATEFU C ION AGGREGATECRIMESSUM ARYOFMOD LNTH E RESULTS
VARIABLES LP1LP3LSLP1LP3LSLLPILSLP1LP3LP S3 lL 3SLP1L SLP3 S LINULILINUILLIN/LUINLULI
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